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A B S T R A C T 
Thi s t h e s i s examines the r e l a t i o n s h i p s between 
domestic i n f l a t i o n and the balance of payments i n Turkey 
between 1950 and 1965. The period chosen i s i n t e r e s t i n g 
i n t h a t i t encompasses a period of r e l a t i v e l y s t a b l e 
p r i c e s from 1950 to 1954 and then a period of rapid 
i n f l a t i o n . I t i s argued that i n f l a t i o n during the v/hole 
period aggravated balance of payments d i f f i c u l t i e s r a t h e r 
than caused them. Exports of primary commodities, 
e s p e c i a l l y a f t e r 1954 were adversely a f f e c t e d by c l i m a t i c 
c o n d i t i o n s and imports, even w i t h a r a p i d l y depreciating 
currency, were not unduly a f f e c t e d by domestic i n f l a t i o n . 
However, i n f l a t i o n did a f f e c t the borrowing c a p a c i t y of 
the economy; both p r i v a t e foreign and public foreign 
c r e d i t s decreased, aa i n t e r n a l economic s t a b i l i t y was 
requested by donor c o u n t r i e s . 
T h i s s t a b i l i t y was achieved i n 1958. The main 
aspect of the s t a b i l i z a t i o n programme was an expenditure 
reducing p o l i c y through c u t s i n monetary expansion. From 
1958 the economy entered a stagnant phase, suggesting that 
both i n t e r n a l and e x t e r n a l s t a b i l i t y was achieved at the 
expense of economic development. 
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C H A P T E R 1 
INTRODUCTION 
1.1 THE SCOPE OF THE STUDY 
Th i s study w i l l examine the r e l a t i o n s h i p between 
i n f l a t i o n and the Balance of Payments i n Turkey during 
the period 1950-65. The period studied has l a r g e l y been 
d i c t a t e d by the a v a i l a b i l i t y of the data. I n addition to 
t h i s , the period chosen covers one i n f l a t i o n a r y phase and 
one s t a b l e phase, providing a comparison between them. 
Th i s study i s w r i t t e n a g a i n s t a background of two 
contemporary c o n t r o v e r s i e s . The f i r s t i s the Keynesian -
Monetarist debate which has two as p e c t s ; one concerns the 
demand f o r money and the other r e l a t e s to the s t a b i l i t y 
of investment and monetary m u l t i p l i e r s . The i n t e r e s t 
e l a s t i c i t y of the demand f o r money and the long run trend 
of income v e l o c i t y a r e the main i s s u e s of t h i s controversy. 
The second controversy, concerning developing c o u n t r i e s , 
r e l e v a n t to t h i s study i s known as the Monetarist-
S t r u c t u r a l i s t debate, developed by a n\imber of L a t i n 
American economists. Although the i s s u e s are l e s s c l e a r , 
two main arguments can be drawn from the debate; the f i r s t 
i s whether i n f l a t i o n a f f e c t s economic growth i n a p o s i t i v e 
manner and the second i s whether monetary expansion should 
be a t t r i b u t e d to s u b s t a n t i a l government d e f i c i t s and easy 
c r e d i t p o l i c i e s , stemming mainly from a g r i c u l t u r a l and 
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import and export b o t t l e n e c k s . I t seems that there i s an 
agreement- that without monetary expansion, i n f l a t i o n can 
not be s u s t a i n e d . As f o r the causes of i n f l a t i o n , 
s t r u c t u r a l i s t s contend t h a t monetary expansion i s a r e s u l t 
of i r r e s i s t i b l e p ressure i n the process of economic growth, 
and i n f l a t i o n can not be curbed through monetary p o l i c y 
without provoking unemployment ;b.r stagnation of growth 
because of supply :i" r i g i d i t i es. Yet, i t has been argued 
t h a t some c o u n t r i e s managed at times to c o n t r o l i n f l a t i o n 
d e s p i t e the b o t t l e n e c k s . Thus i t i s d i f f i c u l t to construct 
a g e n e r a l model on the b a s i s of the s t i n i c t u r a l i s t argument 
s i n c e b ottlenecks and i n e l a s t i c i t i e s have d i f f e r e n t 
i n t e n s i t i e s i n d i f f e r e n t c o u n t r i e s . Moreover, the 
proponents of the s t r u c t u r a l i s t view have not offered any 
p o l i c y d e aling w i t h i n f l a t i o n ; a p o l i c y that meets the 
requirements of economic development a t the same time. As 
de s c r i b e d by F e l i x : 
". .. the s t r u c t u r a l i s t s a r e c r i t i c s without as yet 
power and r e s p o n s i b i l i t y to make and implement 
po l i c y " 2 
1. See f o r the S t r u c t u r a l i s t - M o n e t a r i s t views 
- J . GRUNWALD. "The S t r u c t u r a l i s t School on P r i c e S t a b i l i z a -
t i o n and Economic Development: the C h i l e a n Case". I n 
L a t i n American I s s u e s edited by A. 0. HIRSCHMAN. (The 
Twentieth Century Fund, New York, 1961). 
D. SEERS. "A Theory of I n f l a t i o n and Growth i n Under-
developed Economies Based on the Experience of L a t i n 
America" Oxford Economic Papers March 1966. 
2. D. FELIX. "An A l t e r n a t i v e view of the M o n e t a r i s t - S t r u c t u r a l i s t 
Controversy" i n L a t i n American I s s u e s , edited by A.O. HIRSCHMAN. 
(The Twentieth Century Fund, New York, 1961). 
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The post war Monetarist view (developed by the 
Chicago School) i s s a i d to be more s u i t a b l e f o r economies 
without h i g h l y developed f i n a n c i a l s t r u c t u r e s than the 
Keynesian view based on i n t e r e s t r a t e s mechanisms. 
Regarding the f i n a n c i a l s t r u c t u r e of Turkey t h i s idea 
can be supported. However, one aspect of the Monetarist 
view, i n general, i s har d l y acceptablef'from the point of 
developing c o u n t r i e s as i t does not o f f e r any income 
determination model. However, i t i s a f a c t that money 
i n the f i n a n c i a l s t r u c t u r e of Turkey has a very important 
p l a c e and accounts f o r a very l a r g e share of f i n a n c i a l 
a s s e t s . Therefore, i t may be suggested t h a t changes i n 
the stock of money a f f e c t expenditures. But i t should be 
pointed out t h a t the r a t e of i n t e r e s t i n Turkey i s f i x e d 
by the a u t h o r i t i e s and i s o l a t e d from market f o r c e s . There-
fore, i t can not be argued t h a t the r a t e of i n t e r e s t i s 
e f f e c t i v e as much as i t i s i n developed c o u n t r i e s as 
t h e r e i s no p o s s i b i l i t y of a s s e s s i n g the r e a l e f f e c t of 
i n t e r e s t r a t e s on expenditures. I n t h i s case, i t may be 
suggested t h a t t here may be elements of both ideas i n the 
T u r k i s h c a s e . 
I n t h i s study i n f l a t i o n i s defined as a sustained 
r i s i n g l e v e l of p r i c e s . T h i s d e f i n i t i o n provides us wi t h 
the a n a l y s i s of the e f f e c t s of money income and p r i c e s on 
the balance of payments. However, t h i s d e f i n i t i o n i nvolves 
a d i f f i c u l t y t h a t not a l l p r i c e r i n c r e a s e s are i n f l a t i o n a r y 
i n the sense t h a t they a r e not c o n t r i b u t i n g to the i n f l a -
t i o n a r y process. I n t h i s case, the problem, suggests 
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H.G. Johnson7 
". . . i s not a s c i e n t i f i c question but a p o l i t i c a l 
c[uestion determined by p u b l i c opinion; and public 
opinion v a c i l l a t e s on the i s s u e " . 
Under the co n d i t i o n s of Turkey, a r a t e of i n f l a t i o n 
exceeding 5% per annum may be regarded as an e x c e s s i v e 
i n f l a t i o n f o r the 1950-65 period. I n the 1950-53 period 
p r i c e s rose only 5% per annum on average and then jumped 
i n 1954 t o 13% and reached a 17% i n c r e a s e per annum between 
1954 and 59. (See Table 1.2). 
The concept of the (balance of payments i s a vague 
one, but i s g e n e r a l l y defined as a systematic record of 
a l l economic t r a n s a c t i o n s between the r e s i d e n t s of a 
country and f o r e i g n r e s i d e n t s f o r any s p e c i f i e d period. 
Surpluses and d e f i c i t s can be defined i n terms of accommo-
dating and autonomous t r a n s a c t i o n s . I n t h i s respect, 
f o r a developing country, autonomous t r a n s a c t i o n s are 
wide l y dominated by exports and imports. However, i n 
order to. take the i n v i s i b l e items int o account, the d e f i c i t 
can be defined i n terms of the r e s u l t of current account. 
T h i s study c o n s i s t s of two p a r t s . Part one develops 
a number of t h e o r e t i c a l ideas concerned with Balance of 
Payments adjustment mechanisms. I n p a r t i c u l a r a d i s t i n c -
t i o n i s made between a C l a s s i c a l adjustment mechanism 
r e l y i n g on r e l a t i v e p r i c e adjustments and a Keynesian 
adjustment mechanism r e l y i n g on aggregate expenditure 
H.G. JOHNSON " I n f l a t i o n : A Monetarist' View" i n F u r t h e r 
E s s a y s i n Monetary Economics edited by H.G. Johnson,(Allen 
and Unwin Ltd., 1972,) p.326. 
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adjustments. I n both ca s e s the r o l e of i n f l a t i o n i n 
these adjustment mechanisms i s examined. Part two 
attempts to apply these and other ideas to the Turkish 
economy from 1950 to 1965. 
However, before examining these i s s u e s i n more 
d e t a i l , some general comments are introduced on the r o l e 
of i n f l a t i o n i n economic developmentand a general review 
of the balance of payments and i n f l a t i o n between 1950 and 
196 5 i n Turkey i s presented. I t i s against t h i s background 
t h a t a more d e t a i l e d examination of cause and e f f e c t can 
be conducted. 
1.2 INFLATION AS A TOOL OF ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT 
The problem of economic development has received much 
a t t e n t i o n i n economic theory. I n t e n s i v e study of economic 
development has produced a long l i s t of f a c t o r s a f f e c t i n g 
the development process. F o r a long time, n a t u r a l resources 
were regarded as the p r i n c i p a l f a c t o r of economic develop-
ment.' L a t e r on, c a p i t a l accumulation came to be considered 
as t he most important f a c t o r i n development. Although 
r e s e a r c h and education a r e being emphasized rec e n t l y , 
c a p i t a l accumulation i s s t i l l an important aspect of the 
4 
economic development process. 
C a p i t a l accumulation n a t u r a l l y involved investment 
See f o r example the r o l e of c a p i t a l accumulation i n : 
W. ELKAN. "An I n t r o d u c t i o n t o Development Economics", 
Penguin, Books Ltd., 1973, pp.19-20. 
G. MEIER. Leading I s s u e s i n Development Economics (2nd ed.) 
Oxford U n i v e r s i t y Press, 1971. 
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expenditures. I f a high r a t e of growth i s to be achieved 
the r e q u i r e d funds f o r investments have to be obtained. 
I n t h i s context, i n f l a t i o n i s regarded by some economists 
as a way of fi n a n c i n g investments. A mild degree of 
i n f l a t i o n t r a n s f e r s income from the s o c i a l c l a s s e s w ith the 
low propensity to i n v e s t to the entrepreneurs; and by 
r a i s i n g the nominal r a t e of retur n on investments with 
r e s p e c t to the r a t e of i n t e r e s t induces investment 
expenditures.^ 
These two Keynesian propositions r e s t on the assump-
t i o n t h a t w h i l e entrepreneurs a r e r e a l i z i n g i n f l a t i o n , the 
other c l a s s e s a r e not. However i n the faces of p e r s i s t e n t 
i n f l a t i o n the other c l a s s e s can come to a n t i c i p a t e i n f l a -
t i o n and r a i s e the p r i c e s of s e r v i c e s , so that no s i g n i f i -
cant d i s t r i b u t i o n of income w i l l take place.^ As f a r as 
the r a t e of i n t e r e s t i s concerned, the t h e o r e t i c a l expec-
t a t i o n i s that the f r e e market r a t e of i n t e r e s t w i l l r i s e 
e i t h e r because the a d d i t i o n a l money can only be obtained 
from the balances kept f o r s p e c u l a t i v e purposes a t a higher 
r a t e of i n t e r e s t than i t was before,^ or, the r a t e of 
i n t e r e s t w i l l r i s e s u f f i c i e n t l y to compensate holders of 
5. N.K. ALOOR. "Economic Growth and the Problem of I n f l a t i o n " 
Economica, Vol.2fe, No.13, pp.212-226. 
6. H.G. JOHNSON. " I s I n f l a t i o n the I n e v i t a b l e P r i c e of Rapid 
Development or a Retarding F a c t o r i n Economic Growth", 
The Malayan Economic Review, Vol. XI, No.l, A p r i l 1966, pp.21-28. 
7. J . BALL. I n f l a t i o n and the Theory of Money. (George A l l e n 
and Unwin, London 1964) p.65. 
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i n t e r e s t y i e l d i n g a s s e t s f o r the expected r a t e of i n f l a -
t i o n . Nevertheless, i n f l a t i o n can be s u c c e s s f u l a t the 
e a r l y stage of development process, before the other 
c l a s s e s r e a l i z e the i n c r e a s i n g r a t e of i n f l a t i o n . Even 
i f a l l p r i c e s have r i s e n i n the f u r t h e r stages of an 
i n f l a t i o n a r y process, the c o s t s of entrepreneurs can be 
reduced by keeping the r a t e of i n t e r e s t and wages a t a 
low l e v e l - I n the ca s e of Turkey between 1950-65 i t can 
be observed t h a t both i n t e r e s t r a t e s and wages remained 
a t a low l e v e l . A l l r a t e s of i n t e r e s t were reduced i n 
1950 and were not changed over the whole period studied. 
As f o r wages, wage labour i n Turkey c o n s t i t u t e s a small 
proportion of the t o t a l working population, and both i n 
and ou t s i d e the a g r i c u l t u r a l s e c t o r a lar g e portion of 
t o t a l output i s produced by s e l f employed persons. Thus 
t h e i r incomes depend on the p r i c e s of commodities, not 
t h e i r wages. On the other hand there i s no i n d i c a t i o n 
t h a t t h e i n c r e a s e s i n money wages were great e r than the 
10 
i n c r e a s e s i n p r i c e s . The main reason for t h i s concerns 
8. H.G. JOHNSON, OP. c i t . . p.286. 
9. Y. AKYUZ. "Money and I n f l a t i o n i n Turkey, 1950-68". (The 
F a c u l t y of P o l i t i c a l Sciences, Ankara U n i v e r s i t y , 1970) 
p.7. 
10. D. SAGLAM. "Ttirkeye'de Karau I k t i s a d i Tegebbtlsleri" (The 
S t a t e Economic E n t e r p r i s e s i n Turkey). (The F a c u l t y of 
P o l i t i c a l Sciences, Ankara U n i v e r s i t y , 1967) pp.166-67. 
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i n s t i t u t i o n a l f a c t o r s . U n t i l 1963 the fundamental means 
of a c h i e v i n g higher wages, the r i g h t to s t r i k e , had not 
been granted to the working c l a s s . I n t h i s respect, i t 
may be argued t h a t the two p r e - r e q u i s i t e w i t h i n the Keynesian 
framework were f u l f i l l e d . 
Another suggestion based on the r e d i s t r i b u t i v e e f f e c t 
of i n f l a t i o n i s t h a t i n f l a t i o n t r a n s f e r s income not from 
workers as savers to the entrepreneurs, but from the 
holde r s of money balances t o those r e s p o n s i b l e f o r 
i n f l a t i o n a r y p o l i c y . The b a s i c p o s t u l a t e i s that there 
i s a s t a b l e demand function f o r money; i n order to main-
t a i n d e s i r e d l e v e l of cash balances i n the face of 
i n f l a t i o n the p u b l i c must accumulate money balances. 
T h i s accumulation of money balances i s achieved a t the 
c o s t of reducing the consumption of r e a l income. Thus 
i n f l a t i o n c o n s t i t u t e s a tax on r e a l balances; i n turn 
becomes revenue to the b e n e f i c i a r i e s of the i n f l a t i o n a r y 
i n c r e a s e i n the money supply. 
T h i s a n a l y s i s of i n f l a t i o n as a f a c t of economic 
development r e l a t e s to purely domestic c o n s i d e r a t i o n s . 
Even i n t h i s case, i n f l a t i o n becomes harmful to the 
development process. I t induces s p e c u l a t i v e a c t i o n s and 
even reduces savings. Because their r e a l value f a l l s i n 
the f a c e of i n f l a t i o n and savers can a l l o c a t e savings to 
consumption. U n c e r t a i n t i e s and i n s t a b i l i t y c r e a t e d by 
9 
11 i n f l a t i o n prevents long term investments, because: 
" F i r s t , the long g e s t a t i o n period involved increases 
the r i s k i n an environment of unstable p r i c e s and 
r i s i n g c o s t s . I n f a c t , the longer the planning 
horizon, the gr e a t e r the budgetary and f i n a n c i a l 
d i f f i c u l t i e s due to i n s t a b i l i t y of c o s t s and the 
r i s k of changes i n o v e r a l l supply and demand con-
d i t i o n s " . 12 
I f the e f f e c t s of i n f l a t i o n on the balance of pay-
ments a r e taken i n t o account the disadvantages of i n f l a -
t i o n as a t o o l of development i n c r e a s e : a t the beginning 
of the development process a t l e a s t , the dependence of 
investments on imports i s w e l l known. I n t h i s respect 
the balance of payments c o n s t i t u t e s a c o n s t r a i n t on 
economic development. I t i s g e n e r a l l y agreed t h a t i n f l a t i o n 
always leads t o a d e f i c i t i n the balance of payments and 
aggravates the e x i s t i n g one.''""^  
"But whatever the causes, i n f l a t i o n has i i n v a r i a b l y 
\.:0 had immediate e f f e c t s i n i n t e n s i f y i n g import demand 
or reducing exportable s u p p l i e s ; and where a general 
i n f l a t i o n of p r i c e s and c o s t s has ensued, increased 
imports have a l s o been induced by the changing p r i c e 
r e l a t i o n s h i p between imports and domestic goods, while 
exports have been depressed by t h e i r uncompetitive 
p r i c e s and reduced p r o f i t a b i l i t y " . ^ ^ 
As i s suggested i n the quotation, i n f l a t i o n a f f e c t s 
t h e balance of payments through income and p r i c e e f f e c t s . 
I n c r e a s e s i n money income can absorb the export goods of 
11. See f o r the d i s t u r b i n g e f f e c t of i n f l a t i o n , E.M. BERNSTEIN 
and I.G. PATEL " I n f l a t i o n i n R e l a t i o n to Economic Develop-
ment". IMF S t a f f Papers. Nov. 1952, pp.363-98. 
12. R.O. CAMPOS. " I n f l a t i o n and Balanced Growth", i n Economic 
Development For L a t i n America. Edited by HOWARD ELLIS and 
HENRY C. WALLICH (Macmillan, 1961) pp.94-95. 
13. I f t h e r e i s a d e f i c i t i n the balance of payments because of 
r e a l f a c t o r s , i n f l a t i o n tends to i n c r e a s e t h i s d e f i c i t . 
14. UNITED NATIONS. "World Economic Survey 1956", (United 
Nations, New York) p.102. 
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the economy and put pressure on the balance of payments 
through the import propensity. On the other hand, r i s e s 
i n p r i c e s impair the i n t e r n a t i o n a l competitiveness of 
the economy i n i n t e r n a t i o n a l trade. 
Despite these disadvantages, i n f l a t i o n i s g e n e r a l l y 
r e s o r t e d to as a way of fin a n c i n g investments. 
" I n p r a c t i c a l experience, r e s o r t to i n f l a t i o n a r y 
t a x a t i o n as a method of fin a n c i n g economic development 
i s g e n e r a l l y prompted by the i n a b i l i t y of the develop-
ing country to r a i s e enough revenue by ta x a t i o n and 
by borrowing from the p u b l i c to finance i t s develop-
ment plans - e i t h e r as a r e s u l t of the low income 
and taxable c a p a c i t y of the economy, or more commonly 
as a r e s u l t of i n a b i l i t y to command the necessary 
p o l i t i c a l consensus i n support of the necessary 
s a c r i f i c e s of c u r r e n t income".^5 
Th i s has been the case for Turkey over the l a s t two 
decades. Tax p o l i c y has always been neglected despite 
i n t e n t i o n s t h at an e f f i c i e n t t a x system w i l l be applied. 
Thus incflation can be seen as a p o s s i b l e p o s i t i v e aspect 
of economic development. But, c l e a r l y , i t i s a two-edged 
sword. Mild i n f l a t i o n may s t i m u l a t e e n t r e p r e n e u r i a l 
expectations and lead to an i n c r e a s e i n investment, but 
r a p i d i n f l a t i o n may i n c r e a s e pessimism amongst i n v e s t o r s , 
reducing the r a t e of f i x e d domestic c a p i t a l formation. 
Apart from these i n t e r n a l e f f e c t s , i n f l a t i o n may operate 
through the balance of payments to adversely a f f e c t 
domestic output. 
15. H.G. JOHNSON, OP. c i t . . p.26. 
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1.3 A GENERAL REVIEW OF THE BALANCE OF PAYMENTS AND 
INFLATION IN THE 1950-6 5 PERIOD 
The economic p o l i c y followed by the Turkish Govern-
ment p r i o r to 1950 was based on "orthodox" considerations 
i n t h a t budget p o l i c y was b a s i c a l l y n e u t r a l i n ch a r a c t e r . 
An expansionary p o l i c y was avoided. I n the 1946-50 
period the general l e v e l of p r i c e s rose by only 1.5% 
16 
per annum on average. 
I n 1950 a major p o l i t i c a l change took place and a 
more l i b e r a l p o l i c y was a s s o c i a t e d w i t h i t . The Democrat 
Party came to. power a f t e r the 1950 e l e c t i o n s , taking over 
from the Republican People's Party. The Democrat Party 
Programme was based on f u l l support f o r p r i v a t e e n t e r p r i s e . 
The new government formed by the Democrat Party declared 
t h a t : 
(a) the a g r i c u l t u r a l s e c t o r would be given p r i o r i t y i n 
the development process. 
(b) the p r i v a t e s e c t o r and p r i v a t e foreign c a p i t a l should 
c o n s t i t u t e the b a s i s of the economy 
(c) investment expenditures should be increased and 
financed by the government budget 
(d) economic development must be r e a l i z e d through monetary 
expansion and thus monetary p o l i c y should be the main 
p o l i c y f o r economic development.^^ 
16. For a f u l l account of the 1946-50 period see, Z.Y. HERSHLAG, 
Turkey an Economy i n Transitionyri (Leiden. 1968) and 
S. AREN, "Para ve F i o t l a r 1950-1961" (Money and P r i c e s 
1950-61) The F a c u l t y of P o l i t i c a l Sciences, Ankara, 1963). 
17. S. AREN, OP. c i t . . pp.1-8 
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During the period 1950-60 investments increased 
r a p i d l y . Investment expenditures rose from TL 889.8 m i l l i o n 
i n 1948, to TL 1064 m i l l i o n i n 1950 and to TL 7516.2 
m i l l i o n by 1960 - i n d i c a t i n g a 15% i n c r e a s e per annum on 
average ( i n c u r r e n t p r i c e s ) . Despite the o r i g i n a l i n t e n -
t i o n i n the government programme, the share of the p r i v a t e 
s e c t o r did not i n c r e a s e overwhelmingly i n terms of t o t a l 
investments. The share of the S t a t e Economic E n t e r p r i s e s , 
other than the pub l i c s e c t o r i n v e s t i n g agencies, i n t o t a l 
investments, rose to TL 1399.3 m i l l i o n i n 1960 from 
18 
TL 91.8 m i l l i o n i n 1950. Foreign c a p i t a l did not i n v e s t 
as much as i t had been expected. Although i t rose to 
$3.39 m i l l i o n i n 1959, w h i l e i t was only $.0.11 m i l l i o n 
i n 1950, the annual inflow of forei g n c a p i t a l f l u c t u a t e d 
over the 1950-65 period. The highest inflow was recorded 
i n 1964; $11.8 m i l l i o n . During the 1954-59 i n f l a t i o n a r y 
l9 
period i t f l u c t u a t e d between $3.39 and $2.16 m i l l i o n . 
(Exchange r a t e was TL 2.80 = $1). 
Monetary expansion i n the economy was r a p i d l y achieved. 
The t o t a l volume of c r e d i t s increased continuously between 
19 52-60. I t was TL 3 753 m i l l i o n i n 1952 and rose to 
RL 13110 m i l l i o n i n 1960, which amounted to a 3 5% i n c r e a s e 
18. D. SAGLAM. "Ttirkiye'de Kamu Tegebbilsteri", (Public Enter-
p r i s e s i n Turkey), The F a c u l t y of P o l i t i c a l Sciences, 196 
19. The f i g u r e s were taken from the M i n i s t r y of Commerce. 
1.3 
per annum on average. But i t declined to TL 8713 m i l l i o n 
i n 1961 as a r e s u l t of the 1958 S t a b i l i z a t i o n Programme. 
I n 1963 i t rose again to TL 13 771 m i l l i o n and did not show 
any d e c l i n e i n the f i n a l two years of the period studied. 
The money supply was TL 1145 m i l l i o n i n 1950, and rose to 
TL 5089 m i l l i o n by 196 5,^^ i n d i c a t i n g a 9.7% i n c r e a s e 
per annum. 
An easy c r e d i t p o l i c y and a p r i c e support programme 
were a p p l i e d to the a g r i c u l t u r a l s e c t o r . The a g r i c u l t u r a l 
Bank c r e d i t s increased by 19.0% per annum i n the 1950-60 
period. The p r i c e support programme was financed through 
C e n t r a l Bank c r e d i t s . I n the 1950-60 period C e n t r a l Bank 
c r e d i t s f o r t h i s purpose accounted for 40% of t o t a l C e n t r a l 
21 
Bank c r e d i t s , as i n d i c a t e d by Table 1.1. 
The p u b l i c s e c t o r expenditures increased r a p i d l y . 
T o t a l p u b l i c s e c t o r expenditures were TL 2034 m i l l i o n i n 
19 50; they rose to TL 9049 m i l l i o n by 19 59. Although 
expenditures increased, the government income did not 
r i s e as much as expenditures did. F o r example, the r a t i o 
of taxes t o GNP remained almost the same, 11.5 - 12% i n the 
1950-65 period. The budget d e f i c i t s r a p i d l y increased 
u n t i l 1956, but l a t e r on s t a r t e d f a l l i n g as a r e s u l t of 
the measures taken i n 1956. Thus, the recourse to the 
20. The money supply was c a l c u l a t e d on the b a s i s of the o f f i c i a l 
d e f i n i t i o n of money: commercial demand deposits plus 
currency plus the f r e e r e s e r v e s of the Banks a t C e n t r a l Bank. 
21. The f i g u r e s were computed from the Monthly B u l l e t i n of 
the C e n t r a l Bank, April-May 1972. 
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Table 1.1 The Monev Supply and C e n t r a l Bank C r e d i t s 
1950-1965 
Money C e n t r a l The A g r i c u l - C e n t r a l Bank 
Supply Bank t u r a l C r e d i t s C r e d i t s For 
C r e d i t s P r i c e Support 
1950 
1951 
1952 
19 53 
1954 
1955 
1956 
1957 
1958 
19 59 
1960 
1961 
1962 
1963 
1964 
196 5 
1145 
1392 
1646--
1903 
2078 
2651 
3324 
4079 
4424 
5089 
5574 
6058 
6477 
6925 
806 5 
8906 
1140 
1448 
1862 
2164 
2928 
3 574 
4191 
5157 
5846 
6137 
6389 
642 5 
7092 
8419 
9408 
10074 
412 
637 
1049 
1195 
1475 
1536 
1874 
2095 
2142 
2292 
2392 
1682-
1953 
2408 
2991 
3206 
547 
830 
1005 
1117 
1024 
1423 
1995 
23 78 
2290 
2419 
2482 
2708 
3041 
4005 
3648 
Source: Compiled from The Monthlv B u l l e t i n . The C e n t r a l 
Bank. April-May 1972. 
Notes: 1. Money Supply i s the o f f i c i a l d e f i n i t i o n of 
money. 
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C e n t r a l Bank became a u s u a l way of financing both i n v e s t -
ments and consumption expenditures of the Government. 
Besides the C e n t r a l Government Agencies, the S t a t e 
Economic E n t e r p r i s e s u s u a l l y r e s o r t e d to the C e n t r a l Bank 
to c l o s e th«ir operating d e f i c i t s and finance t h e i r 
investments. T o t a l c r e d i t s from the C e n t r a l Bank to the 
C e n t r a l Government Agencies and the S t a t e Economic Enter-
p r i s e s amounted to TL 3487 m i l l i o n i n 1957, w h i l e i t was 
TL 745 m i l l i o n i n 1950. However i t f e l l sharply i n 1961 
and 1962, to TL 453 m i l l i o n and TL 630 m i l l i o n r e s p e c t i v e l y . 
L a t e r on i t s t a r t e d i n c r e a s i n g again and reached TL 1349 
22 
m i l l i o n i n l l 9 6 6 , a f t e r a d e c l i n e i n 1965. 
Despite the monetary expansion, p r i c e s did not r i s e 
s i g n i f i c a n t l y i n the f i r s t y ears of the period studied due 
mainly to the i n c r e a s e s i n a g r i c u l t u r a l output. This 
i n c r e a s e d by 39% i n the 19 50-53 period, and r e a l income 
rose by 13%. Moreover, Turkey had accumulated a consider-
a b l e amount of exchange reserves during the 1940s and i n 
1947 s t a r t e d r e c e i v i n g Marshall Aid f i n a n c i n g i t s imports. 
I n a d d i t i o n to t h i s the Korean Boom increased the demand 
fo r T u r k i s h exports. Turkey entered 1950 with $126 m i l l i o n 
exchange reserved. S t a r t i n g from 1950 the terms of trade 
turned i n favour of Turkey. However, from 1953 on s t a r t e d 
d e c l i n i n g and i n 1960 turned against and never improved, 
(see Table 1.2). 
22. Computed from the Monthly B u l l e t i n of the C e n t r a l Bank. 
Table 1.2 P r i c e I n d i c e s . Exchange Reserves and the Terms 
of Trade 19 50-1965 
16 
Wholesale Import 
P r i c e P r i c e 
Index Index 
(1) (2) 
19 50 100 100 
1951 106.5 111.4 
1952 107.6 107.6 
1953 109.8 96.2 
1954 121.9 93.7 
1955 130.7 124.3 
1956 152.2 125.3 
1957 181.3 122.8 
1958 208.7 126.5 
1959 249.4 116.4 
1960 262.6 122.8 
1961 270.3 116.4 
1962 285.7 138.0 
1963 297.8 156.4 
1964 295.6 145.4 
1965 321.9 141.6 
Exchange 
Reserves 
i n M i l l i o n $ 
(3) 
126 
98 
6 
69 
2 
-70 
-33 
-58 
15 
-15 
32 
95 
79 
36.2 
50.4 
57.4 
Terms of 
Trade 
1958 = 100 
(4) 
120.3 
130.7 
134.1 
136.8 
131.1 
109.2 
111.1 
111.3 
100.0 
?,98-.9 
83. 5 
104.3 
89.0 
89.0 
88.7 
94.6 
Sources: Column ( 1 ) : M i n i s t r y of Commerce 
Column ( 2 ) : SERIN N. "Kalkinma cu Dig T i c a r e t " , 
(The F a c u l t y of P o l i t i c a l Science, 
Ankara, 1972) p.204. 
Column ( 3 ) : F i g u r e s were obtained personally. 
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During the 1950-6 5 period the share of a g r i c u l t u r e i n 
n a t i o n a l income never f e l l below 30%. Thus i t i s obvious 
t h a t f l u c t u a t i o n s i n a g r i c u l t u r a l production w i l l a f f e c t 
income considerably. A g r i c u l t u r a l production f e l l by 
20% i n 1954 due mainly to bad weather conditions. As 
the monetary expansion was t a k i n g p l a c e very r a p i d l y , the 
decrease i n a g r i c u l t u r a l output disturbed general equilibrium 
i n t he economy and s t a r t e d a s u b s t a n t i a l i n f l a t i o n period. 
The general l e v e l of p r i c e s s t a r t e d r i s i n g s i g n i f i -
c a n t l y from 1954 onwards. The wholesale p r i c e index, with 
1950 as a base year, rose from 121.9 i n 1954 to 249.4 i n 
1959, i n d i c a t i n g a 13% i n c r e a s e per annum on average. 
With the r i s e s i n p r i c e s , the Government attempted to 
t a k e some measures i n 1954^: An o f f i c i a l committee, the 
Banks C r e d i t Regulation Committee, was e s t a b l i s h e d to 
a s s e r t an e f f e c t i v e c o n t r o l on the banks. However, i t 
did not work e f f e c t i v e l y . I n 1955 the C e n t r a l Bank 
discount r a t e was increased from 3% to 4.5%. Yet t h i s was 
not an e f f e c t i v e p o l i c y , f i r s t l y because the C e n t r a l Bank 
23 
was not prepared to accept a l l the b i l l s presented, 
secondly the degree of the l i q u i d i t y of the banking system 
24 
was high and they were meeting a l l c r e d i t demands without 
23. I n 1955 the c r e d i t p o s s i b i l i t i e s of the C e n t r a l Bank were 
widened. The c r e d i t p o s s i b i l i t i e s of the C e n t r a l Bank 
were opened to r e a l and l e g a l persons engaged i n industry 
and mining and the Bank was able to meet the c r e d i t needs 
of s m a l l a r t i s a n s and tradesmen. 
24. S. AREN, OP. c i t . . p.26, 
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going t o the C e n t r a l Bank. The year 1956 was an important 
one. The C e n t r a l Bank discount r a t e was r a i s e d again, 
from 4.5% to 6%. The f i r s t c r e d i t r e s t r i c t i o n was imposed 
by a government decree t h a t bank c r e d i t s were frozen a t 
the maximum l e v e l reached i n three y e a r s p r i o r to 1956. 
But p r i c e s did not stop r i s i n g , and i n the same year the 
National P r o t e c t i o n Law was enacted. The Law authorized 
the government and i t s agencies to impose d i r e c t c o n t r o l s 
on p r i c e s and r e s t r i c t i o n s on p r o f i t margins; the margin 
had not to be g r e a t e r than 5%. The products of the S t a t e 
Economic E n t e r p r i s e s were rationed and t h i s caused black 
25 
market a c t i v i t i e s . Despite the measures, p r i c e s con-
tin u e d r i s i n g . The wholesale p r i c e index rose to 181.3 i n 
1957 from 152.2 i n 1956. I n 1958, i t r e g i s t e r e d 208,7 
point i n c r e a s e . Thus more s t r i c t measures had to be taken. 
26 
I n August 1958, a s t a b i l i z a t i o n programme was declared. 
Bank c r e d i t s were frozen without any r e s e r v a t i o n . The 
pu b l i c s e c t o r was not allowed recourse to the C e n t r a l 
Bank. I n order t o i n c r e a s e the resources of the St a t e 
Economic E n t e r p r i s e s , the p r i c e s of t h e i r products were 
in c r e a s e d . The programme was p r i m a r i l y d i r e c t e d a t stopping 
25. The bl a c k market r a t e was reported to be TL 18 = $1, whereas 
the o f f i c i a l r a t e was TL 2.80. See K. KURDAS, "Kambiyo 
Kuni P o l i t i k a s i ue TUrkiye'nin I k t i s o d i Gelismesi" (Exchange 
r a t e p o l i c y and Economic Department of Turkey). I n Dig 
T i c a r e t and Ekonomik Gelisme (Foreign Trade and Economic 
Development) (The Board of Economic and S o c i a l Studies, 
1968) p.390. 
26. See f o r the S t a b i l i z a t i o n Programme, OECD Economic 
Conditions i n Turkey 1958. p.30. 
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the causes of i n f l a t i o n and was remarkably s u c c e s s f u l 
i n doing t h i s . At the same time the Turkish L i r a was 
devalued from $1 = TL 2.80 to $1 = 9.00 TL. Following 
the a p p l i c a t i o n of the 19 58 s t a b i l i z a t i o n programme the 
economy underwent a stagnation. The r e a l r a t e of growth 
slowed down, from 4.3 5% i n 1959 i t f e l l i n 1960 and 1961 
to 2.38% and 0.57% r e s p e c t i v e l y . The 1950-60 period 
ended w i t h a m i l i t a r y i n t e r v e n t i o n . I n the previous 
paragraph the reason f o r i n f l a t i o n seems to be s t r u c t u r a l 
(or r e a l ) i n i t s nature. However, sometimes the reasons 
f o r i n f l a t i o n , whether they a r e s t r u c t u r a l or monetary, can 
not be d i s t i n g u i s h e d . I n ray b e l i e f , the i n f l a t i o n a r y 
process s t a r t e d w i t h monetary expansion and disturbances 
were caused by p e r s i s t e n t monetary expansion. I n t h i s 
case, I share the monetarist view i n the S t r u c t u r a l i s t -
Monetarist debate. 
With the d e c l a r a t i o n of the 1961 C o n s t i t u t i o n a 
S t a t e Planning Organisation was e s t a b l i s h e d ; thus a 
development plan had to be prepared. A f t e r a t r a n s i t o r y 
programme f o r 1962, the F i r s t FivetiYear Plan was put into 
operation i n 1963. The plan l a i d s t r e s s on f i n a n c i a l 
s t a b i l i t y as a p r e r e q u i s i t e f o r economic development. 
T h i s was r e a l i z e d , a t l e a s t , during the F i r s t Plan period, 
the general - l e v e l of p r i c e s did not r i s e s i g n i f i c a n t l y 
u n t i l 1965. 
Turning now to the balance of payments, the year 1950 
was a t u r n i n g point f o r the Tu r k i s h trade regime. Turkey 
20 
Table 1.3 The V i s i b l e Trade Balance 1950-1968 
( m i l l i o n T u r k i s h L i r a ) 
1950 
1951 
1952 
1953 
1954 
1955 
1956 
1957 
1958 
1959 
1960 
1961 
1962 
1963 
1964 
1965 
Exports 
737.6 
879.4 
1016.2 
1019.0 
93 7.8 
877.4 
854.0 
966.6 
C 692^4 
990.6 
1721.2 
3120.7 
3430.8 
3312.8 
3696.9 
4173.6 
Imports 
799.9 
1125.8 
1556.6 
1491.1 
1339.4 
1393 .4 
1140.6 
1112.0 
882.3 
1316.0 
222p:i7' 
4585.1 
5599.8 
6261.1 
4878.0 
5193.3 
D e f i c i t i n the 
Trade Balance 
- 62.3 
- 246.4 
- 540.4 
- 382.1 
- 401.6 
- 516.0 
- 286.6 
- 145.3 
- 189.9 
- 325.3 
- 492.6 
-1464.5 
-2169.0 
-2903.3 
-1181.1 
-1019.7 
Source: Various Annual B u l l e t i n s of the S t a t e I n s t i t u t e 
of S t a t i s t i c s 
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had become a member of the OECD i n 1948. I n the frame of 
t h i s i n t e r n a t i o n a l cooperation Turkey had to make i t s 
27 
t r a d e regime more l i b e r a l . As e a r l y as November 1949 
the OECD requested i t s members to f r e e a t l e a s t 50% of 
t h e i r imports from q u a n t i t i v e r e s t r i c t i o n s . I n September 
1950, Turkey d e c l a r e d a "Free Import L i s t " by r a i s i n g the 
r a t i o f o r f r e e imports up to 60% and a f u r t h e r 15% i n c r e a s e 
i n the r a t i o was envisaged f o r 1951. However, the l i b e r a -
t i o n p o l i c y d i d not t u r n i n t o a long run p o l i c y due to 
28 
balance of payments d i f f i c u l t i e s . The f i r s t d i f f i c u l -
t i e s were f e l t as e a r l y as 1952. From 1952 onwards mounting 
r e s t r i c t i o n s were imposed on imports. The l i b e r a t i o n 
p o l i c y de f a c t o ended i n September 1952 and de j u r e i n 
A p r i l 1953 (see Table 1.3). 
S t a r t i n g from 1950 imports increased r a p i d l y . I n 
1952 they reached a peak of TL 1556 m i l l i o n , f o r the 1950-
1960 period. However, from then they f e l l continuously 
u n t i l 1959. As imports de c l i n e d the share of imports of 
consumer goods i n the t o t a l f e l l . I t was 24.8% i n 1952, 
and f e l l to 12.2% i n 1957. I n 1965. i t was only 4.4%; 
however, the share of investment goods and raw m a t e r i a l s 
never d e c l i n e d below 77% i n the i s t o t a l . 
27. E. BENER, "Turkiye'de Dig T i c a r e t Rejimi", i n "Dig T i c a r e t 
ve Akonomic Kolkinma" S o s y a l ve Edonomik E t u t l e r Kbnferens 
Heyeti, pp.162-180. 
28. Z.Y. HERSHLAG, op. c i t . , p. 
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As f o r exports, i n 19 50 i n accordance with the 
l i b e r a t i o n p o l i c y , the r e s t r i c t i o n s on exports were con-
s i d e r a b l y reduced. During the f i r s t four years of the period 
1950-6 5 exports incr e a s e d r a p i d l y due mainly to the Korean 
Boom. They reached a peak i n 1953, TL 1109 m i l l i o n s , 
i n d i c a t i n g 139% i n c r e a s e from the 1950 value of TL 73 7.6 
m i l l i o n . 
I n c r e a s e s i n imports always exceeded those i n 
exports. The d e f i c i t was widely financed by exchange 
r e s e r v e s . Turkey had $126 m i l l i o n i n exchange reserves i n 
1950. T h i s amount f e l l to $4.0 m i l l i o n by 1958, with net 
los s e s ' of $70 m i l l i o n , $38 m i l l i o n and $58 m i l l i o n i n 
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1955, 1956 and 1957. By the second quarter of 1958, the 
government was unable t o meet i t s foreseeable o b l i g a t i o n s 
f o r even a few weeks. Import l i c e n c i n g was v i r t u a l l y 
suspended. This speeded up the enactment of the 1958 
S t a b i l i z a t i o n Programme. The Turki s h L i r a was devalued. 
A l l imports, except f o r a few government t r a n s a c t i o n s , 
were a l s o placed i n the new- r a t e . 
I t may be s a i d t h a t the devaluation d e c i s i o n should 
30 
have been made long before 1958. Because the r i s i n g 
l e v e l of p r i c e s w i t h resp e c t to the i n t e r n a t i o n a l p r i c e 
29. The f i g u r e s were taken from the C e n t r a l Bank. 
30. S.-.: AREN, op. c i t . . p.27. 
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l e v e l made imports very p r o f i t a b l e , as the r a t e of exchange 
was kept very low. The import p r i c e index r e g i s t e r e d a 
22.8% i n c r e a s e , w h i l e the wholesale p r i c e index rose 
81.3% between 1954 and 1959. Overvaluation of the Turki s h 
L i r a was s i g n i f i c a n t . I n J u l y 1958 the p r i c e of the d o l l a r , 
on the b a s i s of the gold p r i c e , was c a l c u l a t e d a t $1 = 
TL 21.50, whereas the o f f i c i a l r a t e was being kept a t 
$1 = TL 2.80. One of the important consequences of the 
ove r v a l u a t i o n was t h a t i t caused black market a c t i v i t i e s , 
d i v e r t i n g exchange r e s e r v e s from o f f i c i a l channels. 
On the export si d e , the p r i c e s of major export goods 
such as cotton, tobacco and r a i s i n s rose compared to the 
i n t e r n a t i o n a l p r i c e l e v e l . I n t h i s respect, devaluation 
seemed an appropriate p o l i c y . I n 1960 exports rose to 
TL1721 m i l l i o n from TL 990.6 m i l l i o n i n 1959. During the 
1960-65 period they remained around TL 3 500 m i l l i o n . 
The p r e l i m i n a r y evidence suggests t h a t monetary 
expansion was the main reason f o r the 1954-58 i n f l a t i o n . 
I n c r e a s e s i n money income exceeded r e a l income appreciably 
from 1952 onwards. The main reason f o r the in c r e a s e s i n 
money income was the expansionary monetary p o l i c y pursued 
by the government. Investments were met through d e f i c i t 
f i n a n c i n g and c r e d i t expansion; thus the r a t e of growth 
of imports exceeded both those of exports and foreign 
resources, leading to f u r t h e r d i f f i c u l t i e s i n the 
balance of payments. 
T h i s general review of the balance of payments 
i n d i c a t e s some of the r e l a t i o n s h i p s between monetary 
expansion, the balance of payments and the l e v e l s of 
output and employment. Chapters 2 and 3 now examine 
these r e l a t i o n s h i p s i n more d e t a i l . 
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2S 
C H A P T E R 
THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN INFLATION AND THE BALANCE OF 
PAYMENTS IN CLASSICAL THEORY 
T h i s chapter examines the r e l a t i o n s h i p between the 
balance of payments and i n f l a t i o n i n the context of a 
c l a s s i c a l gold standard model. The b a s i c features of the 
model a r e reviewed and i t s a p p l i c a b i l i t y to a developing 
economy i s discussed. 
C l a s s i c a l theory inv o l v e s the a p p l i c a t i o n of the 
s t a t i c e q u i l i b r i u m a n a l y s i s to the problems of the balance 
of payments on the grounds t h a t i n the adjustment process 
the movements of i n t e r n a t i o n a l l y traded goods a r e assumed 
to be dependent on the changes i n r e l a t i v e p r i c e s and i s 
explained i n terms of the theory of Comparative Costs.''" 
I n t e r n a t i o n a l d i f f e r e n c e s i n production functions causing 
i n t e r n a t i o n a l l y d i f f e r e n t c o s t s t r u c t u r e s c r e a t e trade 
amongst c o u n t r i e s . The f l u c t u a t i o n s of the absolute 
l e v e l of p r i c e s r e l a t i v e t o each other changes the 
d i r e c t i o n and the volume of goods traded. Therefore we 
would expect the following b a s i c r e l a t i o n s h i p s between 
1. W.M. SCAMMEL, I n t e r n a t i o n a l Monetarv P o l i c y . (Macmillan, 
1961). 
2. J . BHAGWATI, "The Pure Theory of I n t e r n a t i o n Trade" i n 
"Surveys of Economic Theory. f7da:ii.CTffidpjiblished by the 
American Economic A s s o c i a t i o n (Macmillan, 1967). 
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i n f l a t i o n and the balance of payments: t h a t movements i n 
abs o l u t e p r i c e s i n country A would a l t e r r e l a t i v e i n t e r -
n a t i o n a l p r i c e s ; thus i n f l u e n c i n g the d i r e c t i o n of trade 
and the volume of goods traded. I n t h i s context the 
adjustment process following from the i n c r e a s e i n absolute 
p r i c e s i s very important. 
C l a s s i c a l theory i n t h i s context can be considered 
i n terms of the quantity theory of money; given f u l l 
employment, i n c r e a s e s i n the stock of money w i l l r a i s e 
the g e n e r a l l e v e l of p r i c e s i n the same proportion as the 
i n c r e a s e i n the stock of money. This i s only p o s s i b l e i f 
the v e l o c i t y c i r c u l a t i o n i s constant and p r i c e f l e x i b i l i t y 
e x i s t s . 
The constancy of v e l o c i t y stems from the f a c t t h a t 
money i s a convenient a s s e t being u n i v e r s a l l y acceptable 
as a means of exchange and some amount of money has to be 
he l d to c a r r y out t r a n s a c t i o n s . I n both versions 
( F i s h e r i a n and Cambridge) of the quantity theory of money 
v e l o c i t y i s assumed to be constant. The F i s h e r i a n approach 
was based on i n s t i t u t i o n a l f a c t o r s ; changes i n the 
h a b i t u a l payments and i n the i n d u s t r i a l s t r u c t u r e of the 
economy can reduce t r a n s a c t i o n s and thus a f f e c t the 
velocity."^ However t h i s was a long run effect,and i n the 
s h o r t run the v e l o c i t y could be assumed to be constant. 
The Cambridge approach emphasizes the " d e s i r e t o hold" 
J . BALL, op. c i t . , p.41. 
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r a t h e r than the'turnover r a t e " , t h a t i s , why does money 
r e s t i n t r a n s a c t o r ' s hands f o r a c e r t a i n length of time 
before being used. Although they recognized that wealth, 
t h e r a t e of i n t e r e s t and the expectations about the future 
could a f f e c t v e l o c i t y , they d i d not show any r e l a t i o n s h i p 
between these f a c t o r s t h a t might be expected to p r e v a i l 
and they did not say much about which ones might have been 
important as expected. The way followed i n t h i s approach 
i s to assume the volume of t r a n s a c t i o n s , the l e v e l of 
wealth and the l e v e l of income, a t l e a s t i n the short run, 
ar e i n s t a b l e proportions to one another. Thus i t was 
nominal terms would be proportional to 
argued t h a t the v e l o c i t y in^nominal income not only f o r 
each i n d i v i d u a l , but a l s o f o r the economy as a whole.^ 
Therefore, given f u l l employment, i n c r e a s e s i n the 
stock of money w i l l r a i s e the absolute l e v e l of p r i c e s 
i n the same proportion, leading to i n f l a t i o n . On t h i s 
r e l a t i o n s h i p between the general l e v e l of p r i c e s and the 
qu a n t i t y of money, the r e l a t i o n between i n f l a t i o n and the 
adjustment process can be e s t a b l i s h e d . Assuming t h a t 
between two c o u n t r i e s , A and B, the volume of goods and 
s e r v i c e s traded i s constant and the domestic money stocks 
a r e 100% backed by gold, then i f the stock of money 
i n c r e a s e s i n A, t h i s r a i s e s the general l e v e l of p r i c e s . 
4. D. LAIDLER, The Demand For Money: Theories and Evidence" 
( I n t e r n a t i o n a l Textbook Company, J u l y 1970) p.48. 
5. H.G. JOHNSON, Macroeconomics and Monetary Theory. (Gray-Mills 
1971) Ch. 6. 
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making B's goods and services r e l a t i v e l y cheaper. Thus 
the goods and services o f B are s u b s t i t u t e d f o r the goods 
and services produced by A". The ensuing trade d e f i c i t 
causes t h e stock o f money i n A t o f a l l ; t he absolute 
l e v e l o f pr i c e s f a l l s . I n d i v i d u a l s i n A receive a smaller 
amount o f money than they received before f o r t h e i r 
p h y s i c a l l y unchanged exports. The t o t a l amount of money 
spent by A on imports from B s l i g h t l y increases due t o 
i n f l a t i o n a r y tendencies i n B. The worsening balance of 
payments r e s u l t s i n l a r g e r money flows, greater d e f l a t i o n 
i n A and i n f l a t i o n i n B. This s i t u a t i o n , however, does 
not continue i n d e f i n i t e l y : t h e r e l a t i v e changes i n the 
n a t i o n a l p r i c e l e v e l s induces money exports from A, 
reducing t h e q u a n t i t y o f money. The cash balances o f 
i n d i v i d u a l s i n A becomes smaller as money income declines 
not only i n nomina+l terms but also i n r e a l terms a t least 
u n t i l p r i c e s have f u l l y adjusted t o monetary d e f l a t i o n . 
I n d i v i d u a l s i n A, t h e r e f o r e , reduce t h e i r imports t o 
6 
maintain cash balances. 
There are two ways i n which i n t e r n a t i o n a l and n a t i o n a l 
p r i c e l e v e l s might become equal: e i t h e r the n a t i o n a l 
l e v e l o f absolute p r i c e s might be adjusted upward and 
downward t o conform t o the i n t e r n a t i o n a l l e v e l or a l t e r n a t i v e l y 
exchange r a t e might a l t e r p e r i o d i c a l l y . I n the c l a s s i c a l 
system t h e former way was regarded as the c o r r e c t i v e i n 
6. L. YEAGER, I n t e r n a t i o n a l Monetary Relations. (Harper and 
Row, 1966) p.63-82. 
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t h e adjustment process and i t was believed t h a t as long 
as t h e measures ensuring money flows between two countries 
were taken, p r i c e movements would ensure the adjustment 
process a u t o m a t i c a l l y : countries l o s i n g money should 
a l l o w t h e i r money income and prices t o f a l l , and countries 
i m p o r t i n g money should allow t h e i r incomes and prices t o 
7 
r i s e - The automatic adjustment process was strengthened 
and accelerated by Central Banks through the so-called 
" r u l e s of the game". Discount r a t e p o l i c y and open market 
operations would r a i s e the i n t e r e s t r a t e and d t i g h t e n 
c r e d i t i n the d e f i c i t c o u n t r i e s , w h i l e lowering the 
8 
i n t e r e s t r a t e and expanding c r e d i t m the surplus countries. 
This would induce compensatory short term c a p i t a l movements 
from the surplus t o the d e f i c i t c o u n t r i e s , and accelerate 
the d e s i r a b l e downward adjustment of prices i n the surplus 
c o u n t r i e s , and upward adjustment i n t h e d e f i c i t countries. 
I n the c l a s s i c a l system the adjustment process was 
h e a v i l y dependent on quick and considerable reactions of 
both demand and supply t o p r i c e changes. However, the 
t e s t s of the Gold Standard showed t h a t the demand e l a s t i c i t i e s 
9 
were much less s e n s i t i v e than i t had been thought. The 
7. W.R. ALLEN & C.L. ALLEN, Foreign Trade and Finance; Essays 
I n I n t e r n a t i o n a l Economic Ecpiilibrium and Adjustment, 
(Macmillan, New York, 1959). 
8. R. TRIFFIN, "The Myth and R e a l i t i e s o f the So-called Gold 
Standard", i n I n t e r n a t i o n a l Finance, edited by R.N. Cooper, 
(Penguin Books 1969), pp.38-61. 
9. A. METZLER, "The Theory o f I n t e r n a t i o n a l Trade" i n A Survey 
of Contemporary Economics, Vol. I , (Richard I r w i n , Inc., 
1949) pp.210-228. 
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e l a s t i c i t y o f demand f o r i n d i v i d u a l products almost 
w i t h o u t exception was low. The q u a n t i t i e s sold were much 
less s e n s i t i v e t o changes i n p r i c e s . T h i s could be 
a t t r i b u t e d , i n my view, t o t h e s t a t i c p r i c e expectations 
i n c l a s s i c a l theory t h a t e ventually the l e v e l of prices 
would reach an e q u i l i b r i u m . Thus the expected p r i c e 
changes i n f u t u r e may not be s u f f i c i e n t t o s u b s t i t u t e 
cheap f o r e i g n goods f o r domestic goods. 
I f the p r i c e e l a s t i c i t i e s are t o be successful i n 
the adjustment process a set of conditions need t o be 
f u l f i l l e d . I n determining how the p r i c e changes a f f e c t 
t r a d e between c o u n t r i e s , f o u r e l a s t i c i t i e s are relevant: 
For d e p r e c i a t i n g c o u n t r i e s these are: 
a) t h e e l a s t i c i t y of supply of exports 
b) t h e f o r e i g n demand e l a s t i c i t i e s f o r exports 
c) t h e home demand e l a s t i c i t y f o r imports 
d) t h e f o r e i g n supply e l a s t i c i t y of imports 
I f t h e p r i c e e l a s t i c i t i e s are t o be successful i n 
the adjustment process, the sum of the demand e l a s t i c i t i e s 
f o r both exports and imports o f the depreciating country 
should exceed u n i t y , as the assumption t h a t both supply 
e l a s t i c i t y of imports and exports of the depreciating 
country are i n f i n i t e . This c o n d i t i o n i s known as the 
Marsha 11-Lerner Condition.'''^ 
10. G. GRUBEL, The I n t e r n a t i o n a l Monetary System. (Penguin 
Books, 1970) pp.90-106- Also 
11. See L. YEAGER, I n t e r n a t i o n a l Monetary Relations. (Harper 
and Row, 1966) pp.38-50. Also, A. KRUEGER, "Balance o f 
Payments Theory", Journal o f Economic L i t e r a t u r e . Vol. 7, 
March 1969, pp.1-26. 
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I t seems t h a t the c l a s s i c a l assumption of a stab l e 
e q u i l i b r i u m f o r the balance o f payments i s subject t o the 
Marshall-Lerner c o n d i t i o n . I n the context o f developing 
c o u n t r i e s , a system of adjustment based on p r i c e e l a s t i c i t i e s 
can not be expected t o work. I t i s generally argued t h a t 
the demand f o r exports o f developing countries i s low, 
12 
probably less than u n i t y . The supply e l a s t i c i t y can not 
be expected t o be i n f i n i t e , a t l e a s t i n the short run, 
as developing c o u n t r i e s export a g r i c u l t u r a l products; 
the production o f a g r i c u l t u r a l commodities takes time. 
Another f a c t o r reducing the relevance o f the p r i c e 
e l a s t i c i t i e s f o r developing countries i s t h a t as long as 
they maintain a h i g h r a t e o f growth, they can not reduce 
the import of c a p i t a l goods and raw materials and t h i s 
makes the demand e l a s t i c i t y r a t h e r r i g i d , and we have 
already noted t h e h i g h dependence on such imports i n the 
Turkish case. 
Moreover, i t has been argued byg. Prebisch t h a t , i n 
the long run, the terms of trade have a tendency t o move 
against developing c o u n t r i e s . According t o Prebisch 
t e c h n i c a l progress i s t a k i n g place i n developed c o u n t r i e s . 
I t i s normally expected t h a t developing countries w i l l 
12. G.K. HELLEINER, " I n t e r n a t i o n a l Trade and Economic Develop-
ment" (Penguin, 1972) pp.132-134. 
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b e n e f i t from t h i s t e c h n i c a l progress because the prices 
of t h e i r imports w i l l f a l l . But prices do not f a l l because 
the producers i n developed countries work under the 
co n d i t i o n s of imperfect competition, and thus they are 
able t o f i x p r i c e s as they want. Moreover, trade unions 
i n developed c o u n t r i e s are able t o c l a i m f o r t h e i r 
members p a r t o f the gains o f t e c h n i c a l progress. There-
f o r e t e c h n i c a l progress i n developed countries r e s u l t s i n 
higher p r o f i t s and higher wages, and thus export prices 
of developed c o u n t r i e s r i s e . I n developing countries the 
s i t u a t i o n i s reverse, i f there i s a t e c h n i c a l progress i n 
these c o u n t r i e s , t h e i r export p r i c e s do not r i s e , because 
the producers i n developing countries work under competi-
t i v e c o n d i t i o n s both i n t e r n a t i o n a l l y and domestically. 
Consequently p r i c e s are reduced by t e c h n i c a l progress, 
leading t o a tendency of the terms of trade against 
developing c o u n t r i e s . I f t h i s argument i s relevant, i t 
can cause a cost i n f l a t i o n i n developing countries as they 
are dependent on imports from developed cou n t r i e s . On 
the other hand due t o higher prices they paid f o r import 
than they receive f o r exports, balance of payments d i f f i c u l -
t i e s can e a s i l y takekplace, and these d i f f i c u l t i e s can 
lead t o an i n f l a t i o n as the import capacity f a l l s and 
t h e r e f o r e aggregate supply o f the economy. 
13. See f o r t h e Prebisch Thesis, R. PREBISCH, "Towards a New 
Trade P o l i c y f o r Development", i n Leading Issues i n 
Economic Development, e d i t e d by G. MEIER, (Oxford U n i v e r s i t y 
Press, 1971), pp.484-492. See f o r c r i t i c i s m , W. ELKAN, 
OP- c i t . , pp.45-49. 
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A f t e r the Second World War the terms of trade moved 
i n favour o f primary producing countries e s p e c i a l l y during 
the Korean War. Since the m i d - f i f t i e s they have moved 
adversly, although the degree o f adverse movement has 
v a r i e d from commodity t o commodity. 
The terms o f t r a d e turned i n favour o f Turkey over 
th e 19 50-57 period. However, they s t a r t e d t u r n i n g against 
from 1958 onwards. I n Table 2.1 the export p r i c e index, 
t h e import p r i c e index or investment goods, raw materials 
14 
and consumer goods and the terms of trade are shown. 
As i t can be seen from Table 2.1, the import p r i c e 
index of investment goods remained the same i n two years 
i a u r i n g t h e 1954-59 i n f l a t i o n a r y period, and remained 
r e l a t i v e l y s t a b l e through t o 1965. The import prices of 
raw m a t e r i a l s f l u c t u a t e d more than investment goods; but 
again t h e o v e r a l l absolute changes over the whole period 
were not l a r g e . 
Table 2.1 suggests t h a t the decline i n the terms o f 
t r a d e against Turkey was caused by f a l l s i n export prices 
r a t h e r than increases i n import p r i c e s . The competing 
c o u n t r i e s w i t h Turkey i n i n t e r n a t i o n a l t r a d e are mostly 
developing c o u n t r i e s such as Greece, B r a z i l , Spain, etc. 
I n t h i s respect, i t may be suggested t h a t the decreases 
i n export p r i c e s o f Turkish goods were a r e s u l t of the 
14. This Table i s the only a v a i l a b l e data i n d i c a t i n g the import 
p r i c e s o f consumer goods, raw m a t e r i a l , investment goods. 
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Table 2.1 Export and Import Price Indices and the Import 
Price Indices o f Investment and Consumer Goods. 
and Raw M a t e r i a l s . 1956-1965 (1963 = 100) 
Export Import Investment Raw Consximer Terms 
Price 
Index 
Price 
Index 
Goods Mate r i a l s Goods of 
Trade 
1956 113.7 89.8 77.7 99.9 104.1 126.6 
1957 108.1 95.4 77.0 109.4 109.9 113.3 
1958 101.7 99.0 ;90>3 105.6 105.1 102.7 
1959 91.7 94. 5 92,6 96.1 95.3 97.0 
1960 82.3 93.4 88.1 98.8 92.1 88.1 
1961 78.6 93.2 92.9 93.4 93.4 84.3 
1962 81.6 91.9 88.6 93.9 94.9 88.8 
1963 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 
1964 95.4 100.0 102.6 98.8 97.1 95.4 
1965 93.6 101.0 104.6 99.2 98.7 92.7 
Source: H. Ce t i n and U . Egeci, Ttirkiye T i c a r e t H o d l e r i 
(State Planning Organization, October 1965) 
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c o m p e t i t i o n from some other developing c o u n t r i e s , and thus 
the "Prebisch Thesis" i s supported i n terms of d e c l i n i n g 
export p r i c e s ; but not supported i n terms of r i s i n g import 
p r i c e s . 
C l a s s i c a l theory proposed a theory based on p r i c e 
e l a s t i c i t i e s , and i t was assumed t h a t the adjustment process 
would work a u t o m a t i c a l l y . But, as has been explained i n 
the previous paragraphs, the evidence suggests t h a t the 
c l a s s i c a l adjustment process can not be relevant t o develop-
inggcountries. However, it should be pointed out t h a t the 
" p r i c e e f f e c t " i n the adjustment process did not disappear 
i n economic theory. I n an i n f l a t i o n a r y process, i t i s 
recognized t h a t r i s e s i n prices a f f e c t the balance of 
payments. But, the changes i n prices are not a t t r i b u t e d 
t o t h e changes i n th e stock o f money but r a t h e r t o increases 
i n expenditures. As explained by E. Bernstein; 
" . . . Most of th e a d d i t i o n a l expenditure w i l l a f f e c t 
home p r i c e s . I f the e l a s t i c i t y of s u b s t i t u t i o n of 
import goods f o r home goods i s moderate (although 
g r e a t e r than u n i t y ) , the secondary e f f e c t s on imports 
w i l l also be moderate . . . On the other hand, i n 
co u n t r i e s where the marginal propensity t o import and 
s u b s t i t u t a b i l i t y of import goods f o r home goods are 
r e l a t i v e l y high, the aggregate balance of payments 
d e f i c i t t h a t may be expected w i l l manifest i t s e l f 
r a t h e r q u i c k l y " . ^ ^ 
There are two aspects o f th e p r i c e changes i n the 
adjustment process: the f i r s t may be c a l l e d the " d i s t u r b i n g 
e f f e c t " which impairs the " i n t e r n a l competitiveness" of 
the economy i n i n t e r n a t i o n a l t r a d e and increases the demand 
15. E.M. BERNSTEIN & I.G. PATEL, " I n f l a t i o n i n Relation t o 
Economic Development", i-M.F. S t a f f Pavers. Vol. 2, 
1951-52, pp.363-398. 
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f o r imports. •'•^  The second e f f e c t t h a t may be c a l l e d the 
" c o r r e c t i v e e f f e c t " , namely, devaluation. I t should be 
pointed out t h a t these two e f f e c t s do not i n v o l v e an auto-
matic adjustment mechanism. P a r t i c u l a r l y devaluation i s a 
p o l i c y matter r a t h e r than an automatic adjustment mechanism. 
This c h a r a c t e r i s t i c o f devaluation becomes more c l e a r i n an 
i n f l a t i o n a r y process. I f a devaluation i s c a r r i e d out 
under t h e c o n d i t i o n s o f less than f u l l employment output 
and employment can increase w i t h o u t p r i c e increases as 
aggregate demand increases and i d l e resources are u t i l i z e d . 
I f a devaluation i s c a r r i e d out i n an i n f l a t i o n a r y period 
aggregate demand increases. However, i n t h i s case f u r t h e r 
r i s e s i n the p r i c e l e v e l are unavoidable. The only remedy 
i s t o reduce domestic expenditures through monetary and 
f i s c a l p o l i c i e s t o o b t a i n r e a l resources t o meet increased 
17 
f o r e i g n demand. I n t h i s respect i n an i n f l a t i o n a r y 
process, p r i c e changes based on p r i c e e l a s t i c i t i e s seem 
t o be s u b s i d i a r y and the manipulation o f expenditures 
occupies a c e n t r a l place i n the adjustment process.a The 
r e l a t i o n s h i p between i n f l a t i o n and the balance of payments 
can be examined w i t h i n the framework of the modern q u a n t i t y 
16. See f o r the concept of " i n t e r n a t i o n a l competitiveness" 
E. BERNSTEIN, i b i d . 
17. See f o r t h i s p o i n t H.G. JOHNSON, "The Monetary Approach t o 
Balance of Payments Theory" i n Further Essays i n Monetary 
Economics ( A l l e n and Unwin, Ltd . , 1972) p.231. 
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18 theory. The modern q u a n t i t y theory suggests t h a t there 
i s a s t a b l e demand f o r money, or, a st a b l e v e l o c i t y f u n c t i o n . 
But, t h e concept o f v e l o c i t y i n the modern q u a n t i t y theory 
i s d i f f e r e n t from the one i n the o l d q u a n t i t y theory. The 
former does not in v o l v e i n s t i t u t i o n a l f a c t o r s , i t i s an 
19 
a p p l i c a t i o n of the general theory of choice. V e l o c i t y 
i n t h e modern q u a n t i t y theory include f i v e d i f f e r e n t forms 
i n which wealth can be hel d : money, bonds, e q u i t i e s , physical 
non-human goods and human c a p i t a l . I n t h i s context, a 
theory o f i n f l a t i o n can be generated: I f there i s a stabl e 
demand f u n c t i o n f o r money i n r e a l terms, the r a t e of 
i n f l a t i o n enters as a cost of holding r e a l balances. Given 
t h i s function,' the r a t e o f increase o f the nominal stock 
o f money determines t h e r a t e o f i n f l a t i o n . Money holders 
e v e n t u a l l y come t o expect t h a t r a t e o f i n f l a t i o n and 
adj u s t t h e i r stocks of r e a l balances t o i t . The money 
holders, t o maintain t h e i r r e a l balances constant, being 
determined by the v e l o c i t y f u n c t i o n , have t o accumulate 
money balances at a r a t e equal t o the r a t e of i n f l a t i o n . 
As i n f l a t i o n proceeds t h i s accumulation of money balances 
i s achieved by reducing the consumption of current r e a l 
18. See f o r t h e Monetarist I n f l a t i o n Theoiy, M. FRIEDMAN, "The 
Quantity Theory o f Money: A Restatement", i n Studies i n 
the Quantity Theory of Money, edited by M. FRIEDMAN (Chicago 
U n i v e r s i t y Press, 1957), pp.3-21. M. FRIEDMAN, "Statement 
on Monetary Theory and Policy" i n I n f l a t i o n edited by 
R.J. BALL and P. DOYLE (Penguin Books, 1970) pp.136-145. 
H.G. JOHNSON, Macroeconomics and Monetary Theory. (Gray-Mills 
Publishing L t d . , 1971) pp.148-162." 
19. H.G. JOHNSON, "Monetary Theory and Policy", i n Essays i n 
Monetary Economics. ( A l l e n and Unwin Ltd., 1969) p.26. 
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income. Thus i n f l a t i o n c o n s t i t u t e s a t a x on r e a l balances, 
which i n t u r n becomes revenue t o the makers of the i n f l a -
t i o n a r y increase i n the money supply. I n t h i s process a 
r e l a t i o n s h i p between i n f l a t i o n and t h e balance o f payments 
can be established. I f the stock of money i s increased 
the a d d i t i o n a l money received by money holders i s spent, 
some p a r t s of these spendings put pressure on the balance 
of payments. Thus d e f i c i t s (surpluses) represent phases of 
adjustment i n t h e v e l o c i t y f u n c t i o n . As long as money 
c r e a t i o n continues, t h i s leads t o a "flow" d e f i c i t i n the 
balance of p a y m e n t s . T h e question here i s t h a t why i s 
the stock o f money increased o r money; created? From an 
h i s t o r i c a l p o i n t of"view an expansion of the money supply 
21 
has always been associated w i t h the needs o f Governments. 
Perhaps i n f l a t i o n and balance o f payments d i f f i c u l t i e s t h a t 
most o f developing c o u n t r i e s are experiencing can be 
explained i n t h i s context. 
To summarize, c l a s s i c a l theory proposed an adjustment 
process based on p r i c e e l a s t i c i t i e s ; t h a t the absolute l e v e l 
o f p r i c e s was determined by t h e changes i n the stock on 
money. The contemporary theory, Keynesian i n i t s s p i r i t , 
although recognizing t h e " p r i c e e f f e c t " , gave i t a sub-
s i d i a r y k r o l e . I n the modern q u a n t i t y theory, Keynesian 
20. H.G. JOHNSON, "Towards a General Theory o f the Balance of 
Payments", i n I n t e r n a t i o n a l Finance edited by R.N. COOPER, 
(Penguin Books, 1969), p.243. 
21. See f o r t h i s p o i n t , P. GA6AN, "The Monetary Dynamics of 
H y p e r i n f l a t i o n " i n Studies i n the Quantity Theory of Money 
edi t e d by M. FRIEDMAN (Chicago U n i v e r s i t y Press, 1957) pp. 
25-120. 
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i n i t s s p i r i t , although recognizing the " p r i c e e f f e c t " , 
gave i t a subsidiary r o l e . I n the modern q u a n t i t y theory, 
the r o l e o f prices i n t h e adjustment process may be less 
c l e a r , as changes i n the stock of money governs money 
expenditures and t h e changes i n and the l e v e l of pr i c e s i s 
explained by the present and past changes i n and the 
l e v e l s o f the money supply. 
So f a r , i t has been argued t h a t the "p r i c e e f f e c t " 
i n t he adjustment process i s given a subsidiary r o l e . 
This has been a r e s u l t of- Keynesian c r i t i c i s m of c l a s s i c a l 
22 
theory. We now t u r n t o the examination of the adjustment 
o f expenditures t o balance o f payments and the r o l e of 
i n f l a t i o n i n t h i s process. 
22. M. LETICHE, "Balance of Payments and Economic Growth" 
(Augusts M. Kelley Publishers, New York, 1967) pp.74-103 
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C H A P T E R 
THF. RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN INFLATION AND THE BALANCE OF 
PAYMENTS IN KEYNESIAN THEORY 
I n t h i s chapter the r e l a t i o n s h i p between i n f l a t i o n 
and t h e balance of payments w i l l be examined i n Keynesian 
theory. The analysis w i l l be presented w i t h i n the frame-
work o f the absorption approach. I n the f i r s t section the 
r e l a t i o n s h i p between i n f l a t i o n and the balance o f payments 
w i l l be analysed and i n the second section s u i t a b l e 
p o l i c i e s t o deal w i t h the balance of payments under con-
d i t i o n s o f i n f l a t i o n w i l l be studie;d. 
3.1 THE ABSORPTION APPROACH 
c l a s s i c a l theory was d i s c r e d i t e d by Keynesian theory 
on t h e grounds t h a t the automatic tendency towards f u l l 
employment d i d not e x i s t because of the absence of p r i c e -
wage f l e x i b i l i t y . Money wages ra t h e r than r e a l wages 
were determined by wage bargaining so t h a t the l e v e l o f 
employment could not be considered independently of the 
absolute l e v e l o f pr i c e s . Thus the c l a s s i c a l dichotony 
was no longer r e l e v e n t . Moreover, wages werej s t i c k y and 
determined by f a c t o r s outside current economic f a c t o r s . 
Therefore, the determination o f the l e v e l of employment i n 
the labour market i n r e a l wage terms was abolished and the 
concept o f e f f e c t i v e demand was introduced. At less than 
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f u l l employment the r a t e o f output and employment was 
governed by e f f e c t i v e demand. 
I n Keynesian theory, the theory o f the l e v e l of prices 
was reduced t o a r e l a t i v e l y minor role;''' the d i r e c t l i n k 
between t h e absolute l e v e l of prices and the q u a n t i t y of 
money was d i s c r e d i t e d as the v e l o c i t y was not constant. 
i 
On t h e assumption of a closed economy; there could be 
th r e e reasons f o r a change i n the p r i c e l e v e l - a change i n 
employment, a change i n wage u n i t s , a change i n production 
techniques. Keynes was concerned p r i m a r i l y w i t h changes 
2 
i n the l e v e l of employment. 
I n i t s o r i g i n a l f o r m u l a t i o n Keynesian theory suggested 
n e i t h e r a theory o f i n f l a t i o n nor a theory of the balance 
of payments. However, the i n c l u s i o n o f the concept of 
e f f e c t i v e demand i n t o the analysis l ed t o i n f l a t i o n and 
balance o f payments' th e o r i e s on the basis o f the income-
expenditure model. 
I n Keynesian theory, a theory of i n f l a t i o n can only 
be obtained on the assumption of f u l l employment. Assuring 
t h a t t h e economy i s an open economy by the use of the w e l l 
known formula, 
Y = C + I + X- M (1) 
1. H. BALL, OP. c i t . . p.62. G. ACKLEY, Macroeconomic Theory 
(Macmillan, 1961) pp.105-155. 
2. H.G. JOHNSON, "Monetary Theory and Keynesian Economics", 
i n Monetary Theory edited by R.W. CLOWER (Penguin Books, 
1969) pp.226-47. 
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t h e r e l a t i o n between i n f l a t i o n and the balance o f payments 
can be established. Assuming the Y i s f u l l employment 
output, consumption C and investment I include imported 
consumption and investment goods, X represents value of a l l 
exports and M the value o f a l l imports of goods and 
services i n the t r a d e balance.^ 
The formula (1) can be rearranged so t h a t , 
X - M = Y- C + I (2) 
I f we def i n e X - M as the trade balance (B) and C + I as 
aggregate expenditure (E), then equation (2) reduces t o : 
B = Y - E (3) 
This general formula i s the basis o f the absorption 
approach t o Ibalanceoof payments an a l y s i s . From equation 
(3) i t can be seen t h a t a d e f i c i t i n the balance o f pay-
ments c o n s i s t s o f an excess o f aggregate expenditure over 
f u l l employment output. As long as money expenditures 
exceed f u l l employment output, a d e f i c i t i n the balance 
of payments w i l l ensue. 
4 
How does an i n f l a t i o n a r y process m the economy s t a r t ? 
There are two p o s s i b i l i t i e s i n the Keynesian framework. 
F i r s t l y , r i s e s i n costs can cause i n f l a t i o n . I n Keynesian 
3. G. MEIER, " I n t e r n a t i o n a l Trade and Development", OP. c i t . . 
H.G. JOHNSON, "Towards a General Theory of the Balance of 
Payments", I n t e r n a t i o n a l Trade and Economic Growth,(George 
A l l e n and Unwin) 1958), pp.153-68. 
4. This analysis f o l l o w s t h a t presented by, J. BALL, OP. c i t . . 
pp. 63-78, and, G M. BRON FENBRENNER and F.D. HOLZMAN, "A 
Survey of I n f l a t i o n Theory", i n Surveys"in Economic Theory 
Vol. 1 (Macmillan, 1968) pp.46-107. 
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theory costs, p a r t i c u l a r l y wages, are assumed t o be 
constant. Given t h e l e v e l o f employment and marginal 
costs, t h e r e i s only one l e v e l of prices consistent w i t h 
t h a t l e v e l of employment from the p o i n t of view of 
p r o f i t a b i l i t y . The goods market i s assumed t o be purely 
c o m p e t i t i v e , ensuring maximum p r o f i t . As the l e v e l of 
employment increases, marginal costs s t a r t r i s i n g because 
of t h e law of di m i n i s h i n g returns on the one hand; as f u l l 
employment i s reached the o b t a i n i n g o f f a c t o r of produc-
t i o n o n l y becomes possible by g o f f e r i n g higher prices f o r 
them, on the oth e r hand. I f costs r i s e , prices i n the 
goods market have t o r i s e t o render the l e v e l of e x i s t i n g 
employment p r o f i t a b l e a t the new l e v e l of costs. As 
p r i c e s r i s e , money income increases; thus the demand f o r 
money f o r t r a n s a c t i o n purposes increases. I f the stock o f 
money i s f i x e d , a d d i t i o n a l money can only be found through 
i d l e balances kept f o r speculative purposes of a higher 
r a t e o f i n t e r e s t . I f the r a t e of i n t e r e s t r i s e s , the 
e q u i l i b r i u m i n t h e goods market i s disturbed, leading t o a 
re d u c t i o n i n t h e l e v e l o f e f f e c t i v e demand a t the e x i s t i n g 
l e v e l of production. Therefore, the cur r e n t l e v e l of 
employment w i t h respect t o the curr e n t l e v e l o f demand i s 
excessive and t h e l e v e l o f employment i s l i k e l y t o f a l l . 
Rises i n costs r e s u l t i n some increase i n prices and some 
dec l i n e i n employment. The a c t u a l combination of a f a l l 
employment and the r i s e i n the p r i c e l e v e l t h a t w i l l r e s t o r e 
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equ i l ib r ium depend generally on the s i t ua t i on i n ind iv idua l 
markets. I f investment expenditures are h ighly e las t ic 
w i t h respect to the rate of in teres t then the l eve l of 
expenditures i n the goods market w i l l decline. This 
reduces the transactions demand f o r money. Despite the 
decline i n the demand f o r money, i f the rate of in teres t 
does not f a l l , the equi l ibr ium w i l l l i k e l y take place 
through changes i n employment. 
As long as the ra te of in teres t i s assumed to be 
a f f e c t i n g expenditures, a sustained i n f l a t i o n based on 
costs can not be generated, unless i t i s assumed that the 
monetary au thor i ty provides addi t ional money required to 
c i r c u l a t e the nat ional income at ever r i s i n g prices. This 
point raises a c r u c i a l question, whether cost i n f l a t i o n is 
the r e su l t of po l i c i e s pursued by governments to maintain 
f u l l employment. By increasing the money supply s u f f i c i e n t l y 
t o f inance them governments approve cost i n f l a t i o n on the 
grounds tha t without creat ion of money, or new purchasing 
power, a continuing pr ice increase would be impossible. 
I n discussion of the cost i n f l a t i o n thesis i t has been 
argued tha t a r i s i n g l eve l o f prices and wages induce the 
increase i n the money supply or, at least, adds impetus 
t o the ra te of c r e d i t c rea t ion .^ 
5. F. MACHLUP, "Cost Push and Demand P u l l " , I n f l a t i o n , edited 
by J . BALL and P. DOYLE (Penguin Books, 1969), pp.149-176, 
and W.A. MORTON, "Trade Unionism, f u l l employment, 
i n f l a t i o n " , i n I n f l a t i o n , O P . c i t . , pp.99-116. 
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Rises i n the pr ice l eve l may come from another source; 
demand condi t ions . I f the economy is f u l l y employed, rapid 
increases i n expenditures create excess demand over the 
capacity of the economy. I f money income rises more than 
rea l income, t h i s generates an i n f l a t i o n a r y process. 
Assuming tha t the nominal stock of money increased, the 
i n i t i a l impact of t h i s increase is to reduce the rate of 
in te res t and to ra ise the l eve l o f -investments i n r ea l 
terms. Given tha t consumption depends solely on real 
income and that government expenditures do not increase 
i n r ea l terms, the t o t a l demand on real resources w i l l now 
be greater than the resources avai lable . These demanding 
investment goods w i l l be ready to pay higher prices to 
achieve the desired increase i n rea l investments, thus 
there w i l l be monetary excess demand created by monetary 
expansion. As f u l l employment exis ts , monetary expansion 
immediately a f f e c t s the balance of payments, leading t o a 
. . 6 d e f i c i t . 
As long as investment expenditures are not increased 
by i n f l a t i o n a r y ways, i t w i l l not create any d e f i c i t i n 
the balance of payments as the output created by the invest-
ments allows aggregate supply to keep pace w i t h aggregate 
demand. The in te res t ing point here i s tha t an expansion of 
income i s assumed not to a f f e c t the balance of payments, as 
Nurkse has commented; 
6. J . BALL, np. c i t . . pp.70-72. 
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" I t may seem strange tha t an expansion of income i n 
t h i s model i s not necessarily accompanied by any net 
increase i n imports. The marginal propensity to 
import would seem to be zero, which looks l i k e a 
rather unnatural r e su l t . But there is nothing strange 
about i t i f we remember that i n t h i s case there has 
been a s t r u c t u r a l change i n the economy, the creation 
of a new indust ry . The usual concepts of income 
analysis i n in te rna t iona l trade, j u s t l i k e those of the 
Keynesian income analysis i n general, assume a given 
economic s t ruc ture . Development means changes i n 
economic s t ructure and i n t h i s dynamic context the 
func t iona l re la t ionships between income and imports 
need not behave i n the usual manner."7 
The suggestion by Nurkse seems to be based on the 
assumption that as soon as the products of the new industry 
are sold on theddomestic market, expenditures w i l l be 
d iver ted from imported goods and there w i l l not be any 
balance of payments d i f f i c u l t i e s . However, i t should be 
pointed out that t h i s can only be possible i f i n f l a t i o n 
i s avoided. I f expenditures are not increased through 
c r e d i t expansion, dishoarding or a reduction i n savings, 
income w i l l remain l i m i t e d at the l eve l dictated by macro-
economic equi l ibr ium, and thus any purchase of the products 
of the new industry w i l l reduce expenditures on imported 
goods. Assuming f u l l employment exis ts , i f money income 
increases by i n f l a t i o n a r y methods, money expenditure 
w i l l exceed the increases i n output, leading to a d e f i c i t 
i n the balance of payments. 
As monetary expansion i s viewed as the main reason 
7. R. NURKSE, "Trade Theory and Development Policy", i n 
Economic Development f o r La t in America, edited by HOWARD 
S. ELLIS, assisted by HENRY C. WALLICH (Macmillan, 1961) 
p.260. 
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8 
f o r both i n f l a t i o n and the balance of payments the ro le of 
the ra te of in te res t i n t h i s context should be examined. 
I n the previous paragraphs i t was explained that i n an 
i n f l a t i o n a r y process the ra te of in teres t i s expected to 
r i s e and to check expenditures, reducing the i n f l a t i o n a r y 
pressure i n the economy. Moreover, i f the rate of in teres t 
r ises r e l a t i v e t o fore ign rates of in te res t , in ternat ional 
funds are a t t rac ted to the i n f l a t i o n country, closing the 
d e f i c i t i n the balance of payments by adjustments of the 
c a p i t a l account. This relates to "the assignmentrproblem" 
Proper use of monetary po l icy can ease balance of payments 
d i f f i c u l t i e s . However one th ing should be pointed out 
tha t t h i s suggestion assumes the independence of the monetary 
a u t h o r i t y . This i s hardly acceptable from the point of 
view of developing countries as the monetary author i t ies 
are a part of developmentpprogrammes on the one hand, and 
8. The assignment problem fol lows from the observation that 
governments give r e spons ib i l i t y f o r the pursuit of pol icy 
object ives seperately t o d i f f e r e n t government au thor i t i e s . 
For instance, the Central Bank, c o n t r o l l i n g monetary 
po l i cy , i s assigned r e spons ib i l i t y f o r external balance, 
and the Treasury (or min i s t ry of finance i n the case of 
Turkey), c o n t r o l l i n g f i s c a l po l icy , i s given respons ib i l i ty 
f o r f u l l employment. The assignment problem is that which 
objec t ive should be assigned to which agency, to guarantee 
the most e f f i c i e n t operation o f po l i cy . The solut ion to 
t h i s kproblem is the use of the "p r inc ip le of e f f e c t i v e 
market c l a s s i f i c a t i o n " . 
I n the context of the balance of payments and i n f l a -
t i o n , the independency of the monetary author i t ies is 
important. I f the monetary au thor i ty i s given autonomy, 
i t exerts inf luence through the monetary base on the rate 
of in te res t and thus the balance of payments. As i s known, 
the concept of the monetary base involves the independency 
of the monetary au tho r i t i e s . This broad issue i s discussed 
i n , R.A. MUNDELL, "Appropriate use of Monetary and Fisca l 
po l i cy f o r I n t e rna l and External S t a b i l t i y " , IMF S ta f f 
Papers, V o l . 9, No. 1, 1961. 
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the s t ructure of developing countries i s not sui table f o r 
the proper working of the rate of in te res t , as described 
by A. Bloomfield, on the other hand: 
" I t fo l lows from the underdeveloped nature of the 
money and c a p i t a l markets that the in teres t rate 
s t ruc ture i n underdeveloped countries is largely 
unintegrated and that over a large part of the 
economy in te res t rates are r e l a t i v e l y insensi t ive to 
the actions of the monetary au thor i t i e s . Even w i t h i n 
given sectors or l o c a l i t i e s of the market there i s 
o f t e n a wide d i v e r s i t y of in teres t rates because of 
wide differences i n the type and qua l i t y of r i s k 
or because of the forces of custom and t r a d i t i o n . 
There i s an especial ly wide gap between in teres t rates; 
i n the so-called organized and unorganized sectors of 
the money market. In teres t rates undeniably play a 
lesser ro l e than they do i n more developed countries 
i n in f luenc ing the volume and; d i r ec t ion of invest-
ments. I n the modus operandi of monetary pol icy , the 
a v a i l a b i l i t y of c r e d i t f ac to r i s l i k e l y to be more 
important, r e l a t i v e to the cost f ac to r , than i t i s 
i n more developed countr ies . ( In some cases, i n f ac t , 
the au thor i t i e s f i x maximum loan rates f o r banks or 
o f f i c i a l lending i n s t i t u t i o n s ) " . ^ 
Thus i t cannot be assumed that even i f in teres t rates are 
inf luenced by excess monetary demand, that a l l sectors i n 
the economy, w i l l respond, through organized money markets, 
i n theq appropriate fashion. Equally in teres t rate po l ic ies 
pursued by governments i n the pursui t o f some broad economic 
development strategy may exacerbate balance of payments 
problems. Therefore, not surpr i s ing ly , i n many developing 
countries c r ed i t r e s t r i c t i o n s are select ive c red i t controls 
9. A. BLOOMFIELD, "Monetary Policy i n Underdeveloped Countries", 
i n Readings i n i-lEconomie Developmeat. edited by T. MORGAN, 
G. BETZ and N.K. CHOUDHRY ( Wadworth Publishing Company, 
U.S.A., 1963) p.367. 
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are preferred to in te res t rate po l i c i e s . The reasons 
can be sought i n terms of the assignment problem or, more 
generally, in terms of the fragmented nature of the 
f i n a n c i a l system. 
Given these sorts of po l icy constraints we can now 
look at possible management pol ic ies resu l t ing from a 
balance of payments d e f i c i t . 
3.2 BALANCE OF PAYMENTS MANAGEMENT POLICIES 
A d e f i c i t i n the balance of payments i s the di f ference 
between expenditures and rea l income as shown i n equation 
(3) where Y indicates output, B the trade balance and E 
aggregate expenditures. I f a d e f i c i t exists i n the 
balance of payments, namely, E i s negative, two sets of 
po l i cy can be employed, e i ther Y is increased, output 
increasing po l i c i e s , or, E i s reduced, expenditure reducing 
p o l i c y . •'•^  I t should be pointed out tha t income and 
expenditure are i n t e r dependent and hence t h i s d i s t i n c t i o n 
re fe rs to the i n i t i a l impact of the po l icy as any change i n 
e i the r income, as expenditure w i l l s t a r t m u l t i p l i e r changes 
i n bo th . : However, so long as the marginal propensity to 
spend i s less than one, the e f f e c t of an expenditure 
reducing po l icy or output increasing pol icy w i l l always 
improve the balance on current a c c o u n t . B u t t h i s i s 
10. L . YEAGER, In te rna t iona l Monetary Relations, (Harper and 
Row, 1966) pp.87-136, and H.G. JOHNSON, "Balance of Pay-
ments", i n Money Trade and Economic Growth. (Allen and 
Unwin, 1968) pp.15-27. 
11. H.G. JOHNSON, i b i d . 
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hardly acceptable from the point of view of developing 
countries as a high rate of growth depends on a high level 
of investment expenditures. 
Another way to increase" output i s to d iver t the 
expenditures from abroad on the grounds that output i s 
governed by the demand f o r i t . This po l icy i s known as an 
expenditure switching po l i cy . 
An expenditure reducing pol icy can be applied through 
monetary r e s t r i c t i o n s , budgetary po l icy and d i rec t controls, 
Since any po l i cy of t h i s kind tends t o reduce income and 
employment, i t could be use fu l f o r an economy experiencing 
both i n f l a t i o n and balance of payments . d i f f i c u l t i e s . 
Expenditure switching po l i c i e s can be applied by 
the use of devaluation and trade controls i n the form of 
exchange r e s t r i c t i o n s , quant i t a t ive and qua l i t a t i ve 
cont ro l s , generally imposed on imports. 
Under i n f l a t i o n a r y conditions there are two targets 
to be achieved i n the economy: a stable l eve l of prices 
( i n t e rna l balance) and an equi l ibr ium i n the balance of 
payments (external balance). I n t h i s case the pol icy 
12 
variables can not be less than two, and ]each pol icy 
12. Tinbergen made an important observation that the number of 
po l i cy variables must not be smaller than the number of 
ta rge ts . This means that the au thor i t i es responsible f o r 
in t e rna t iona l and domestic equi l ibr ium iraist i n general make 
use of at least two po l icy variables at a l l times. See 
J . TINBERGEN, On the Theory of Economic Policy. (North 
Holland Publishing Company 1952), and J . TINBERGEN, 
"The Relation between In t e rna l I n f l a t i o n and the Balance 
o f Payments", Banca Nazionale del Lavoro. Quarterly Review. 
October-December 1952, pp.187-194. 
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var iab le should be paired w i t h the target on which i t has 
the greatest r e l a t i v e impact. However, i t should be pointed 
out tha t each po l i cy variable has an e f f e c t on both in te rna l 
and external equ i l ib r ium. Expenditure reducing po l i c i es , 
f o r example, may also have inc identa l i-;switching e f fec t s , 
t o the extent tha t they inf luence the r e l a t i v e structure 
of prices as w e l l as t h e i r absolute l e v e l . However, the 
r e l a t i v e impact of each instrument on each of the two 
targets tends t o be d i f f e r e n t . I n general, expenditure 
reducing po l i c ies tend to have a r e l a t i v e l y greater impact 
domestically, whereas switching po l ic ies tend to have a 
r e l a t i v e l y greater impact external ly , since t h e i r most 
d i r ec t e f f e c t i s on the'iZ\vo'ljume and d i r ec t ion of i n t e r -
na t ional t ransactions. But the point about expenditure 
reducing po l i c ies deserves much closer examination i n the 
context of developing countries, the e f fec t s of expenditure 
reducing po l i c i e s on the balance of payments may be greater 
than expenditure switching po l ic ies as they are heavily 
dependent on imports of investment goods. 
Under i n f l a t i o n a r y condit ions, a pol icy model can be 
obtained on the basis o f formula (3) . I n the formula Y 
w i l l be assumed to be f u l l employment output and can not 
be reduced i n the short run. I n t h i s case a d e f i c i t 
r e su l t ing from i n f l a t i o n i s t o be moved, money expenditures 
should be reduced to the l eve l of rea l output. However, 
t o the extent tha t exchange reserves are avai lable, an 
economy can run a d e f i c i t . I n t h i s case, a d e f i c i t con-
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s t i t u t e s a leakage of excessive spendings, exerting a 
s t a b i l i z i n g e f f e c t . 
I n an i n f l a t i o n a r y process expenditure switching 
p o l i c i e s , i n the form of devaluation and trade controls , 
are l i k e l y to prove i n e f f e c t i v e . The effectiveness of 
devaluation depending as i t does on the Marsha11-Lerner 
condit ions i s rather questionable under the conditions of 
developing countr ies . Even i f t h i s condi t ion is f u l f i l l e d , 
i t i s necessary, i n an i n f l a t i o n a r y process, that devalua-
t i o n has t o be associated w i t h a f a l l i n aggregate expen-
di tures to meet the s h i f t e d demand from abroad. I f , when 
a country devalues, i t does not also adopt measures to 
keep aggregate domestic expenditure constant, any increase 
i n exports or decrease i n imports w i l l lead to an i n f l a t i o n 
of expenditures and renewed pressures on the balance of 
payments. I t i s therefore essential that monetary expan-
sion should not be allowed to o f f s e t the equilabrating 
e f f e c t s o f devaluation. However, the e f fec t s of devalua-
t i o n i n an i n f l a t i o n a r y process should not be b e l i t t l e d . 
I f the money supply i s kept constant, expenditures w i l l 
be automatical ly reduced by the r i s e i n the pr ice leve l 
and the reduction i n the rea l value of cash balances as a 
r e su l t o f the devaluation. •'"'^  Besides the e f fec t s on 
expenditures of the r i s e i n the l eve l of prices, the re la-
t i v e p r ice changes associated w i t h a change i n the terms 
13. S.S. ALEXANDER, "Effects of a Devaluation on a Trade 
Balance", IMP.-Staff Papers. V o l . 2, A p r i l 1952, pp.263-278. 
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of trade w i l l also a f f e c t expenditures, through both the 
"income e f fec t s" and the "price e f f ec t " (subst i tut ion) of 
the change i n the terms of trade. VJhen devaluation is 
complemented by monetary and f i s c a l po l ic ies reducing 
expenditures, i t may be possible to remove the d e f i c i t i n 
the balance of payments. 
As f o r trade controls , imposed on imports, they do 
not reduce expenditures, only keep them w i t h i n the economy 
and thus t h i s aggravates i n f l a t i o n a r y pressures. I f import 
controls are retained on a long run basis, i t can a f f e c t 
production adversly; behind the protect ion of import 
controls monopoly elements or i n e f f i c i e n t production uni ts 
14 
can emerge. Moreover, on the short run basis, import 
con t ro l can hamper production as they prevent the necessary 
raw materials spare parts from reaching the production 
u n i t s . These were the cases f o r Turkey during the 1954-59 
i n f l a t i o n . 
A l l t h i s suggests that i n an i n f l a t i o n a r y process, 
balance of payments d i f f i c u l t i e s can only be avoided by 
g iv ing weight to expenditure reducing po l ic ies , on the 
assumption that by reducing aggregate expenditure both the 
demand f o r domestic goods and the demand f o r imported goods 
can be reduced simultaneously. I f the demand f o r domestic 
production is decreased s i g n i f i c a n t l y t h i s may create an 
14. E. LUNDBERG, " In te rna t iona l S t a b i l i t y and the National 
Economy" i n S t a b i l i t y and Progress i n the World Economy, 
edited by D. HAGUE, (St. Mar t in ' s Press, 1958) pp.216-218. 
15. Z.Y. HERSHLAG, O P . c i t . , p.2 53 . 
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add i t iona l e f f e c t of increasing the volume of exports, thus 
ass i s t ing the reduction of the balance of payments d e f i c i t . 
Thus Keynesian analysis provides a very useful 
linkage between i n t e r n a l prices and external trade, and 
provides indicat ions of the pol icy measures necessary to 
restore pr ice s t a b i l i t y and balance of payments equi l ibr ium. 
However, when t h i s broad ana ly t i ca l framework is applied 
to the Turkish case, then considerable a t ten t ion has to be 
paid to the "transmission mechanisms" by which pol icy 
operates on the economy. I n t h i s context chapter 4 now 
looks c losely at the f i n a n c i a l s t ructure i n Turkey and 
monetary expansion i n the period under study. 
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C H A P T E R 4 
MONETARY EXPANSION IN TURKEY DURING THE 1950-65 PERIOD 
4.1 THE FINANCIAL STRUCTURE OF TURKISH ECONOMY 
I n t h i s chapter the monetary expansion i n the 1950-65 
period w i l l be examined. F i r s t l y , a sui table d e f i n i t i o n 
of money f o r the analysis w i l l be sought, and secondly a 
balance sheet analysis of the banking system w i l l be 
presented to reveal which sectors of the economy contributed 
t o monetary expansion i n t h i s period. 
Before analysing t h i s monetary expansion, i t w i l l be 
u s e f u l to examine the f i n a n c i a l s t ructure of the economy 
t o show the importance of money i n the economy. The 
phrase " f i n a n c i a l s tructure" refers to the f i n a n c i a l assets 
and the f i n a n c i a l i n s t i t u t i o n s of the economy. I n Table 
4 . 1 , the percentage d i s t r i b u t i o n of f i n a n c i a l assets i s 
shown. Regarding the Table, the economy can be i d e n t i f i e d 
as a monetary economy i n that money and monetary l i a b i l i t i e s 
are widely used. The banking system has a large share i n 
the f i n a n c i a l s t ruc ture . However, i n 1950-62 period the 
share of the banking system did decrease. The pos i t ion 
of the -banking system i n the f i n a n c i a l s tructure seems 
to be t y p i c a l of economies at the early stages of develop-
ment. As the economy develops the share of the banking 
system i n the f i n a n c i a l s t ructure has a tendency to decline. 
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Table 4 .1 Financial Assets Held by the Nonbank Public 
(Percentage Dis t r ibu t ion ) 
1952 1962 
Currency and Deposits 100.0 88.9 100.0 71.6 
Central Bank Notes 42.4 36.0 
Coins 1.6 1.3 
Deposits 56.0 62.7 
a. Demand Deposits 48.9 53.1 
b. Time Deposits 7.1 9.6 
Securi t ies lOO.O 8.5 100.0 10.6 
Bonds 100.0 C. M 83.5 
Stocks 16.5 
Insurance Funds 100.0 2.6 100.0 17.8 
L i f e Insurance 1.0 
Pension Fund 100.0 32.0 
Social Security 63.0 
Array Fund Pension 4.0 
Tota l F inancia l Assets 100.0 100.0 
Source: Derived from S. KORUM, "Financial Structure, 
Economic Growth, and Monetary Policy i n Turkey", 
i n Symposium on Central Banking. Monetary Policy 
and Economic Development. (Central Treaty 
Organization, Izmir , 1971) p.126. 
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I n t h i s respect, changes i n the f i n a n c i a l s tructure of the 
Turkish economy have some s i m i l a r i t i e s w i t h the experiences 
of developed countr ies .^ 
Despite t h i s decreasing share the banking system 
s t i l l accounted f o r a large part of the f i n a n c i a l assets 
i n the economy by 1962 (72%). The lack of non-f inancia l 
i n s t i t u t i o n s and t h e i r primary secur i t ies are s i g n i f i c a n t ; 
government bonds, pr iva te bonds and corporate stocks only 
account f o r a small por t ion of t o t a l f i n a n c i a l assets. 
Government bonds accounted f o r 9.89% of t o t a l f i n a n c i a l 
assets i n 1965; pr iva te secur i t ies and corporate stocks 
2 
2.33% and 1.28% i n the same year respect ively. This 
charac te r i s t i c o f the economy can be related to a large 
extent t o the legal s t ructure of the production un i t s . 
The dominant legal form of ownership outside the ag r i cu l -
t u r a l sector i s i nd iv idua l proprie torship and general 
partnership. This s i t ua t i on suggests that the savers and 
investors are not separated to any s i g n i f i c a n t extent. 
This property of the f i n a n c i a l s t ructure puts the 
economy i n t o a very close re la t ionsh ip w i t h monetary 
1. R. GOLDSMITH, "Financial Structure and Economic Growth i n 
Advanced Countries - An.Experiment i n Comparative Financial 
Morphology", Capi ta l Formation and Economic Growth. (New 
York, National Bureau of Economic Research, 1955). 
2. Y. AKYUZ, "Money and I n f l a t i o n i n Turkey 1950-68", (The 
Faculty of P o l i t i c a l Science, Ankara Univers i ty , 1972). 
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phenomena i n Turkey. I t may be suggested that the stock 
of money i s one of the most important factors a f f e c t i n g 
the expenditures. Equally the narrowness of the domestic 
capita,l market has meant tha t the major commercial banks 
have been act ive i n i n d u s t r i a l finance, and, therefore, 
monetary expansion, working through the banking system, 
has had a d i r ec t impact on i n d u s t r i a l investment. 
4 .2 . THE DEFINITION OF MONEY 
The main controversies around this d e f i n i t i o n of money 
are whether or not i t can be uniquely defined"^ and how 
the demand f o r money i s considered. I n the l a t t e r aspect 
the problem turns around whether or not time deposits w i l l 
4 
be included. 
The a t t r i b u t e of money, l i q u i d i t y , can be defined as 
the length of time to convert an asset a t i t s f u l l pr ice 
i n t o another asset to be used f o r transactions.^ Thus 
currency and cheque accounts are as money since the "length 
of time" i s almost zerdr w i t h respect to these assets. 
However, the d i s t i n c t i o n between " l i q u i d i t y " and " i l l i -
q u i d i t y " i s rather vague, even time deposits can rapidly 
be converted in to currency. Therefore i t i s more reasonable 
to speak of a l i q u i d i t y spectrum. 
3. See N. KALDOR, "The New Monetarism"/ Lloyds Bank Review. 
July 1970, pp.1-8. 
4. J . BALL, r i n f l a t i o n andlthe Theory of Money. (Allen and 
Unwin L t d . , London 1964) p.165. 
b . 
5. J . BALL, op. c i t . . p.170 
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I n Turkey deposits are c l a s s i f i e d as (a) saving 
deposits, (b) commercial deposits, (c) o f f i c i a l deposits 
and (d) inter-bank deposits. Each has time and demand 
components. The o f f i c i a l d e f i n i t i o n of money includes 
currency plus commercial demand deposits plus the f r ee 
reserves of the banks at the Central Bank. The reasoning 
behind t h i s d e f i n i t i o n seems to be that commercial demand 
deposits are cheque accounts and the f r ee reserves are 
considered as currency. 
The o f f i c i a l d e f i n i t i o n of money may not be s u f f i c i e n t , 
and time deposits, i n ray view, should be included i n the 
d e f i n i t i o n . F i r s t l y , the use of a cheque can not be taken 
as a c r i t e r i a f o r "moneyness", as the use of a cheque is 
rather narrow i n Turkey; the major i ty of payments being 
made i n cash. Thus the d i s t i n c t i o n between demand and 
time deposits seems to be less important as the arrange-
ments t o draw time deposits can easi ly be made.^ There-
f o r e i t can be suggested that the "moneyness" of time and 
demand deposits i s i d e n t i c a l . Thus through t h i s chapter 
a broad d e f i n i t i o n o f moniey-j " which includes currency plus 
commercial demand and time deposits plus saving time and 
demand deposits w i l l be employed. 
0. YENAL, "Development of the Financial System", i n Four 
Studies on Economic Development of Turkey, edited by 
C.F. SHORTER, (Frank Cass, 1963). 
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4.3 A BALANCE SHEET ANALYSIS OF THE BANKING SYSTEM^ 
The b a s i c p r i n c i p l e of the a n a l y s i s i n t h i s s e c t i o n 
i s based on a simple accounting i d e n t i t y t h a t the a s s e t s 
s i d e of a balance sheet i s always equal to the l i a b i l i t i e s 
s i d e , and thus any change i n the a s s e t ( l i a b i l i t i e s ) 
s i d e c r e a t e s an equivalent change i n the l i a b i l i t i e s 
s i d e ( a s s e t s ) . 
F i r s t l y the monetary base w i l l be examined on the 
assumption t h a t t h e r e i s a s t a b l e r e l a t i o n between the 
monetary base and the money supply. The hypothesis i n 
t h i s s e c t i o n i s that the p u b l i c s e c t o r i s the main source 
f o r the expansion i n the monetary base and thus the money 
supply. The monetary base i f defined as currency i n 
c i r c u l a t i o n g plus the f r e e deposits of the banks at the 
C e n t r a l Bank. I n order to see which s e c t o r s contributed 
to the expansion of money base, the economy w i l l be divided 
i n t o f i v e main s e c t o r s : the C e n t r a l Government, the S t a t e 
Economic E n t e r p r i s e s , the Organizations f o r P r i c e I n t e r -
vention, the p r i v a t e s e c t o r and the foreign s e c t o r . 
The o r g a n i z a t i o n s f o r p r i c e p o l i c y c o n s i s t of two 
S t a t e Economic E n t e r p r i s e s and one C e n t r a l Government 
agency; the S t a t e Economic E n t e r p r i s e s dealing with p r i c e 
7. The methodology used i n t h i s chapter was o r i g i n a l l y adopted 
by Yilmaz Akyuz i n h i s book, Monev and I n f l a t i o n i n Turkey 
1950-68. Although the same methodology has been used i n 
t h i s chapter the s e c t o r s i n t o which the economy has been 
divided a r e d i f f e r e n t from Akyuz's d i s t r i b u t i o n . The 
Monopoly Adm i n i s t r a t i o n was considered as an organization 
f o r p r i c e i n t e r v e n t i o n . 
p o l i c y a r e the S o i l Products O f f i c e and the Sugar Company. 
The former i s engaged i n the stock and p r i c e regulation of 
the main c e r e a l crops, the l a t t e r deals w i t h the purchase 
of sugar beet and production of sugar. The C e n t r a l 
Government agency dealing with p r i c e p o l i c y i s the S t a t e 
Monopoly a d m i n i s t r a t i o n engaging i n tobacco purchase 
and the p r i c e p o l i c y f o r the crop. Besides these three 
o r g a n i s a t i o n s , t h e r e i s another i n s t i t u t i o n ; the A g r i -
c u l t u r a l S a l e s Cooperative c o n s i s t i n g of a number of small 
c o o p e r a t i v e s . The A g r i c u l t u r a l S a l e s Cooperatives are 
g 
under the c o n t r o l of the A g r i c u l t u r a l Bank of Turkey. 
The C e n t r a l Bank i s s u e s notes i n the following way: 
(a) 120 days commercial b i l l s of r e a l and l e g a l persons 
engaged i n i n d u s t r i a l and mining business may be accepted 
by the Bank f o r rediscount when presented by a commercial 
bank; and a l s o 9 month b i l l s presented by banks which 
a r e l e g a l l y assigned to meet the c r e d i t needs of small 
a r t i s a n s and tradesmen; 
(b) 9-months a g r i c u l t u r a l b i l l s presented by a bank; 
(c) 9-months Treasury Guaranteed B i l l s of the i n s t i t u t i o n s 
e s t a b l i s h e d by a s p e c i a l a c t , w i t h c a p i t a l owned by the 
s t a t e , 
(d) 9-months Treasury bonds presented by a bank; 
8., A f u l l account of the p r i c e i n t e r v e n t i o n p o l i c y and the 
o r g a n i s a t i o n s concerned i s found i n the work by A.O. FORKER, 
" A g r i c u l t u r a l P r i c e P o l i c v i n Turkey". Vol. 2-, USAID, 
Ankara, 1970. 
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(e) Short term advances to treasury,. 
(f) Advances on government bonds, on gold and foreign 
exchange; 
(g) I s s u e s based on gold and foreign exchange earnings, 
i n c l u d i n g t r a n s f e r s . 
^ The C e n t r a l Government agencies a r e e l i g i b l e to 
borrow from the C e n t r a l Bank through the (d) and ( e ) . 
These borrowings have to be repa i d w i t h i n the same f i n a n c i a l 
year,. and the maximum amount to borrow i s l i m i t e d and 
9 
su b j e c t t o l e g i s l a t i o n ; 
The S t a t e Economic E n t e r p r i s e s can obtain c r e d i t s 
through the operations (a) and (c) . However, i n p r a c t i c e 
borrowings were made only through the operation ( c ) . 
The p r i v a t e s e c t o r can borrow through rediscounting. 
gold and fo r e i g n currency. 
The C e n t r a l Bank Balance Sheet can be divided into 
the items shown below: 
Ass e t s L i a b i l i t i e s 
- C r e d i t s and Advances - Deposits 
T Gold and Foreign Exchange - Currency i n C i r c u l a t i o n 
A s s e t s 
- Gold and Foreign Exchange 
- Claims to be l i q u i d a t e d L i a b i l i t i e s 
- Other a s s e t s - C a p i t a l Account and other 
l i a b i l i t i e s 
In. t h e balance sheet Gold and Foreign Exchange a s s e t s 
and l i a b i l i t i e s r e f e r to the Foreign Sector. The item 
9. S. AREN, OP. c i t . . p.12 
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"Claims to be l i q u i d a t e d " i n v o l v e s two c o n s o l i d a t i o n 
operations undertaken i n 1955 and 1961: I n the former 
y e a r TL 550 m i l l i o n of Treasury guaranteed bonds of the 
S o i l Products O f f i c e was c a n c e l l e d and TL 54 m i l l i o n was 
s e t t l e d between the Treasury and the C e n t r a l Bank. The 
remaining TL 496 m i l l i o n was t r a n s f e r r e d into a l i q u i d a -
t i o n fund. I n 1961 TL 5003 m i l l i o n outstanding debt of 
the C e n t r a l Government, the S t a t e Economic E n t e r p r i s e s , 
and the Organisations f o r p r i c e i n t e r v e n t i o n was t r a n s f e r r e d 
i n t o the same fund. I n r e t u r n the C e n t r a l Bank obtained 
the Treasury Bonds w i t h 0.5% i n t e r e s t to be repaid over a 
one hundred year period. As f o r the gold and exchange 
item, the C e n t r a l Bank i s the only a u t h o r i t y f o r dealing 
w i t h f o r e i g n currency. I n order to see the e f f e c t s of 
the f o r e i g n sector, the counterpart funds w i l l be taken 
i n t o account and t r e a t e d as a l i a b i l i t y . Thus net foreign 
a s s e t s cover net gold and f o r e i g n exchange a s s e t s and 
counterpart funds. 
Thus changes i n the Monetary Base equal: 
a) changes i n C e n t r a l Government C r e d i t s minus deposits, 
plus 
b) changes i n the S t a t e Economic E n t e r p r i s e s C r e d i t s , plus 
c) changes i n the o r g a n i s a t i o n s f o r P r i c e I n t e r v e n t i o n 
C r e d i t s , plus 
d) changes i n P r i v a t e Sector C r e d i t s , 
e) changes i n net f o r e i g n a s s e t s , plus 
f ) changes i n (net) other a s s e t s . 
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On t h i s c l a s s i f i c a t i o n changes i n the Monetary Base 
a r e shown i n Table 4.2. The claims to be l i q u i d a t e d were 
a l l o c a t e d to r e l e v a n t s e c t o r s . As i t can be seen from 
Table 4.2 the changes i n the monetary base were dominated 
by p u b l i c s e c t o r borrowings. Of the three s e c t o r s of the 
p u b l i c s e c t o r , the most important was the organizations 
f o r p r i c e i n t e r v e n t i o n . P a r t i c u l a r l y i n the 1950-58 period 
the r e l a t i o n s h i p between the changes i n the monetary base 
and the changes i n the borrowings of the organizations 
f o r k p r i c e i n t e r v e n t i o n i s very marked. 
I n the 1951-58 period the resources of the C e n t r a l 
Government Agency, The S t a t e Economic E n t e r p r i s e s and the 
Organizations f o r P r i c e I n t e r v e n t i o n r a p i d l y increased. 
The t o t a l c r e d i t to these t h r e e was TL 1008 m i l l i o n , i n 
1956? I t rose to 5156 m i l l i o n by 1959. I n the following 
paragraphs the reasons f o r the recourse of these three 
s e c t o r s to the C e n t r a l Bank w i l l be examined. F i r s t , the 
Organizations f o r P r i c e I n t e r v e n t i o n a r e examined. 
The S o i l Products O f f i c e deal w i t h main c e r e a l crops, 
such as wheat, b a r l e y , rye. The share of these crops i n 
the t o t a l crop production was 55% on average i n the 1950-65 
period. The i n t e r v e n t i o n by the o f f i c e aimed at s t a b i l i z i n g 
market p r i c e s . More important than t h i s , the o f f i c e 
attempted to protect both the consumers i n urban areas and 
the income of the producers who c o n s t i t u t e the l a r g e s t 
s e c t i o n of the population. Such a p o l i c y of securing low 
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p r i c e s i n . t h e market and a r e g u l a r and r e l a t i v e l y high 
income i n the a g r i c u l t u r a l s e c t o r led to the large d e f i c i t s 
of the o f f i c e . I n the 19 50-65 period, vwith the exception 
of 1952, the accounts of the o f f i c e showed lar g e d e f i c i t s . 
As can be seen from Table 4.33 the l o s s e s of the o f f i c e 
continued throughout the period. I n 1954 the l o s s was the 
h i g h e s t f o r the whole period. I n that y e a r a g r i c u l t u r a l 
production f e l l sharply, by 20%. This can be accepted as 
evidence of the income p o l i c y by the o f f i c e . Also i n 
Table 4.3 i t can be seen t h a t the p r i c e paid to the 
producers was always higher than the o f f i c e s a l e p r i c e . 
The Sugar Company has a monopoly i n the sugar beet mar-
ket. The company i n f l u e n c e s production d i r e c t l y by i t s 
p r i c e and a l l o c a t i o n p o l i c y . The production of sugar 
i n c r e a s e d r a p i d l y and s e l f - s u f f i e n c y was achieved, i n the 
e a r l y 1950s. Despite t h i s f i f t e e n new f a c t o r i e s were b u i l t 
up w i t h the hope of exporting sugar. T h i s could not be 
r e a l i z e d as Turkey was unable to kcompete on the world 
market f o r exports a g a i n s t cane w i t h her more expensive 
beet d e r i v a t i v e . The surplus sugar had to be sold on the 
world market a t a l o s s . On the other hand the domestic 
s a l e p r i c e of sugar did not keep pace with in c r e a s e s i n 
the p r i c e of i t s main raw m a t e r i a l s . (See Table 4.4). 
The export p r i c e of sugar rose i n 1963 due to the 
Cuban c r i s i s . However, i t f e l l i n the next year again. 
The p r o t e c t i v e p r i c e and production p o l i c y l e d the company 
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Table 4.4 Suaar and Sugar Beet P r i c e s 19 54-1965 
P r i c e 
1953 = 
Index 
: 100 
Sugar Cost and P r i c e Per 
KG (In kurus's) 
Sugar 
Beet 
Sugar Domestic 
P r i c e 
Export 
Cost 
Export 
P r i c e 
1954 120 100 1956 200 n.a 36 
1957 170 153 1962 2 50 180 53 
1959 196 230 1963 2 50 180 223 
1963 231 192 1964 2 50 180 178 
196 5 267 192 
Source: Y. AKyuz, op. c i t . , p.177. 
i n t o l a r g e operating d e f i c i t s which were l a r g e l y financed 
by t h e C e n t r a l Bank c r e d i t s . C e n t r a l Bank c r e d i t s to 
f i n a n c e these d e f i c i t s rose r a p i d l y i n the 1954-1959 
period, as can be seen from Table 4.2. 
P r i c e i n t e r v e n t i o n i n tobacco i s accomplished through 
the S t a t e Monopoly AcSministration. There i s no compre-
hensi v e data to a n a l y s e the recourse of the admi n i s t r a t i o n 
to the C e n t r a l Bank. However, i n Table 4.5 the p r i c e 
paid by the Administration and the p r i v a t e s e c t o r i s 
shown. I n the 1961-1965 period the ad m i n i s t r a t i o n p r i c e s 
were above the p r i v a t e s e c t o r p r i c e s . S t a r t i n g from 1954 
onwards tobacco stocks i n c r e a s e d r a p i d l y . To some extent 
borrowings of the Monopoly Administration may be a t t r i b u t e d 
t o meeting the c o s t s of the stocks . 
Table 4.5 The F a c t o r s A f f e c t i n g the S t a t e Monopoly 
Administration's D e f i c i t s 1954-1965 
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Adminis 
P r i c e s 
P r i v a t e 
Sector 
P r i c e s 
Stocks C e n t r a l 
Bank 
C r e d i t s 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
1954 - - 168 110 
1956 - - 219 200 
1958 - - 213 215 
1960 - - 589 319 
1961 769 806 553 50 
1962 1175 1152 692 -
1963 908 872 747- 75 
1964 806 675 960 335 
1965 897 845 1455 423 
Sources: Column; 1-2; A. FORKER, OP. c i t . . 
Column 3; U. KORUM, "Ekonometrik Modeller ve Tttrk 
Ekonomisi i a n B i r Deneme" (Econometric Models 
and an A p p l i c a t i o n to the Turk i s h Economy), The 
F a c u l t y of P o l i t i c a l Sciences, Ankara, 1969. 
Column 4; The Monthly B u l l e t i n of the C e n t r a l 
Bank, May-April 1972 
Columns 1 and 2 i n Kurus/Kg. 
Column 3 i n 000's tons. 
Column 4 i n m i l l i o n TL. 
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The S t a t e Economic E n t e r p r i s e s i n the 1950-65 period 
w idely r e s o r t e d to the C e n t r a l Bank. The reason f o r t h i s 
was the operating d e f i c i t s and the finance of investment 
expenditures. The main f a c t o r behind the operating l o s s e s 
of t h e S t a t e Economic E n t e r p r i s e s was the p r i c e p o l i c y 
d i c t a t e d by the a u t h o r i t i e s concerned: the p r i c e s of the 
products of the S t a t e Economic E n t e r p r i s e s were determined 
below the p r i c e s of s i m i l a r goods produced by the p r i v a t e 
s e c t o r . P a r t i c u l a r l y t h i s was the case i n cement, c o a l , 
t e x t i l e s and t r a n s p o r t s . Losses of the S t a t e Economic 
E n t e r p r i s e s a r e shown i n Table 4.6. As the p r i c e s of the 
Table 4.6 Losses o f the S t a t e Economic E n t e r p r i s e s 1954-1959 
Operating Losses Investment 
( i n m i l l i o n TL) ( i n m i l l i o n TL) 
1954 15.7 91.8 
19 5 5 60 . 9 2 53 .8 
1956 155. 5 5539.9 
1957 206.5 1104.9 
1958 345.9 1692.0 
1959 470.5 1883.0 
Source: 1) P. SAGLAM, "Turkiye'de Kamu Tesebbtlsteri (Public 
E n t e r p r i s e s i n Turkey). The F a c u l t y of P o l i t i c a l 
S c i e n c e s . 
2)0.E.CD. Reports - various. 
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s t a t e of economic e n t e r p r i s e s were kept low, i t was 
necessary to r a t i o n . Rationing was a p p l i e d to c o a l , 
s t e e l , sugar, t e x t i l e s and cement i n the second h a l f of 
the 1950-60 period. T h i s caused f u r t h e r bottlenecks as 
d e s c r i b e d by A. Krueger.^^ 
"The f a c t t h a t S t a t e Economic E n t e r p r i s e s attempted 
to hold t h e i r p r i c e s down below the c o s t s of produc-
t i o n not only added f u e l to the i n f l a t i o n through 
monetary c r e a t i n g but a l s o l e d to a reduction i n the 
l e v e l of economic a c t i v i t y i n the p r i v a t e s e c t o r ; 
p r i v a t e firms were unable to compete with the S t a t e 
Economic E n t e r p r i s e s and were t h e r e f o r e forced to 
c u r t a i l production or s e l l a t black market p r i c e s " . 
Thus i n the economy unused c a p a c i t y emerged i n the 
l a t e 1950's, c o n t r i b u t i n g to the i n f l a t i o n a r y process. 
The jump i n the p r i c e s of the S t a t e Economic E n t e r p r i s e s 
was due t o the 1958 s t a b i l i z a t i o n programme. I n order to 
i n c r e a s e the sources of the S t a t e Economic E n t e r p r i s e s 
and c l o s e the operating d e f i c i t s , the p r i c e s of t h e i r 
products were incr e a s e d . 
The share of investments of the S t a t e Economic 
E n t e r p r i s e s rose i n the 1950-60 period. The share was 
9.1% i n 1950 and i t rose to 18% by 1960. I n 1965 i t 
accounted fo r 25% of t o t a l investments. During the 1950s, 
the main f i e l d of investments was i n f r a s t r u c t u r e . I n the 
same period around 30% of these investments were financed 
from the short term c r e d i t s of the C e n t r a l Bank on the 
10. A. KRUEGER, "Turkish Devaluation: Promises and P i t f a l l s " , 
METU Studies i n Develcjpment, Spring 1971, pp.245, f n . l 4 . 
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b a s i s of the Treasury Guaranteed Bonds. T h i s p o s s i b i l i t y 
was opened up to meet the short term working c a p i t a l 
needs of the S t a t e Economic E n t e r p r i s e s . 
The C e n t r a l Bank was not the only i n s t i t u t i o n f i n a n c i n g 
the S t a t e Economic E n t e r p r i s e s . The Amortization and 
C r e d i t Funds financed investments by the S t a t e Economic 
E n t e r p r i s e s . The Fund was e s t a b l i s h e d i n 1953 to develop 
the money market and to administer the government debt. 
The main sources f o r t h i s Fund were part of the l e g a l 
r e s e r v e s of the commercial banks, f o r e i g n c r e d i t s and 
bond i s s u e s . The outstanding debt of the S t a t e Economic 
E n t e r p r i s e s was TL 1600 m i l l i o n i n 1959. The i n t e r e s t i n g 
point i s t h a t the purpose of the l e g a l r e s e r v e s was 
circumvented to a g r e a t e r extent as they returned to the 
market. The debt of the S t a t e Economic E n t e r p r i s e s rose 
i n the 1960-64 period. I t was 2 576.4 m i l l i o n i n 1960, 
rose t o 3021 m i l l i o n and 4304 m i l l i o n i n 1961 and 1964 
r e s p e c t i v e l y . 
The C e n t r a l Government did not have recourse to the 
C e n t r a l Bank s i g n i f i c a n t l y . However, s t a r t i n g from 1954 
the borrowings from the C e n t r a l Bank rose. The main 
reason was the d e f i c i t i n the budget. During the 19 50s 
the average r a t e of i n c r e a s e i n revenues was s l i g h t l y 
s m a l l e r than the i n c r e a s e i n expenditures. The accounts 
of the C e n t r a l Government Budget are r a t h e r complex, and 
t h e r e a r e wide d i s c r e p a n c i e s i n the f i g u r e s f o r expenditures 
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and revenues. However Table 4.7 has been prepared on the 
b a s i s of the f i g u r e s given i n the F i r s t Development Plan, 
i n 1963, and the Second Development Plan i n 1967. 
I n t he f i r s t h a l f of the 1950-60 period the d e f i c i t 
i n the budget rose a t a ; slower.; r a t e than i n the second 
h a l f . As the d e f i c i t rose the monetary t r a n s f e r s from 
the C e n t r a l Bank in c r e a s e d r a p i d l y . The pattern of 
investments undertaken by the C e n t r a l Government a r e shown 
i n Table 4.7. I t should be pointed out that i n the 
period 1950-60 most of the investments by the C e n t r a l 
Government agencies were made i n i n f r a s t r u c t u r e , / and i t 
could be argued t h a t these a r e expenditures t h a t the 
government would normally be very u n w i l l i n g to c u r t a i l . 
One of the main reasons f o r the budgetary d e f i c i t s was 
the f a i l u r e to i n c r e a s e t a x a t i o n . During the 1950-65 
period t h e r a t i o o f tax t o GNP remained almost the same, 
11%. Despite recommendations by s e v e r a l reports, the 
a g r i c u l t u r a l s e c t o r was not taxed, de s p i t e i t s l a r g e 
share i n the economy, although i t must be recognized that 
t h e r e were probably c o n s i d e r a b l e i n s t i t u t i o n a l c o n s t r a i n t s 
on c r e a t i n g a v i a b l e t a x p o l i c y f o r the a g r i c u l t u r a l 
s e c t o r . 
I n t h i s second stage of the a n a l y s i s changes i n 
deposit money w i l l be examined. The Turkish banking 
system c o n s i s t s of the S t a t e Banks and the P r i v a t e Sector 
Banks. Most of the S t a t e Banks have been e s t a b l i s h e d i n 
the form of S t a t e Economic E n t e r p r i s e s . P r i v a t e banks 
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a r e regulated by the Banks C r e d i t s Regulation Coiranittee. 
The r a t e of i n t e r e s t on deposits and c r e d i t s , the maximum 
amount of deposits the banks can accept a r e f i x e d by t h i s 
Committee. 
The balance sheet of the banking system can be 
div i d e d i n t o the items shown below. 
A s s e t s L i a b i l i t i e s 
- C r e d i t s -Deposits 
- L i q u i d Assets -The C e n t r a l Bank Advances 
- L e g a l Reserves -Other Engagements 
-Other Assets - C a p i t a l Account and Other 
L i a b i l i t i e s 
Thus changes i n deposit money can be explained by 
a) changes i n re s e r v e s , plus 
b) changes i n net cl a i m s on p u b l i c s e c t o r c r e d i t s , plus 
c) changes i n p r i v a t e s e c t o r c r e d i t s , plus 
d) changes i n the C e n t r a l Bank advances and other 
engagements 
e) changes i n net other a s s e t s . 
Changes i n bank r e s e r v e s a r e divided i n t o changes i n 
currency kept i n bank v a u l t s and f r e e deposits a t the 
C e n t r a l Bank; and changes i n the l e g a l reserves, which 
a r e p a r t l y kept a t the C e n t r a l Bank. Net claims on the 
p u b l i c s e c t o r cover the c r e d i t s to C e n t r a l Government 
agencies and the S t a t e Economic E n t e r p r i s e s and the 
Organizations j f o r P r i c e I n t e r v e n t i o n minus t h e i r deposits. 
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I n Table 4.8 changes i n deposit money are showp. 
As i t can be seen from the Table, i n the 1950-65 period 
the p r i v a t e s e c t o r dominated the deposit money. Of the 
p r i v a t e s e c t o r c r e d i t s a g r i c u l t u r a l c r e d i t s were most 
important. The percentage d i s t r i b u t i o n of c r e d i t s between 
the various s e c t o r s of the economy i s shown i n Table 4.9. 
I n t h e e a r l y 1950s the share of a g r i c u l t u r a l c r e d i t s i n 
t o t a l c r e d i t s i n c r e a s e d . T h i s can be a t t r i b u t e d to the 
p o l i c y followed by the government. However, i n 1954-59 
i t f e l l . The i n t e r e s t i n g development t h a t took place i n 
the 1954-59 period was that the share of the public s e c t o r 
borrowings incre a s e d r a p i d l y . 
I n t h e 1950-65 period changes i n money deposits 
was dominated by the p r i v a t e s e c t o r borrowings. The 
p u b l i c s e c t o r had a r e l a t i v e l y small share i n the commer-
c i a l banking c r e d i t s . During the period 1950-65 the 
average annual r a t e of change i n p r i v a t e s e c t o r borrowing 
was 17%g whereas changes i n t o t a l monetary deposits was 
18% per annum. 
Table 4.5; The Percentage D i s t r i b u t i o n of C r e d i t s Between 
the Public and A g r i c u l t u r a l Sectors 1950-1963 
Pu b l i c A g r i c u l t u r e Others 
Sec t o r 
1950-53 10.60 40-80 59.20 
1954-59 21.47 35.48 64.62 
1960-6 5 13.87 26.44 73.56 
Source: Monthlv B u l l e t i n of the C e n t r a l Bank. May-April 
1972. 
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I n t h e t h i r d stage of the a n a l y s i s , the balance 
sheets of the C e n t r a l Bank and commercial banks are studied. 
Thus changes i n the money supply can be i n v e s t i g a t e d i n 
terms of the net clai m s of the whole banking system on 
the p u b l i c and p r i v a t e s e c t o r s . 
The c o n s o l i d a t e d balance sheet of the banking system 
i n Turkey can be forxmilated as f o l l o w s : 
Money supply = claims on the pub l i c s e c t o r plus the p r i v a t e 
seciior plus net f o r e i g n a s s e t s plus other a s s e t s . 
Thus changes i n money supply can be explained i n 
terms of the changes i n the r i g h t hand s i d e items of the 
balance sheet. Changes i n money supply i n the 1950-65 
period a r e shown i n Table 4.10. 
The share of the claims of the p r i v a t e s e c t o r i s 
g r e a t e r than the pu b l i c s e c t o r . A major part of these 
c l a i m s a r e due t o the commercial banks. I n the 1950s 
the c l a i m s on the C e n t r a l Government Agencies remained 
r a t h e r n e g l i g i b l e . However, due to the large borrowings 
of t h e S t a t e Economic E n t e r p r i s e s and the rorganizations 
f o r p r i c e i n t e r v e n t i o n , the claims on the pub l i c s e c t o r 
continuously increased, between 1950 and 1958. A f t e r 
1958, due to the 1958 S t a b i l i z a t i o n Programme undertaken, 
the c l a i m s on the S t a t e Economic E n t e r p r i s e s d e c l i n e d 
r a p i d l y , w h i l e the i n c r e a s e s i n the organizations f o r 
p r i c e i n t e r v e n t i o n were stopped. T h i s tendency continued 
a f t e r 1960 and a s p e c i a l a c t was passed which made i t 
very d i f f i c u l t f o r the S t a t e Economic E n t e r p r i s e s to have 
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r e c o u r s e t o the C e n t r a l Bank by i s s u i n g Treasury guaranteed 
Bonds. 
So f a r the evidence suggests that the claims of the 
C e n t r a l Bank on the p u b l i c s e c t o r as a whole account f o r 
most changes i n the monetary base. 
We now need to go on and examine the r o l e of i n t e r e s t 
r a t e s i n the period. 
4.4 THE RATE OF INTEREST 
The f u n c t i o n of the r a t e of i n t e r e s t w i t h i n the 
Keynesian theory of i n f l a t i o n i s to r i s e and to check 
expenditures. On the other hand, i n the Modern Quantity 
Theory, the r a t e of i n t e r e s t i s not given much importance 
as i t may l a g behind p r i c e changes and i t becomes inade-
quate as an i n d i c a t o r f o r the c o s t of holding money, which 
i s a c e n t r a l concept to i n f l a t i o n . 
The c r e d i t market i n Turkey c o n s i s t s of the s o - c a l l e d 
unorganized c r e d i t market and the organized market i n 
which the r a t e of i n t e r e s t i s f i x e d by the monetary 
a u t h o r i t i e s . 
According to the o f f i c i a l sources, the unorganized 
c r e d i t market works very e x t e n s i v e l y i n Turkey and an 
important portion of the c r e d i t s from t h i s market a r e 
financed by the resources of the banking system. The 
share of the unorganized market c r e d i t s i n the t o t a l 
c r e d i t s was estimated by S t a t e Planning Organization, 
t o be around 28% and n e a r l y 78% of t h i s was provided by 
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the banking s y s t e m . I n the unorganized market, the 
r a t e of i n t e r e s t i s known to be w e l l above the bank r a t e . 
I n western Turkey, the r a t e was reported to be 150% i n 
12 
1970. The data i n d i c a t i n g the e f f e c t s of i n f l a t i o n on 
the r a t e i s not a v a i l a b l e , however, i t can be s a i d t h a t 
i n r u r a l areas i t may be responsive to i n f l a t i o n as the 
money lenders i n r u r a l areas a r e mostly merchants and 
they a r e supposed to be s e n s i t i v e to p r i c e r i s e s . 
I n the organized market, the r a t e of i n t e r e s t i s 
f i x e d by the monetary a u t h o r i t i e s . The r a t e i s kept 
below t he market rate."*""^ I n Table 4.11 the o f f i c i a l 
r a t e s of i n t e r e s t a r e shown. As i t can be seen from 
Table 4.11, a l l r a t e s were reduced i n 1951 i n accordance 
w i t h government p o l i c y and were not changed u n t i l 1960. 
Despite the 1954-59 i n f l a t i o n , the i n t e r e s t r a t e 
p o l i c y was not r e v i s e d . P a r t i c u l a r l y , the i n t e r e s t 
r a t e on the medium and long term a g r i c u l t u r a l c r e d i t s was 
11. Second F i v e Year Plan. The S t a t e Planning Organization, 
Ankara, 1964. 
12. The i n t e r e s t r a t e i n the unorganized market has been i n v e s t i -
gated s e v e r a l times. According to a report prepared i n 
1932 by the Higher I n s t i t u t e of A g r i c u l t u r e the r a t e was 
found between 39% and 90.3%. The i n t e r e s t i n g point i s that 
d e s p i t e the high i n t e r e s t r a t e , lenders are always r e l u c -
t a n t , j thus the easy a g r i c u l t u r a l p o l i c y followed by the 
Government i n the e a r l y 19 50s to a gr e a t e r extent a f f e c t e d 
expenditures, t h a t i s , the a v a i l a b i l i t y of c r e d i t increased. 
S t u d i e s of the unorganized market i n Turkey have been under-
taken by: U. HASSAN, "Tarimsal Kredi S o r u n l a r i (The Problem 
of A g r i c u l t u r a l C r e d i t , Review of the F a c u l t y of P o l i t i c a l 
S c i e n c e s , Ankara, Dec. 1970. pp.85-161. J . BLALOCK, 
" C a p i t a l and Finance i n Turki s h A g r i c u l t u r e " , Economic 
Planning D i v i s i o n . (USAID 1969, Ankara) p.51-57. 
13. M. FRY, "The I n t e r e s t Rate P o l i c y i n Turkey", Hacettepe 
B u l l e t i n of S o c i a l Sciences and Humanities". 
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14 a t a low l e v e l compared to the others. 
The C e n t r a l Bank discount r a t e p o l i c y did not follow 
the same pattern. I n 1950 i t was reduced from 5.5% to 3% 
f o r the f i r s t time. With the i n c r e a s e s i n p r i c e s , the 
r a t e was i n c r e a s e d again, from 4.5% to 6% i n 1956. 
However t h i s was not an e f f e c t i v e p o l i c y , f i r s t l y because 
the r a t e was low compared to the market ra t e , secondly, 
the C e n t r a l Bank could not a c c e p t a l l the b i l l s presented. 
D e s p i t e the r i s e s i n the discount r a t e , t h i s was not a 
s u c c e s s f u l p o l i c y as one expert explained: 
"Given the spread between the r a t e s paid on about 
85 per cent of a l l p r i v a t e bank deposits (demand and 
saving deposits of 4 month or l e s s maturity) and the 
C e n t r a l Bank rediscount r a t e s , the rediscount r a t e 
can not be used as a t o o l to c o n t r o l c r e d i t and the 
r a t e of expansion i n the money supply".16 
I n Table 4.12 the i n t e r e s t r a t e s on deposits are 
shown. Compared to the discount r a t e , they were rat h e r 
low and thus the banks t r i e d to avoid C e n t r a l Bank 
borrowings s i n c e the c o s t of obtaining funds from demand 
and time deposits was low and thus the discount r a t e 
p o l i c y was i n e f f e c t i v e . 
The long term government bonds i n t e r e s t r a t e i s worth 
14. One of the main important consequences of t h i s p o l i c y can 
be s a i d t h a t mechanization of the a g r i c u l t u r a l s e c t o r was 
speeded up. 
15. The p o s s i b i l i t y of the C e n t r a l Bank C r e d i t s was widened i n 
1955 both by extending the maturity of the c r e d i t s and by 
making a comprehensive d e f i n i t i o n of l e g a l and r e a l persons, 
16. E.R. CANTERBERY, "The T u r k i s h F i n a n c i a l System; Nature, 
Problems and Recomendations", USAID Economic Plannincr 
D i v i s i o n . (1967, Ankara). 
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examining. I n an i n f l a t i o n a r y process the r a t e i s 
expected to r i s e . However, evidence suggests that t h i s 
had not been so i n the 1954-1959 i n f l a t i o n . The nominal 
r a t e of i n t e r e s t on government bonds never rose above 
5.5% i n the period under study, while the annual r a t e of 
i n f l a t i o n was hard l y l e s s than 10% i n the same period. 
I n f a c t , the market f o r government bonds i s very small and 
a p o l i c y to c o n t r o l i n f l a t i o n i n t h i s manner was not 
f e a s i b l e . The volume of bonds t r a n s a c t e d during a year 
i s much l e s s than 0.1% of the t o t a l amount of bonds, 
suggesting a very dormant market and i n addition bonds 
18 
a r e a small proportion of t o t a l f i n a n c i a l a s s e t s . 
Another aspect of the r a t e of i n t e r e s t which was 
ap p l i e d i n the period under study i s i t s a f f e c t s on 
deposits, p a r t i c u l a r l y i n the i n f l a t i o n a r y process. I t 
i s g e n e r a l l y argued t h a t , due to i n c r e a s e s i n p r i c e s , 
the r e a l value of deposits f a l l s , thus encouraging 
depositors to l i q u i d a t e t h e i r a s s e t s , leading to fur t h e r 
i n c r e a s e s i n p r i c e s . I n t h i s case the t h e o r e t i c a l expecta-
t i o n i s t h a t the r a t e of i n t e r e s t w i l l r i s e s u f f i c i e n t l y 
to compensate the holders of i n t e r e s t y i e l d i n g a s s e t s for 
i n f l a t i o n . However, i n 1950, as was explained before, a l l 
17. J . KANE, "The Role of Money i n Recent Turkish I n f l a t i o n " 
i n "Tttrkive'de Enflasven. ( I n f l a t i o n i n Turkey), ( I s t a n b u l 
U n i v e r s i t y , The F a c u l t y of Economics, 1968), pp.33-50 
18. Y. AKTUZ, OP. c i t . 
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r a t e s of i n t e r e s t were reduced and were not r a i s e d over 
the 1950-6 5 period. But i n 1950-65, both commercial and 
saving deposits continuously increased; the 1954-59 
i n f l a t i o n a r y period not being an exception to t h i s . 
T h i s could be a t t r i b u t e d t o two f a c t o r s ; f i r s t l y , as was 
explained before, monetization of the economy was going 
on through the p r i c e support programme and easy c r e d i t 
p o l i c y , so the use of money increased i n the economy; 
secondly, banking a c t i v i t i e s i ncreased i n the 1950-60 
period. The number of the banks was 34 i n 1950, and rose 
to 58 by 1959. The number of branches or l o c a l bureaus of 
the banks rose to 1710 i n 1959 from 53 5 i n 1950. Thus i t 
can be suggested t h a t these two developments together made 
money holders used to the banks and to the t r a n s a c t i o n s 
w i t h the banks. T h i s may e x p l a i n why deposits continuously 
i n c r e a s e d over the 1950-60 period, not only i n absolute 
terms, but as a proportion of GNP. 
I t should be pointed out t h a t the deposit currency 
r a t i o did not follow the same trend. I t was much higher 
i n 1954 a t 1.6q than i n previous and subsequent years 
between 1950 and 60. I t f e l l to 1.49 and 1.47 i n 1955 
and 1956 r e s p e c t i v e l y . T h i s can be a t t r i b u t e d to i n f l a -
t i o n . The decrease i n 1956 can p a r t l y be a t t r i b u t e d to 
the c r e d i t r e s t r i c t i o n s imposed by the government. The 
deposit currency r a t i o s t a r t e d r i s i n g again i n the e a r l y 
1960s. T h i s may be widely a t t r i b u t e d to the p r i c e s t a b i l i t y 
which was secured i n t h i s period. 
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I n t e r e s t r a t e p o l i c y was not a s u i t a b l e p o l i c y during 
the 1954-59 i n f l a t i o n s i n c e such a p o l i c y i n Turkey i s 
co n s t r a i n e d by the narrowness of the money market. However, 
i t may be suggested t h a t the low r a t e i n t e r e s t p o l i c y i n 
the a g r i c u l t u r a l s e c t o r destroyed any r a t i o n a l resource 
a l l o c a t i o n . Low l e v e l i n t e r e s t r a t e s on medium and long 
term a g r i c u l t u r a l c r e d i t s caused funds to be a l l o c a t e d to 
consumption. Thus a high i n t e r e s t r a t e p o l i c y may have 
c o n t r o l l e d i n f l a t i o n a r y tendency from the a g r i c u l t u r a l 
s e c t o r to other s e c t o r s . 
A l l t h i s suggests t h a t the r a t e of i n t e r e s t did not 
work i n the i n f l a t i o n a r y process, the main reason was 
governmental a c t i o n to keep i t a t a low l e v e l . Thus 
expenditures could not be reduced, leading to f u r t h e r 
i n f l a t i o n and balance of payments d i f f i c u l t i e s . 
T h i s chapter has examined i n some d e t a i l the con-
se c t o r 
s t i t u e n t elements of the monetary^'and the f a c t o r s which 
have in f l u e n c e d changes i n the money supply. The pre-
dominant fe a t u r e of t h i s a n a l y s i s i s the r o l e of the public s e c t o r 
i n s e c u r i n g c e n t r a l bank c r e d i t s and maintaining aggregate 
expenditure a t l e v e l s f a r above aggregate income i n the 
pu b l i c s e c t o r as a whole. The c r e d i t p o l i c i e s of the C e n t r a l 
Bank towards p u b l i c s e c t o r a u t h o r i t i e s must be seen as a 
very important element i n the rap i d i n c r e a s e i n p r i c e s i n 
the 1954-1959 period. The next chapter examines the 
broad impact of these i n f l a t i o n a r y .policies on the 
aggregate supply i n the economy. 
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C H A P T E R 5 
AGGREGATE SUPPLY IN THE TURKISH ECONOMY 1950-1965 
I n t h i s chapter a more d e t a i l e d examination of the 
aggregate supply of the economy i s examined. The purpose 
of t h i s chapter i s to examine the i n t e r r e l a t i o n s h i p 
between aggregate supply i n the economy and the general 
l e v e l of p r i c e s and to review the production-exports 
r e l a t i o n s h i p . I n order to do t h i s the economy i s divided 
i n t o two major s e c t o r s ; a g r i c u l t u r e and industry. 
5.1 AGRICULTURE 
The share of a g r i c u l t u r e i n n a t i o n a l -income was 
44% i n 1950. By 1965 i t accounted f o r 31%. Despite i t s 
decreasing share the f l u c t u a t i o n s of a g r i c u l t u r a l output 
s t i l l a f f e c t the economy fundamentally. A g r i c u l t u r e 
a f f e c t s industry, as the farmer supp l i e s the necessair^ 
raw m a t e r i a l s the l a t t e r needs. Moreover, as a g r i c u l t u r a l 
products have the l a r g e s t share i n exports, the sector 
a f f e c t s the balance of payments of the economy. 
A g r i c u l t u r a l production i s shown i n Table 5.1. I n 
the 1950-53 period a g r i c u l t u r a l production rose by 39%. 
Thi s i n c r e a s e was due mainly to the i n c r e a s e s i n the crop 
ar e a ; p a r t l y a t the expense of meadows and pastures and 
p a r t l y bringing i n t o use formerly unused or u n d e r u t i l i s e d 
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Table 5.1 I n d i c e s of A g r i c u l t u r a l production 1950-1965 
(1948 = 100) 
F i e l d Meadows 
Area Pastures Vineyards Vegetables O l i v e Groves 
1950 104.6 98.5 104.7 87.5 107.2 
1955 151.0 76.9 131.9 95.0 159.2 
1960 167.1 74.8 145.9 105.0 193.9 
1965 169,5 70.1 • 150.2 110.1 224.6 
Source: M i n i s t r y of A g r i c u l t u r e , Summary of A g r i c u l t u r a l 
S t a t i s t i c s . 
land resources. The share of meadows and pastures i n 
t o t a l c u l t i v a t e d area decreased as can be seen from Table 
5.1. 
The i n c r e a s e s i n crop area were l a r g e l y helped by 
i n c r e a s i n g numbers of t r a c t o r s . The number rose from 
16,585 i n 1950, to 3 5,600 i n 1953 and t o 54,468 i n 1965, 
i n d i c a t i n g a 9.7% i n c r e a s e per annum on average. However 
i n t h e 1950-53 period improved farming methods were a l s o 
introduced, but t h e i r impact on increased production was 
marginal. The use^of f e r t i l i z e r increased. I t rose to 
82,000 tons i n 1953 from 42,000 tons i n 1950. But the 
share of f e r t i l i z e r i n the t o t a l c o s t s of the a g r i c u l t u r a l 
s e c t o r was r a t h e r small not only i n the 1950-53 period 
but a l s o i n the r e s t of the period. I n 1950-53 i t s share 
i n t h e t o t a l c o s t s of the a g r i c u l t u r a l s e c t o r was 0.7% on 
average. The use of plant p r o t e c t i o n chemicals was 
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n e g l i g i b l e i n the 19 50- 53 period, only 2,500 tons.''' The 
i r r i g a t e d area remained around 3% of t o t a l c u l t i v a t e d area 
i n the 1950-53 period. Thus i t can be concluded t h a t 
a g r i c u l t u r a l production rose i n the 1950-53 by the use of 
2 
e x t e n s i v e farming methods. 
I n 1954, a g r i c u l t u r a l production f e l l sharply by 
20%. T h i s i s g e n e r a l l y a t t r i b u t e d to bad weather conditions, 
However, th e r e was another f a c t o r operating i n the long 
run. According to r e s e a r c h by Oakes, the a v a i l a b l e land 
f o r c u l t i v a t i o n was 16.4 m i l l i o n hectares f o r 1953 but 
the l i m i t had alre a d y been exceeded i n t h i s year as the 
c u l t i v a t e d area was 18.8 m i l l i o n hectares and a f a l l i n 
production on t h i s marginal land due to bad weather 
c o n t r i b u t e d to the d e c l i n e i n a g r i c u l t u r a l production i n 
1954. T h i s argument can be supported by the f a c t t h a t the 
share of f a l l o w i n the t o t a l c u l t i v a t e d area increased, 
i n d i c a t i n g t h a t marginal land was being used. I t was 
4.6 m i l l i o n h e c t a r e s i n 1950, rose to 5.7 m i l l i o n hectares 
i n 19 53, by 1960 i t had r i s e n to 7.9 m i l l i o n and by 1965 
to 8.2 m i l l i o n h e c t a r e s . ^ 
A f t e r 1954, a g r i c u l t u r a l production rose. However, i t 
1. J . E . BLALOCK, " C a p i t a l and Finance i n Turkish A g r i c u l t u r e " 
AID Economic Planning D i v i s i o n . (Ankara) May 1969, p.67. 
2. J . DEWDNEY, " A g r i c u l t u r a l Problems and Regional Develop-
ment i n Turkey". Paper presented to a Conference on Tu r k i s h 
P o l i t i c s . Durham, 1973. 
3. G. KAZGAN, "Tllrkiye'de Torimsal Gelisme 1948-1962" (Agri-
c u l t u r a l Development i n Turkey 1948-1962) (Faculty of 
Economics, I s t a n b u l , 1966) p.5. 
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was not u n t i l 1958 t h a t the 1953 l e v e l was achieved again, 
the r a t e of growth of a g r i c u l t u r a l production was slower 
than i t was i n the 1950-53 period. The r a t e of growth 
of a g r i c u l t u r a l output was 12% per.annum i n the 1950-53 
on average, during 1955-58 i t was only 4.5%. The 1955-58 
period can be c h a r a c t e r i z e d as a stagnant period. I n t h i s 
period the use of f e r t i l i z e r and plant p r o t e c t i o n chemicals 
decreased, the number of t r a c t o r s d d e c l i n e d . I n 1958 pro-
duction rose again, however i n 1961 f e l l and i n the r e s t 
4 
of the period remained s t a b l e . 
As was explained i n chapter 4, s t a r t i n g from 1950 the 
monetization o f the a g r i c u l t u r a l s e c t o r r a p i d l y increased, 
through the A g r i c u l t u r a l Bank C r e d i t s and the p r i c e support 
programme. The A g r i c u l t u r a l Bank c r e d i t s i n the 1950-53 
period i n c r e a s e d by 294-4%. As production rose r a p i d l y i n 
t h i s period, monetary expansion i n t h i s s e c t o r did not 
c r e a t e any i n f l a t i o n a r y pressure. However, despite the 
slower r a t e of i n c r e a s e s i n production a f t e r 1954 c r e d i t s 
i n c r e a s e d by 140%, and the p r i c e support programme went on 
and between 1955 and 1958, through the support programme, 
c r e d i t s i n c r e a s e d by 326%. This s i t u a t i o n to a g r e a t e r 
extent c o n t r i b u t e d t o the i n f l a t i o n a r y process. 
A g r i c u l t u r a l products c o n s t i t u t e the l a r g e s t part of 
exports. The accounted f o r 93% of t o t a l exports i n 1950, 
G. KAZGAN, OP. c i t . . p.12, 
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85% i n 1960 and 76% i n 1965. Tobacco, cotton and hazelnuts 
are the major export goods. These three accounted f o r 70% 
of the t o t a l exports i n the 1950-65 period. I t i s therefore 
obvious that the production of these goods is important 
from the point of view of the balance of payments.^ 
I n the 1950-65 period the production of tobacco 
increased by 45%; however the land allocated to tobacco 
production nearly doubled. I n the.Li954-60 period the y i e l d 
per hectare fol lowed a r i s i n g t rend. This can be a t t r i -
buted to the use of sui table land f o r tobacco production. 
A f t e r 1960 the y i e l d per hectare started decl in ing. I n 
1962, tobacco production f e l l sharply due to Blue Rust. 
Although i t rose i n 1963, the y i e l d per hectare f e l l . I t 
was 721 kgr per hectare i n 1961, decl ining to 596 kgr 
despite the increase i n the tobacco area. This suggests 
that tobacco was being grown on land not sui table to the 
6 
crop, leading to a low q u a l i t y of tobacco. 
I n order t o see whether the production of tobacco 
a f f e c t s the exports of tobacco, a regression analysis was 
conducted between the production of tobacco and the volume 
5. See chapter 6. 
6. Increases i n land al located to tobacco production is generally 
a t t r i b u t e d to pr ice support po l i c i e s . The price support 
po l i cy may have a f fec ted tobacco production i n two ways. 
F i r s t l y , as the prices given by the pr ice supporting 
organisat ion, the State Monopoly Administrat ion, was high 
and induced the tobacco production extensively. Secondly, 
a secure pr ice guaranteed by the government induced tobacco 
producers to expand the tobacco land. 
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of i t s exports. 
The resul ts are as fo l lows : 
The formula employed was: 
Y = f (X) (1) 
where X indicates the volume o f production and Y the volume 
of exports. The l inea r equation without a time lag i s 
shown below: ^  
Y = 77.743 - 0.095635 X = 0.036 (2) 
(-0.725) 
I n the second stage a one year lag was used. The resul t 
i s as f o l l o w s : 
Y 2 55.669 + 0.087980 X = 0.027 (3) 
(0.627): 
The resu l t s d id not show any re la t ionship between X and Y. 
This s i t u a t i o n f o r tobacco may be explained by the existence 
of stocks. I n the years when tobacco production f e l l , 
stocks may have been used and thus the negative e f f ec t of 
low production on exports could have been removed. However, 
i t should be pointed out tha t there was no s i g n i f i c a n t 
shortage of tobacco production reducing the volume of 
exports. 
The production of cotton increased by 10.87 % per 
annum i n the 1950-65 period on average. Between 1950-58 
the area under cot ton doubled and output rose by a s imi l a r 
amount. S ta r t ing from 1958, the land allocated to cotton 
increased by less than 20%, output doubled again. I n the 
7. The f igures i n the brackets i n a l l equations show t-values. 
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e a r l i e r phase much of the cotton was dry farmed or i r r i g a t e d 
by simple methods. Between 1960-65, increases i n y i e l d per 
hectare can be a t t r i bu t ed to intensive farming methods. 
The production of cotton and the volume of exports are 
h igh ly corre la ted . The regression analysis without any 
time lag gave the l inea r equation shown below: 
Y = 39.996 + 0.65061 X = 0.815 (4) 
(7.968) 
when a one year lag was used, R^  rose: 
Y = 58.324 + 0.80129 X R^  = 0.887 (5) 
This s i t u a t i o n seems a normal state of a f f a i r s f o r cotton, 
as demand f o r cot ton i s high, and declines and rises i n 
cot ton production a f f e c t cot ton exports. 
As f o r hazelnuts, i n the 1950-65 period hazelnut 
production increased. Hazelnut production f luctuates year 
by year, one year 's excess production compensates next 
year 's low production. I n 1950-65 the number of hazelnut 
trees rose by 9% per annum on average. The resul t of a 
s i m i l a r regression analysis to the ones on tobacco and 
cot ton yie lded the fo l l owing r e su l t s : 
The regression analysis without a time lag : 
Y = 35.434 + 0.037507 X R^  = 0.023 (6) 
(0.571) 
When a one year lag was applied an increase i n the value of 
2 
R was observed. The l inear equation i s as fo l lows : 
Y 2 23.422 + 0.17130 X R^  = 0.425 (7) 
(3.216) 
The resul ts of the regression analysis suggest tha t , apart 
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from cot ton, production does not a f f e c t exports. 
Las t ly , a regression analysis was conducted between 
the a g r i c u l t u r a l production index and the export volume 
index. The resul ts are as fo l lows : 
The l i nea r equation without a time lag i s shown below: 
Y = 61.828 + 0.80833 X R^  = 0.295 (8) 
(2.419) 
When a one year time lag was used: 
Y = 26.980 + 1.2525 X R^  = .500 (9) 
(3.743) 
2 
The l inea r equation and R w i t h one year time lag indicates 
a r e l a t i v e l y strong re la t ionsh ip . Thus i t may be concluded 
tha t the time f a c t o r i s important i n the export-production 
re l a t ionsh ip . 
According t o a series of reports prepared by the State 
Planning Organization on the major export goods of Turkey, 
i t was suggested that any s i g n i f i c a n t bottleneck of pro-
8 
duction hindering exports was not observed. 
I n the l as t stage of the analysis the pr ice e l a s t i c i t y 
of the production of three major export goods was computed. 
This e l a s t i c i t y i s important i n the context of the adjust-
ment process based on r e l a t i v e . p r i c e changes. As was 
explained, i n the Marshall-Lerner condit ion the supply 
e l a s t i c i t y w i t h respect to pr ice changes i s assumed t o be 
i n f i n i t e . 
8. These reports are known as Madde Arostirmalesi (Research on 
commodities). The reports covered Hazelnuts, Tobacco, 
Chromium and cot ton . 
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I n t h i s section two pr ice e l a s t i c i t i e s of production 
9 
were computed, the farmer's prices and the export pr ice . 
The resu l t s were as f o l l o w s : 
Tobacco 
(1) The farmer's pr ice e l a s t i c i t y without any time lag; 
Y = 1.5065513 + 0.2191449 X R^  = t396 (10) 
(3.03238) 
(2) The farmer's pr ice e l a s t i c i t y w i t h a one year lag; 
Y = 0.2939 + 0.51321 X R^  = 0.512 (11) 
(2.175) 
(3) The export p r ice e l a s t i c i t y without any time lag; 
Y = 1.5475605 + 0.1882912 X R^  = 0.262 (12) 
I - (2.23456) 
(4) The export p r ice e l a s t i c i t y w i t h a one.year lag; 
Y = 1.4704 + 0.22211 X R^  = 0.335 (13) 
(2.654) 
As the resul ts have shown, the export and the farmer's 
pr ice e l a s t i c i t y of tobacco production i s rather low. 
However, when a one year lag has been used, a s l i g h t increase 
i n the pr ice e l a s t i c i t i e s can be observed. 
Although prices seem not to a f f e c t tobacco production 
d i r e c t l y , increases i n tobacco production came about through 
an i n d i r e c t way, expansion of tobacco area. However, a f t e r 
1960 p roduc t iv i ty per hectare s tar ted decl ining, namely, 
increases i n tobacco area exceeded increases i n tobacco 
production. Despite low produc t iv i ty the high price support 
9. Farmer's p r i ce : t h i s series is ca l led "F i r s t Hand Sel l ing 
Price", and i s a simple ar i thmetic average of prices reported 
by the loca l markets. 
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programme continued. This may have resulted i n an i n f l a -
t ionary process. However, i n 1960-65 there wasn't any 
strong i n f l a t i o n a r y tendency i n the economy. I n 1961 
cen t r a l bank c red i t s to the Monopoly Administration was 
considerably reduced, from TL 319 m i l l i o n i n 1960 to 
TL 50 m i l l i o n i n 1961. I n 1962 cent ra l bank credi ts to 
the Administrat ion were completely reduced. I t may 
be suggested that the Administrat ion met the pr ice supporting 
programme from i t s own funds, and d id not dis turb monetary 
equ i l ib r ium. The export pr ice e l a s t i c i t y of tobacco i s low 
compared t o the farmer's pr ice e l a s t i c i t y . The reason f o r 
t h i s was that producers and exporters of tobacco are 
seperated, and thus i t may be suggested tha t export prices 
do not a f f e c t tobacco production. 
Cotton 
(1) The farmer's pr ice e l a s t i c i t y without any time lag; 
Y = 0.2897615 + 0.7658430 X R^  = 0.683 (14) 
(4.66141) 
(2) The farmer's pr ice e l a s t i c i t y w i t h a one year lag; 
Y = .21789 + 0.98523 R^  = 708 (15) 
(3) The export pr ice e l a s t i c i t y of cotton without any time 
l ag ; 
Y = 1.34924 + 0.36666 X R^  = 0.357 (16) 
(4) The export pr ice e l a s t i c i t y of cotton w i t h a one year lag; 
Y = 1.1316 + 0.47912 X R^  = 0.403 (17) 
(3.076) 
10. This s i t u a t i o n i s t rue f o r the other export goods. However, 
i n tobacco t h i s could be more clear . Because the producers 
of the other export goods have established a cooperative, 
the A g r i c u l t u r a l Sales Cooperatives, dealing w i t h each crop. 
Thus i t may be suggested tha t i n fon ta t i on about export prices 
can be transmit ted by these cooperatives. I n tobacco, the 
As i n the case of tobacco, when a one year time lag has been 
used, both pr ice e l a s t i c i t i e s r i s e . But the pr ice e l a s t i -
c i t i e s of cotton production, compared to tobacco, are 
rather h igh . Pa r t i cu l a r ly , the farmer's pr ice e l a s t i c i t y 
of cot ton w i t h a one year lag i s almost u n i t y . This may 
be a t t r i b u t e d to both the high support prices and high 
demand f o r cotton exports. Regarding the product iv i ty and 
export conditions of cot ton, i t may be suggested that the 
pr ice support po l i cy f o r cotton did not create any i n f l a -
t i ona ry condition-^! i n the economy. 
Hazelnut 
(1) The farm pr ice e l a s t i c i t y without a time lag; 
Y = 1.33336 + 0.24432 X R^  = 0.107 (18) 
(1.2980) 
(2) The farm pr ice e l a s t i c i t y w i t h a one year lag.; 
Y = 1.4874 + 0.20255 X R^  =^0.097 (19) 
(3) The export p r ice e l a s t i c i t y without a time lag; 
Y = 1.3 7586 + 0.20762 (20) 
(1.1199) 
(4) The export pr ice e l a s t i c i t y w i t h a one year lag; 
Y = 1.3050 + 0.25540 X R^  = 0.163 (21) 
(1.651) 
The resul ts suggest tha t the pr ice e l a s t i c i t i e s of 
hazelnut production are rather low. Despite t h i s hazelnut 
area increased r ap id ly . The main reason f o r t h i s i s that 
due to the geographical s t ructure of the region the area 
i s not su i table f o r growing other crops, (the i n c l i n a t i o n 
o f land, c l imate condi t ions ) . Thus the support pr ice may 
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have increased the land al located to hazelnut production. 
The data suggests that pr ice e l a s t i c i t i e s of the 
production of the major export goods, except cotton, are ' 
rather low. Despite the resul ts of the regression analysis, 
i t may be argued that producers are responsive to price 
changes. Because the land allocated to the production of 
these crops has increased. Thus i t may be suggested that 
p r i ce changes a f f e c t production not d i r e c t l y , but indirec l y , 
through increases i n land. I n the a g r i c u l t u r a l sector 
the lack of the use of intensive a g r i c u l t u r a l methods i s 
w e l l -known. I n t h i s respect, support prices may have 
increased the land al located to the crops. 
5.2 INDUSTRY 
Although agr i cu l tu re was given p r i o r i t y i n the 1950-60 
period, industry also benefi ted from larger investments. 
I n d u s t r i a l output rose during the 1950-65 by 126% however, 
the share of the sector i n rea l income remained almost 
constant at 17%"^ ^ 
The largest con t r ibu t ion to the i n d u s t r i a l sector 
was the manufacturing sector. The main components of 
t h i s sector are shown i n Table 5.2. Manufacturing i s 
most developed i n the food, beverage, tobacco and c lo th ing 
sectors. The share of t h i s sector was 76.8% i n 1950, i n 
1960 they accounted f o r 64.1%. I n the 1950-60 period the 
11. Computed from the F i r s t Five Year Plan, p.18 
Table 5.2 Percentage d i s t r i b u t i o n of manufacturing 
output 1950-1960 
100 
Food 
Beverages-
Tobacco 
Text i les 
Cloth 
Chemicals 
Machinery 
Transport Vehicles 
Metal Products 
Coal 
Rubber 
Metal Molting 
Non-Metal Products 
Paper 
Pr in t ing 
Leather 
Wood-Furniture 
Others 
1950 1952 1954 1956 1958 1960 
32.9 28.6 27.3 27.8 28VO 32.3 
2.4 
1.2 
0.6 
0. 5 
2.2 
2.7 
0.3 
1.4 
2.9 
2.2 
1.6 
0.9 
0.8 
1.4 
0.2 
244 2.6 2.1 
14.2 13.4 14.2 13.3 
2.5 
9.7 
1.0 
6.2 
0.6 
2.9 
2.6 
0.1 
1.5 
5.3 
2.0 
1.7 
0.7 
0.6 
1.3 
1.8 
0.7 
7.6 
0.8 
2.5 
2.6 
1.1 
1.2 
4.3 
2.5 
1.5 
1.0 
0.6 
1.3 
0.3 
0.6 
8.6 
1.0 
2.0 
2.0 
1.2 
1.3 
5.1 
2.5 
1.4 
1.1 
0.7 
1.6 
0.3 
0.6 
8.3 
1.3 
1.6 
2.7 
1.9 
1.8 
5.3 
3.2 
1.1 
1.2 
1.0 
1.6 
1.7 
9.1 
26.1 27.3 27.8 27.4 27.7 21.0 
0.6 
8.0 
1.4 
2.5 
3.6 
1.9 
1.2 
7.6 
3.2 
1.7 
1.3 
0.8 
1.5 
0.5 0.5 
Source: State Planning Organization, The Second Five Year 
Plan, 1967. 
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production of sugar, cement, coal and alcohol increased signi-
f i c a n t l y . I n cement.production nat ional s e l f su f f i c iency 
was achieved; cement production was 396,000 tons i n 1950, 
rose t o 972,000 tons and 2/040,000 tons ing) 1956 and 1960 
12 
respectively" and i n 1963 production was 2,723,000 tons. 
A f t e r 1954, the production of o l i v e o i l , wine, beer, 
paper and alcohol declined. This mainly resulted from the 
f a l l i n a g r i c u l t u r a l production i n the previous years, and 
balance : O f payments dQl^f icul t ies . The l a t t e r hampered the 
production of woolen t e x t i l e s as the necessary amount of 
woolen f i b r e could not be imported. The decline i n the 
production of processed tobacco can be a t t r i bu ted t o the 
decline i n the production of tobacco. 
Table 5.3. The Production o f some Selected I n d u s t r i a l Goods 
1955 . 1956 1957 1958 
Wine 9.6 8.6 5.0 9.6 
Beer. 29.8 28.1 31.4 33.7 
Olive O i l 41.0 90.0 43.2 90.0 
Paper 46.7 45.3 54.3 57.7 
Woolen Text i les 8.6 7.9 10.1 12.2 
Source: Various reports of the 
Industry. 
Chambers of Commerce and 
Data was taken from N. SERIN, " Turkiye 'n in Sanayilesmesi I J C H ^ C L ¥ V t * » J W U J ' ^ ^ A A > i > — , w ^ — 
(The Faculty of P o l i t i c a l Science, Ankara, 1961) 
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I t may be suggested that the decline i n some sectors of 
manufacturing was caused by balance of payments d i f f i c u l -
t i e s rather than the lack o f a g r i c u l t u r a l production, as 
a f t e r 1954 a g r i c u l t u r a l production increased. However, 
as i t has been explained before, the decline i n a g r i c u l t u r a l 
production i n 1954 contr ibuted to both the i n f l a t i o n a r y 
process and balance of payments d i f f i c u l t i e s . I n t h i s 
respect, an i n d i r e c t negative e f f e c t of the ag r i cu l tu r a l 
sector on industry may be established. 
Another re la t ionsh ip of agr icu l tu re , i n the context 
o f p r i ce increases, to industry could be the prices of 
a g r i c u l t u r a l inputs used by industry; due to the high 
prices of a g r i c u l t u r a l inputs i n some sectors of manufac-
t u r i n g , production could have been c u r t a i l e d . There i s 
no avai lable data f o r the prices of a g r i c u l t u r a l inputs. 
However, an assessment i n general terms can be made. I n 
Table. 5.4 the pr ice index of a g r i c u l t u r a l goods and that 
of i n d u s t r i a l goods are shown. Over the whole period 
studied, the p r ice index o f manufactured goods was above 
the pr ice index of a g r i c u l t u r a l goods. I n t h i s case, i t 
may be suggested that prices of i n d u s t r i a l goods increased 
as a g r i c u l t u r a l inpu t ' s prices rose, and t h i s resulted i n 
decreasing demand f o r i n d u s t r i a l goods, leading to a 
reduction i n production. 
To summarize, over the 1950-65 period the a g r i c u l t u r a l 
sector had an important e f f e c t on macroeconomic equi l ibr ium. 
The decline i n output i n 1954 led the economy in to i n f l a t i o n a r y 
. 1 0 3 
Table 5.4 The Price Indices of A g r i c u l t u r a l Commodities 
and I n d u s t r i a l Commodities 1950-1965 
(1948 = 100) 
The Price Index Of The Price Index Of 
A g r i c u l t u r a l Goods Manufactured Goods 
1950 98.2 107.6 
1951 101.2 113.7 
1952 105.8 125.2 
1953 112.9 140.3 
1954 115.2 163.7 
1955 136.2 180.5 
1956 149.2 216.2 
1957 192.1 254.7 
1958 219.1 318.5 
1959 252.7 375.2 
1960 258.8 391.0 
1961 265.7 413.7 
1962 287.0 424.7 
1963 301.4 447.0 
1964 302.6 455.7 
1965 316.3 472.4 
Source: The State I n s t i t u t e of S t a t i s t i c s , the Minis t ry 
of Coiranerce 
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s i t u a t i o n , as the rate of monetary expansion was going on. 
I n the long run, the production of the major export goods 
d id not a f f e c t exports negatively, except i n the case of 
cereal production, the bulk of which is consumed domes-
t i c a l l y anyhow. The area al located to the major export 
goods was increased; i n t h i s respect the producers of the 
export goods can t e n t a t i v e l y be said to be responsive to 
pr ices , p a r t i c u l a r l y to the changes i n the farmer's prices. 
But, except cot ton, there is no sign of the use of inten-
sive methods. Thus i t may be suggested that production i s 
a f f ec t ed by cl imate condit ions, and t h i s creates insta-
b i l i t y i n the economy. This was the case i n 1954. 
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C H A P T E R 6 
THE EFFECTS OF INFLATION ON EXPORTS 
I n t h i s chapter the e f f ec t s of i n f l a t i o n on Turkish 
exports w i l l be examined. I n f l a t i o n a f f ec t s exports i n two 
ways: f i r s t l y increased money income can absorb export 
goods causing a s h i f t i n t o t a l expenditure, and, secondly 
a prolonged i n f l a t i o n can cause wages and prices to r i s e 
and thus the prices of export goods are a f fec ted , dis turbing 
the economy's in te rna t iona l competitive pos i t ion . 
Turkish export goods consist p r imar i l y of a g r i c u l t u r a l 
commodities: tobacco, cot ton, hazelnuts, r a i s i n and minerals 
are the major export goods of Turkey. I n Table 6.1 the 
percentage d i s t r i b u t i o n of exports between these goods i s 
shown. 
Turkish exports, at the beginning of the 1950s 
experienced some s t r u c t u r a l changes. Before 1950, tobacco, 
r a i s i n s , f i g s and hazelnuts accountedffor a large share of 
the exports. I n 1948 the share of these goods i n t o t a l 
exports was about 46%. I n the 1950-53 period the share of 
these goods i n t o t a l exports decreased, and i n t h i s period 
the exports of cereal crops increased and accounted f o r 
24.5% of the t o t a l exports by 1952.'^ The main reason f o r 
t h i s was that Turkey harvested a good cereal crop a f t e r 
Computed from S t a t i s t i c a l Year Book 1950, (The State I n s t i -
t u t e of S t a t i s t i c s , Ankara). 
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1949 and became a major exporter of wheat. On the other 
hand the production and exports of cotton were induced by 
the Korean Boom. The share of cotton i n t o t a l exports rose 
rap id ly , and chromium was sold at a higher price i n the 
in t e rna t iona l market due to the Korean Boom, inducing i t s 
exports. 
I n the 1950-54 period cereal exports were 30% of 
t o t a l exports. However, s t a r t i n g from 1955 they declined 
sharply, t o 7.4%. Although they rose to 11% i n 1956 and 
11.8% inJ 1959, but i n the rest of the period under study 
followed a decl in ing t rend. 
Despite the increases i n exports i n the 1950-53 period, 
balance of payments d i f f i c u l t i e s were f e l t as early as 
1952. Exports increased i n the 1950-53 period, the volume 
of exports index rose from 113 i n 1950 to 155 i n 1953 
(1948 = 100). However the export pr ice index did not show 
the same development. I t rose to 115 i n 1951 and f e l l to 
104 by 1953 (1948 = 100)."^ As long as the volume of exports 
increased, the export pr ice index f e l l , thus i n years of 
food crops there was qui te o f ten a danger of low prices. 
Another con t r ibu t ing fac to r to the decline i n the export 
pr ice index was that as soon as the Korean war was over, 
the United States and Canada drove t h e i r stocks onto the 
2. Z.Y. HERSHLAG, O P . c i t . . p.204. 
3. The pr ice and the volume of index of exports were computed 
. by N. SERIN, "Dis Ticaret Siyaset inin I k t i s e d i Kalkinnio 
Uzerindeki E t k i s i " (The e f f ec t s o f Foreign Trade Policy on 
economic development) (Hacettepe and Bogazici Univers i t ies 
1973) p.42. 
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i n t e r n a t i o n a l market p u l l i n g down the export p r i c e of 
Tu r k i s h wheat. I n order to dispose of the surplus wheat, 
Turkey had to o f f e r i t a t a lower p r i c e than the i n t e r -
n a t i o n a l p r i c e . I n 1954 a sharp d e c l i n e i n a g r i c u l t u r a l 
production took pla c e . Exports f e l l to TL 937.8 m i l l i o n 
i n 1954 from 1019 m i l l i o n i n 1953. This d e c l i n e i n 
exports can not be a t t r i b u t e d to i n f l a t i o n as i n the 
1950-53 period the domestic l e v e l of p r i c e s did not r i s e 
s i g n i f i c a n t l y . Exports declined continuously u n t i l 1959. 
I n the r e s t of t h i s chapter the r e l a t i o n between 
i n f l a t i o n and exports w i l l be examined. 
I n the context of the r e l a t i o n s h i p between i n f l a t i o n 
and the balance of payments, i t i s argued that increased 
money income can absorb export goods. P a r t i c u l a r l y , i f 
imports of the economy a r e f o r c i b l y c u r t a i l e d , the money 
income spent on them can be spent instead on the export 
goods. I n the case of Turkey, from 1950 onwards money 
income increased continuously. Disposable income was 
TL 10.229 m i l l i o n i n 1951; i t rose to TL 17,003 i n 1955. 
Between 1955-60 i t increased by 242.2%. With the imposi-
t i o n of r e s t r i c t i o n s on imports i n 1952, the increased 
money income could a f f e c t exports. Turkey's major export 
goods a r e tobacco, cotton, minerals and dried f r u i t s . Of 
these tobacco and cotton account f o r a l a r g e part of exports, 
I n 1955 they c o n s t i t u t e d about 40% of the t o t a l exports. 
L i v e s t o c k s and animal products and legumes are other impor-
t a n t export goods, they had a 5% share i n t o t a l exports i n 
1 0 9 
1955. Due to the a v a i l a b i l i t y of data, the a n a l y s i s w i l l 
4 
deal w i t h these export goods. 
I t i s obvious t h a t i n c r e a s e d money income can not 
absorb cotton and tobacco as they are raw m a t e r i a l s . I n 
order to see whether i n f l a t i o n has a f f e c t e d the volume of 
exports of cotton and tobacco, the production of the 
i n d u s t r i e s using these goods as inputs should be examined. 
As f o r tobacco, the production of c i g a r e t t e s and manipulated 
tobacco i n the 1950-60 i s shown i n Table 6.2. As i t can 
be seen from Table 6.2 the production of c i g a r e t t e s and 
processed tobacco remained s t a b l e . Moreover, i n the 
1950-60 period, exports of tobacco, although they declined 
i n 1954, remained almost the same i n 1955, and 1956. I n 
1957 they reached the highest l e v e l - 86.7 thousand tons 
f o r the period. I n the r e s t of the period studied, exports 
of tobacco f l u c t u a t e d . Due to in c r e a s e s i n production, 
s t o c k s of tobacco i n c r e a s e d (See Table 6.2). I n t h i s 
r espect, i t can be concluded that the in c r e a s e s i n money 
income did not a f f e c t exports of tobacco. 
Exports of cotton f l u c t u a t e d year by year during the 
1950-65 period. I n 1956 and 1958 the volume of exports 
d e c l i n e d to 34.6 thousand tons and 34.5 thousand tons r e s -
p e c t i v e l y . However, over the i n f l a t i o n a r y period, the 
production of domestic cotton f i b r e and cotton t e x t i l e s 
did not i n c r e a s e , and the production of cotton t e x t i l e s 
even f e l l i n the 1957-59 period. Average production i n 
the 1954-56 period was about 3 50 m i l l i o n metres, i t f e l l 
4. A l l data used i n t h i s chapter were taken from the Yearbook 
of S t a t i s t i c s (The S t a t e I n s t i t u t e of S t a t i s t i c s , Ankara). 
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t o about 150 m i l l i o n metres i n the 1957-59 period. Thus i t 
can be s a i d t hat i n f l a t i o n did not incluence the exports 
of cotton. 
The exports of l i v e s t o c k and animal products and 
legumes decreased i n the i n f l a t i o n a r y period. Exports of 
legumes completely ceased i n 1957, the share of l i v e s t o c k 
i n t o t a l exports declined, (see Table 6.1). I n the 
1950-65 period the production of legumes, except i n 1954, 
in c r e a s e d continuously. Thus i t can not be suggested t h a t 
t h e r e was a supply shortage t h a t hindered the exports of 
legumes. However, the exports of legumes followed a 
d e c l i n i n g trend and l a t e r on i n d i c a t e d an unstable trend. 
The d e c l i n e i n the exports of legumes may to some extent 
be a t t r i b u t e d t o r i s e s i n money income. 
The exports of l i v e s t o c k and animal products followed 
a d e c l i n i n g trend, as Lovasy has i n d i c a t e d : 
"Exports of l i v e s t o c k from Turkey were reduced from an 
annual average of some 480,000 during 1948-51 to an average 
O S some 110,000 i n the next eight years, as herds maintained 
on farms g r e a t l y increased. A d d i t i o n a l money incomes 
accrued i n the f i r s t i n s t a n c e to the a g r i c u l t u r a l s e c t o r ; 
they r e s u l t e d p r i m a r i l y from high support p r i c e s for g r a i n . 
The higher incomes induced farmers to i n c r e a s e t h e i r 
holdings of l i v e s t o c k , p a r t l y as a hedge against i n f l a t i o n . 
Also, as a r e s u l t of d i v e r s i o n to the domestic market, 
t h e r e was a sharp d e c l i n e i n exports of eggs."^ 
I n order to study the p r i c e e f f e c t of i n f l a t i o n , four 
major export goods w i l l be examined; tobacco, cotton, r a i s i n 
and chromium. The c o u n t r i e s competing w i t h Turkey f o r cotton 
5. G. LOVASY, "Recent Experiences i n S t a b i l i z i n g P o l i c y " 
IMF S t a f f Papers, Vol. IX, 1962, p.3 7. 
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a r e B r a s i l , the United S t a t e s and Egypt; for tobacco: 
Yu g o s l a v i a and B u l g a r i a ; f o r chromium: Russia and 
Rhodesia, and f o r r a i s i n s : Greece. 
The p r i c e s and the exports of these goods are shown 
i n Table 6.3. As i t can be observed from Table 6.3, i n 
the 1954-59 period i n f l a t i o n a r y process, the p r i c e s of 
major export goods had always been above the competing 
c o u n t r i e s . However, a f t e r the i n f l a t i o n a r y t h i s tendency 
continued.^ 
The causes of r i s e s i n the export p r i c e s can not be 
found e a s i l y , as the data on c o s t f a c t o r s are not a v a i l a b l e . 
However, an assessment i n general terms can be made: I n 
the 1954-59 i n f l a t i o n a r y period the use of f e r t i l i z e r , 
p l a n t p r o t e c t i o n chemicals decreased, and the number of 
t r a c t o r s f e l l . To some extent i t may be s a i d that t here 
was no upward pressure from these inputs. The r i s e s i n 
export p r i c e s may be a t t r i b u t e d to the p o l i c y followed by 
the government i n the 1950-60 period. As explained before, 
a p r i c e support programme was applied i n the a g r i c u l t u r a l 
s e c t o r , cotton and tobacco were being subsidized through 
the A g r i c u l t u r a l S a l e s Cooperatives. The farmer's p r i c e s 
and the export p r i c e s of cotton and tobacco are shown i n 
Table 6.4 
7. Table 6.3 was prepared on the b a s i s of the f i g u r e s obtained 
from the United Nations Trade S t a t i s t i c s . National curren-
c i e s were converted i n t o $ value on the b a s i s of exchange 
r a t e shown i n IMF Supplementary 1970. 
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I n cotton, some yea r s farmer's p r i c e s exceeded export 
p r i c e s . This seems c l e a r i n the 1954-58 period. This could 
e x p l a i n high export p r i c e s f o r cotton. As for tobacco, 
t h e r e i s no c l e a r evidence t h a t farmer's p r i c e s a f f e c t e d the 
tobacco export p r i c e s . High export p r i c e s may be a t t r i b u t e d 
to r i s i n g storage and t r a n s p o r t c o s t s . I n the tobacco 
exports there was an i n t e r e s t i n g development. I n 1957 
d e s p i t e the high export p r i c e tobacco exports were at t h e i r 
h i g h e s t l e v e l f o r the 1950-60 period. The main reason f o r 
t h i s was the b i l a t e r a l t r a d e agreement with the European 
S o c i a l i s t c o u n t r i e s . E s s e n t i a l l y the ;• share of b i l a t e r a l 
t r a d e i n terms of t o t a l t r a d e increased during the i n f l a t i o n -
a r y y e a r s . I n 1952 the share of the s o c i a l i s t c ountries 
was 6.4% i n the t o t a l exports, rose to 22.2% i n 1955 and 
f e l l t o 10.7% i n 1959. These types of agreements, to some 
extent reduced the r o l e of the p r i c e mechanism i n the 
fo r e i g n t r a d e of Turkey. 
I n order to r e v e a l the long run p r i c e e f f e c t s on 
tobacco exports and cotton exports a r e g r e s s i o n a n a l y s i s 
was conducted. The r e s u l t s a r e as f o l l o w s : 
The formula employed was 
Y = f (P^) (1) 
where Y i n d i c a t e s the volume of export goods and P export 
p r i c e s . A l l values were i n logarithmic terms. 
Cotton, 2 
Y = 1.7807247 + .0462850 X R =j.0037262 (2) 
(3.4565226) (.2205074) 
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Tobacco, 
Y = 1.7523060 + .0212509X R = .0033767 (3) 
(6.4623928) (.2177944) 
The r e s u l t s show t h a t t h e r e i s no r e l a t i o n s h i p between the 
exports of these two goods and t h e i r export p r i c e s . 
However, production and exports of these goods take time. 
I n t h e second s t e p of a n a l y s i s a one year lag was used. 
Cotton, 
Y = .1194586 + .72 51588X R = .4084009 (4) 
(.2051593) (3.1088064) 
Tobacco, 
Y = 1.6377286 + .0660235X R = .0298134 (5) 
(6.091295) (.6789287) 
When a one year lag was used, the r e g r e s s i o n a n a l y s i s 
f o r cotton gave a b e t t e r explanation. The t value i s high 
2 
t h e r e i s a r i s e i n the value of R . However, the p r i c e 
e l a s t i c i t y i s s t i l l l e s s than unity. 
As f o r tobacco, the s i t u a t i o n f o r tobacco did not 
2 
change. Both the value of R and t a r e low. This i s t r u e 
f o r tobacco t h a t a f t e r 1960 when the world demand decreased. 
F i r s t l y , the demand s h i f t e d to a v i r g i n o type of tobacco 
from the o r i e n t a l type of tobacco which Turkey produced; 
secondly i n 1963.j due to Blue Rust the demand fo r Turkey's 
tobacco decreased. T h i r d l y , as explained i n Chapter 5, the 
q u a l i t y of tobacco f e l l . 
Evidence suggests t h a t the p r i c e e f f e c t s of i n f l a t i o n 
on exports was not important. Because the p r i c e e l a s t i c i t y 
of the demand f o r these two goods i s l e s s than u n i t y . 
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Regarding the behaviour of the volume of exports of these 
two goods a r e l a t i o n s h i p between the p r i c e e f f e c t s of 
i n f l a t i o n on the exports can not be e s t a b l i s h e d , namely, 
i t may not be suggested that the i n t e r n a t i o n a l ' c o m p e t i t i v e -
ness of Turkey to a g r e a t e r extent was disturbed by i n f l a -
t i o n . I t seems t h a t r e a l f a c t o r s r a t h e r than monetary 
f a c t o r s a f f e c t e d the exports of Turkey i n the l a t e 1950's. 
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C H A P T E R 7 
THE EFFECT OF INFLATION ON IMPORTS 
Thi s chapter w i l l examine the broad e f f e c t s of 
i n f l a t i o n on ijnport demand and w i l l concentrate e s p e c i a l l y 
on the 1954-1959 period. Emphasis w i l l be put on both the 
income s u b s t i t u t i o n e f f e c t s and r i s i n g domestic p r i c e s . 
The y e a r 1950 was a t u r n i n g point f o r the Tu r k i s h 
import regime. For the f i r s t time, imports were considerably 
r e l a x e d . On October 1950, the government declared a F r e e 
Import L i s t r a i s i n g the f r e e import r a t i o by 60%. A 
f u r t h e r 15% i n c r e a s e i n the r a t i o was envisaged for 1951. 
From 1950 to 1952 the value of imports rose by 194.2% 
but f e l l i n 1953, by 4%, and kept d e c l i n i n g u n t i l 1959. 
The f i r s t balance of payments d i f f i c u l t i e s were f e l t i n 
1952. From t h i s year onwards mounting r e s t r i c t i o n s were 
imposed on imports. I n 1953 the l i b e r a l i s a t i o n p o l i c y was 
completely abandoned. The d i f f i c u l t i e s f e l t i n 1952 can 
not be a t t r i b u t e d to i n f l a t i o n as i n t h i s year p r i c e s did 
not r i s e s i g n i f i c a n t l y . The reason should be sought i n 
r e a l f a c t o r s r a t h e r than i n f l a t i o n . A s from 1950 i n v e s t -
ment expenditures rose r a p i d l y , i. I n Table 7.1 the percentage 
1. The concepts of r e a l f a c t o r and monetary f a c t o r s a r e r a t h e r 
vague i n theory. Here r e a l f a c t o r s r e f e r to the propensity 
t o imports. 
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d i s t r i b u t i o n between investment goods and consumer goods 
i s shown. I t can be seen from the t a b l e t h a t the share of 
c o n s t r u c t i o n goods and machinery and equipment increased 
w h i l e the share of raw m a t e r i a l s f e l l . Thus i t can be 
concluded t h a t new production u n i t s were being e s t a b l i s h e d . 
I n 1956-53 period the share of consumer goods i n t o t a l 
imports accounted f o r 2 5% of t o t a l imports on average. 
T h i s was a r a t h e r high percentage. The reason f o r t h i s 
can be found i n i n c r e a s e s i n r e a l income. I n 1950-53 
period r e a l income rose by 13% and showed i t s e f f e c t s on 
the balance of payments. I t should be pointed out t h a t 
w i t h t he a p p l i c a t i o n of the l i b e r a l i s a t i o n p o l i c y imports 
2 
of consumer goods were cjuite easy. 
Imports on the 1950-53 period were l a r g e l y financed 
through exchange r e s e r v e s accumulated i n the 1940s, as both 
export earnings and f o r e i g n resources were i n s u f f i c i e n t to 
meet imports. I n 1952 exchange re s e r v e s f e l l to $6 m i l l i o n 
from $126 m i l l i o n i n l l 9 5 0 . Thus the economy reached a 
"balance of payments b a r r i e r " before i n f l a t i o n took place.^ 
2. A f t e r the Second World War the p o l i c y pursued by the govern-• 
ment gave r i s e to a p o l i t i c a l and economic i n t e r e s t i n 
a d j u s t i n g Turkey's economic regime t o a 'western' s t y l e . 
T h i s may have increased the demand f o r imported consumer 
goods, through the demonstration e f f e c t . See Z.Y. HERSHLAG, 
O P . c i t . , p.182, and R. NURKSE Problems of C a p i t a l 
Formation i n Underdeveloped Countries. ( B a s i l Blackwell, 
Oxford, 1966), pp.57-81. 
3. See f o r t h i s point; I.G. PATEL, "Trade and Payments P o l i c y 
f o r a Developing Economy", i n I n t e r n a t i o n a l Trade Theory i n 
a Developing World, edited by R. HARROD and D. HAGUE. 
(Macmillan, 1963), p.310. 
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Table 7.1 Percentage D i s t r i b u t i o n of Imports Between 
Investment and Consumer Goods. 1950-1965 
I N V E S T M E N T G O O D S 
Machinery 
and Raw Consumer 
Construction Ecpiipment M a t e r i a l s Goods 
1950 
1951 
1952 
1953 
19 54 
1955 
1956 
1957 
1958 
1959 
1960 
1961 
1962 
1963 
1964 
1965 
11.8 
10.6 
12.0 
16.0 
15.6 
18.1 
13.6 
12.0 
8.6 
7.7 
7.3 
5.7 
4.8 
6.1 
4.8 
4.9 
34.2 
32.4 
38.5 
36.0 
37.4 
36.2 
44.6 
31.5 
34.7 
37.9 
44.6 
39.1 
40.2 
39.7 
40.9 
36.9 
33.4 
32.2 
27.4 
26.1 
27.4 
31.1 
30.7 
44.2 
44.5 
44.2 
38.5 
45.3 
37.8 
48.8 
49.4 
53.8 
20.6 
24.8 
22.1 
19.8 
19.6 
14.6 
11.1 
12.3 
12.2 
10.2 
9.6 
9.9 
7.2 
5.4 
4.9 
4.4 
Source The S t a t e I n s t i t u t e of S t a t i s t i c s . 
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One of the important consequences of t h i s decrease i n 
exchange r e s e r v e s was that the economy l o s t i t s manoeuvra-
b i l i t y i n i t s balance of payments, and maintenance of the 
4 xmport c a p a c i t y now depended on obtaining foreign c r e d i t s . 
As was explained before, the economy f e l l i n t o a sub-
s t a n t i a l i n f l a t i o n a r y period from 1954 onwards. I n t h i s 
chapter the e f f e c t s of i n f l a t i o n on imports w i l l be examined 
i n the 1954-59 period through the "income (expenditure) 
e f f e c t " and the " p r i c e e f f e c t " . F i r s t "income (expenditure) 
e f f e c t " w i l l be examined. 
As can be seen i n Table 7.1, the share of investment 
goods ( i n c l u d i n g raw m a t e r i a l s ) never f e l l below 75% of 
t o t a l imports. T h i s suggests dthat the e f f e c t s of i n f l a t i o n 
on t h e balance of payments should be examined i n the con-
t e x t of the saving-investment r e l a t i o n s h i p . I n t h i s context, 
a d e f i c i t i n the balance of payments i s regarded as an 
a d d i t i o n t o savings, thus td" investments, on the condition 
t h a t exchange r e s e r v e s and/or foreign resources are 
a v a i l a b l e t o f i n a n c e the d e f i c i t . ^ From the point of view 
4. There a r e three resources f o r fi n a n c i n g d e f i c i t s : export 
earnings, f o r e i g n a i d , and exchange r e s e r v e s . I n the case 
of Turkey, both export earnings and f o r e i g n a i d lagged 
behind imports. Thus d e f i c i t s were l a r g e l y financed by the 
use of exchange r e s e r v e s accumulated during the war. Foreign 
a i d has widely been i n the form of pub l i c foreign a i d . 
Obviously the c r e d i t s i n t h i s form a r e granted on some 
c r i t e r i o n s . Economic s t a b i l i t y i s one of these c r i t e r i o n s . 
When i n f l a t i o n proceeded i n Turkey, the public foreign a i d 
( i n c l u d i n g i n t e r n a t i o n a l i n s t i t u t i o n s ) decreased as the 
requested economic reforms were not enacted. 
5. R. NURKSE, "The R e l a t i o n Between Home Investment and E x t e r n a l 
Balance i n the L i g h t of B r i t i s h Experience, 1945-1955", The 
Review of Economics and S t a t i s t i c s , May 1956, p.138. 
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of macroeconomic equilibrium, a d e f i c i t implies excess 
demand, namely, money expenditures exceed t o t a l domestic 
output. Assuming t h a t f u l l employment e x i s t s , excess money 
expenditure over r e a l output r e s u l t s i n a d e f i c i t i n the 
balance of payments or aggravates the e x i s t i n g one. That 
i s why i n f l a t i o n i s important i n an a l y s i n g balance of 
payments d i f f i c u l t i e s . 
I n t h e c a s e of Turkey, evidence suggests that i n v e s t -
ment e f f e c t s aggravated the balance of payments d i f f i c u l -
t i e s i n c r e a s i n g the demand f o r imports.^ P a r t i c u l a r l y the 
p u b l i c s e c t o r investments were l a r g e l y financed through 
C e n t r a l Bank c r e d i t s . As was explained i n Chapter 4, the 
S t a t e Economic E n t e r p r i s e s were one of the main reasons 
f o r the moaefeary expansion. 
I n the 1954-59 period the d e f i c i t i n the balance of 
payment decreased. There were two reasons behind t h i s : 
f i r s t l y , f u r t h e r r e s t r i c t i o n s on imports were imposed, 
because t he borrowing c a p a c i t y of the economy was impaired. 
Both p u b l i c and p r i v a t e foreign c r e d i t s decreased i n 
1954-58. T o t a l f o r e i g n c r e d i t s were $272 m i l l i o n i n 1955, 
f e l l to $262 m i l l i o n and to $225 m i l l i o n i n 1956 and 1957 
r e s p e c t i v e l y . Thus, the balance of payments became c r i t i c a l . 
As described by one expert: 
6. Over the whole period s t u d i e d the share of investment goods 
i n t o t a l imports was never l e s s than 75%. I n order to 
obtain t he necessary exchange reserves imports of consumer 
goods were cut. 
1 2 3 
"The government l a t e r found that, when the e x t e r n a l 
supply of c a p i t a l goods on c r e d i t s a l s o diminished, 
i t could s t i l l proceed, a l b e i t temporarily, with i n f r a -
.il s t r u c t u r e development p r o j e c t s , . . . with the e x i s t i n g 
machinery. ( I t used m i l i t a r y t r u c k s and bullcJozers 
when the c i v i l i a n equipment wore o u t ) . Construction 
thus progressed: t h e r e were new roads, new dams, and 
new harbours, but no new v e h i c l e s on the roads. 
I n d u s t r i a l consumer goods, based on imported raw ^ 
i t a t e r i a l s , a l s o disappeared from the market . . . " 
A l l t h i s r e s u l t e d i n imposing f u r t h e r r e s t r i c t i o n s on 
imports. I n d u s t r i a l production i n some s e c t o r s declined 
as necessary spare p a r t s and raw m a t e r i a l s could not be 
obtained. Unused c a p a c i t y emerged, i t was 48% and 40% i n 
1957 and 1958 r e s p e c t i v e l y . 
Secondly, domestic production of some imported goods 
in c r e a s e d . P a r t i c u l a r l y t h i s was the case f o r co n s t r u c t i o n 
goods. Production of cement rose r a p i d l y , decreasing the 
share of c o n s t r u c t i o n goods i n t o t a l imports (see Table 7.1). 
However, balance of payments d i f f i c u l t i e s went on, because 
p r e v i o u s l y e s t a b l i s h e d new production u n i t s recjuired imports 
by 1957, w h i l s t i t averaged 29.0% during the previous seven 
y e a r s . Moreover, domestic production could not rep l a c e 
s p e c i a l kinds of imports, p a r t i c u i L a r l y machinery and 
equipment. 
By the second quarter of 1958, the government was 
unable to meet i t s foresee a b l e o b l i g a t i o n s f o r even a few 
weeks and thus a s t a b i l i z a t i o n programme had to be undertaken. 
7. E. STURC, " S t a b i l i z a t i o n P o l i c i e s : Experience of Some 
European Countries i n the 1950s". IMF S t a f f Papers. J u l y 
1968. 
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I n c o n s u l t a t i o n with the i n t e r n a t i o n a l Monetary Fund, the 
8 
1958 S t a b i l i z a t i o n Programme was declared i n August. 
The S t a b i l i z a t i o n Programme, although i t involved a 
major change i n the trade regime, was p r i m a r i l y d i r e c t e d 
a t stopping the causes of i n f l a t i o n . An output i n c r e a s i n g 
p o l i c y was applied, imports were relaxed as Turkey 
obtained $359m i n c r e d i t s , and thus imports rose by 49.2%. 
I n the f i e l d o f money and c r e d i t k p o l i c y , some expenditure 
reducing measures were taken: the C e n t r a l Bank c r e d i t s 
were frozen w i t h i n a c e r t a i n l i m i t . P a r t i c u l a r l y the 
C e n t r a l Bank c r e d i t s to the public s e c t o r could not 
exceed a c e r t a i n l i m i t . Commercial Bank c r e d i t s were 
frozen a t the l e v e l of J u l y 1958 plus TL 200 m i l l i o n . I n 
order t h a t the i n t e r n a l resources of the S t a t e Economic 
E n t e r p r i s e s could cover t h e i r operating d e f i c i t s , the 
p r i c e s of t h e i r products increased i n 1958. 
Despite the S t a b i l i z a t i o n Programme, the Government 
Budget f o r 1959 envisaged i n c r e a s e s i n expenditure. I n 
f a c t , the C e n t r a l Government expenditures rose by 3 5% i n 
1959 p a r t i a l l y as the r e s u l t of a s a l a r y i n c r e a s e f o r 
9 
c i v i l servants. The d e f i c i t i n the Consolidated Budget 
rose by 58.6% i n the same year, and 36.7% of t h i s d e f i c i t 
was met by C e n t r a l Bank c r e d i t s . The money supply rose 
8. S t a b i l i z a t i o n Program of T u r k i s h Government. ( I n t e r n a t i o n a l 
Monetary Fund, Washington), J u l y 1958, Part I I , p.6. 
9. Computed from H. KIZILYALLI, "TUrk Vergi S i s t e m i n i n 
Ekonomik A n a l i z i " (The Economic A n a l y s i s of the T u r k i s h 
Tax System). (The F a c u l t y of P o l i t i c a l Sciences, Ankara, 
1963) Table 9. 
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by 15%. Despite t h i s expenditure i n c r e a s i n g tendency, 
however, r i s e s i n p r i c e s slowed down from the middle of 
1959 onwards. The main reasons could be that i n c r e a s e s i n 
the p r i c e s of the S t a t e Economic E n t e r p r i s e s products 
absorbed the new excess l i q u i d i t y i n the economy and the 
import c a p a c i t y was increased. I n 1960 the C e n t r a l Govern-
ment expenditure f e l l by 9%. I n 1960 and 1961 the C e n t r a l 
Bank c r e d i t s t o the p u b l i c s e c t o r were sharply declined. 
The d e f i c i t i n the Consolidated Budget f e l l by 10%. "'"^  
Regarding the behaviour of p r i c e s , i t can be suggested 
t h a t the 1958 S t a b i l i z a t i o n Programme was s u c c e s s f u l i n 
c u r i n g both i n f l a t i o n and balance of payments d i f f i c u l t i e s . 
However, i t should be pointed out t h a t the core of the 
S t a b i l i z a t i o n Programme was an expenditure reducing p o l i c y 
through c u t s i n the money supply. I n t h i s respect, i t may 
be s a i d t h a t the p r o p o s i t i o n t h a t a t f u l l employment, 
balance of payments d i f f i c u l t i e s can e f f e c t i v e l y be cured 
by reducing expenditures has been j u s t i f i e d under the con-
d i t i o n s of T u r k i s h economy. 
I n t h i s s i t u a t i o n , the burden f e l l on investment 
expenditures r a t h e r than consumption expenditures, and 
t h i s l e d to a stagnation i n the economy. I t seems t h a t i t 
was unavoidable f i r s t l y because the d i r e c t e f f e c t s of con-
sumption expenditures on imports had already been cut through 
10. The f i g u r e s of the Consolidated Budget were obtained from 
the F i r s t F i v e Year Plan, p.18. 
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Import c o n t r o l s . I n t h i s case the p o s s i b i l i t y could be 
the m u l t i p l i e r e f f e c t : i f consumption expenditures were 
cut, t h i s would reduce income and the demand for imports. 
But t h i s was a matter of time and the economy could not 
w a i t as the d i f f i c u l t i e s hadteome to an unbearable point. 
Thus i t may be s a i d t h a t investment expenditures occupies 
a c e n t r a l place i n managing the balance of payments. 
Turning now to the p r i c e e f f e c t s of i n f l a t i o n on the 
balance of payments, i n an i n f l a t i o n a r y process, given 
f i x e d exchange r a t e s , i t can be expected t h a t r e l a t i v e 
p r i c e s of imported goods w i l l d e c l i n e and the p r a c t i c a l : 
consequence w i l l be a r i s e i n imports, leading to balance 
of payments d i f f i c u l t i e s . I n the case of Turkey, the p r i c e 
e f f e c t of i n f l a t i o n , i n other words the overvaluation of 
the T u r k i s h L i r a , did not show a d i r e c t e f f e c t on balance 
of payments through i n c r e a s i n g imports but r a t h e r an 
i n d i r e c t e f f e c t , as s t r i c t q u a n t i a t i v e c o n t r o l s were being 
imposed on imports i n the 1954-1959 period. 
Turkey s e t an exchange r a t e of $1 = TL 2.80 i n 1946, 
and t h i s r a t e was not changed u n t i l 1958. With the i n c r e a s e s 
i n p r i c e s the overvaluation of the T u r k i s h L i r a increased 
r a p i d l y . As can be seen from Table 7.2, the value of the 
d o l l a r on the b a s i s of the T u r k i s h wholesale p r i c e index 
and of the U.S.A. wholesale p r i c e index rose up to TL 16.40 
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Table 7.2 Three F a c t o r s A f f e c t i n g T u r k i s h Imports 1950-1965 
(3) (1) 
Overvaluation 
of T u r k i s h L i r a 
1950 
1951 
1952 
1953 
1954 
1955 
1956 
1957 
1958 
1959 
1960 
1961 
1962 
1963 
1964 
196 5 
2.68 
2.77 
2.88 
3.22 
3.41 
3.86 
4.39 
16.40 
19&;f60 
20.65 
21.29 
22.56 
23.46 
23,19 
24.49 
(2) 
Wholesale 
P r i c e Index 
100 
106. 5 
107.6 
109.8 
121.9 
130.7 
152. 5 
181.3 
208.7 
249.4 
262.6 
270.3 
285.7 
297.8 
295.6 
321.9 
Import 
P r i c e Index 
100 
111.4 
107.6 
96.2 
93.7 
124.3 
125.3 
122.8 
126.5 
116.4 
122.8 
259.5 
336.7 
411.4 
462.0 
488.0 
Source; Column 1 - IMF F i n a n c i a l S t a t i s t i c s 
Column 2 - The M i n i s t r y of Commerce 
Column 3 - N. SERIN, "Dis T i c a r e t S i y a s e t i n i n 
I k t i s a d i Kalkinma Uzerine E t k i s i 
(The E f f e c t s of Foreign Trade P o l i c y 
on Economic Development) (Harettepe 
U n i v e r s i t y , A p r i l 1973.) 
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by 1958. According to the o f f i c i a l sources, on the b a s i s 
of the gold p r i c e , the p r i c e of the d o l l a r was computed at 
TL 21.50 by J u l y 1958. This s i t u a t i o n made imports very, 
p r o f i t a b l e . I n the period 1954-59 the import p r i c e index 
remained below the wholesale p r i c e index. The wholesale 
p r i c e index rose by 36% on average, w h i l e the import p r i c e 
index rose by only 6%. Therefore speculation against the 
T u r k i s h L i r a i n c r e a s e d . Black market a c t i v i t i e s developed, 
adding f u r t h e r d i f f i c u l t i e s to the balance of payments 
s i t u a t i o n . 
I n the e a r l y 1950s, Turkey obtained short-term 
import c r e d i t s , the s o - c a l l e d a r r e a r s . These c r e d i t s were 
l a r g e l y used to import. I n 1955 the amount of these c r e d i t s 
r ose t o $127 m i l l i o n which was the highest f o r the whole 
period studied. However, during the i n f l a t i o n a r y period 
they f e l l and i n 1959 were only $29 m i l l i o n . I n the same 
11. The o v e r v a l u a t i o n of the T u r k i s h L i r a was computed on the 
b a s i s of the following formula: 
Y = a t . c t . Y 
^ bt+ dt+ 
where t = base y e a r : 
= C e n t r a l Bank S e l l i n g Rate f o r $ i n year t where 
balance of payments i n equilibrium. 
a^ = USA wholesale p r i c e index f o r year t . 
b^^ = USA wholesale p r i c e index i n year t+ 
c ^ = Domestic p r i c e index i n year t . 
c ^ ^ = Domestic p r i c e index i n y e a r t+ . 
^ t + ~ "The purchasing power p a r i t y " . 
The formula was obtained from A. GERAKIS, " S t a b i l i z a t i o n of 
the Greek Economy", IMF S t a f f Papers V o l . IV, 1954-1955. 
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y e a r i n P a r i s a conference was h e l d to s e t t l e these debts, 
and a t t h i s conference i t was revealed t h a t most of the 
imports on the b a s i s of the a r r e a r s were financed from 
exchange earnings l e f t o utside Turkey. On the other hand 
the I n t e r n a t i o n a l Monetary Fund estimated that exports 
and imports had been underestimated by more than $100 m i l l i o n 
per annum i n the middle 1950s. Bearing these points i n 
mind. Table 7.3 was prepared. Here imports of the eight 
major t r a d e partners of Turkey from Turkey on the b a s i s of 
t h e i r records, and Turkey's exports to these c o u n t r i e s 
on the b a s i s of T u r k i s h records a r e shown. The export 
f i g u r e s reported by Turkey f o r Germany, U.S.A and I t a l y , 
which a r e three major trade partners of Turkey, are l e s s 
than the f i g u r e s reported by these c o u n t r i e s between 
1954 and 1959. A f t e r 1960 the f i g u r e s reported by I t a l y 
and Turkey are very c l o s e i n 1962. The U.S.A.-Turkey 
f i g u r e s a r e almost equal i n 1961 and 1962. The d i f f e r e n c e 
between the Germany f i g u r e s and the T u r k i s h f i g u r e s i s 
the s m a l l e s t i n 1965. However, the d i f f e r e n c e f e l l from 
$68.6 m i l l i o n i n 1959 to $26 m i l l i o n . As f a r as Germany 
and Turkeys were concerned, i t may be suggested that, a t 
l e a s t i n c r e a s e s i n the amount of exchange earnings l e f t 
12 
i n Germany had stopped. 
12. Turkey's exports to i t s t r a d e partners i n FOB terms, while 
the t r a d e partners' imports from Turkey are i n CIF teinms. 
However, the d i f f e r e n c e between CIF and FOB p r i c e s i s not 
important. According t o the IMF, i t i s 12% f o r Turkey and 
i s a l s o r e l e v a n t to trade partners as Turkey r e g i s t e r s 
i t s imports i n C I F terms. 
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I n the l i g h t of the evidence presented i n Table 7.3 
i t may be hypothesised t h a t due to i n f l a t i o n a considerable 
amount of exchange earnings were not brought into Turkey. 
However, i t should be pointed out t h a t Table 7.3 i s a 
gene r a l approximation and s t r i c t conclusions can not be 
drawn from i t . I f exchange earnings have been l e f t out-
s i d e Turkey a t t h a t time, there could be two main reasons 
f o r t h i s . 
F i r s t l y , imports to Turkey were very p r o f i t a b l e . 
Investments were going on and the demand f o r investment 
goods was r a t h e r high, thus imports of investment goods 
were very p r o f i t a b l e . The government was aware of t h i s 
f a c t so t h a t i t imposed a new duty, the Treasury Share, 
on imports i n 19 57. The goods on which the duty was 
l e v i e d d were mostly investment goods. The r a t e of the 
Treasury Share was 40% of import values (Turkish L i r a s ) 
of t hese goods. I n t h i s respect the imposition of the 
Treasury Share can be regarded as a p a r t i a l devaluation. 
T h i s duty was not s u c c e s s f u l i n reducing imports as import 
p r i c e s remained w e l l below the market p r i c e s , inducing 
imports. 
Secondly, a devaluation may have been expected. The 
imposition of the Treasury share may have increased the 
devaluation expectations. 
The T u r k i s h L i r a was devalued on August 1958 i n 
accordance w i t h the 1958 S t a b i l i z a t i o n Programme. Three 
c a t e g o r i e s of exports were e s t a b l i s h e d . Those i n the f i r s t 
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category (opium, tobacco, copper, chromium) received 
TL 2.10 premium per d o l l a r ( i n a d d i t i o n t o TL 2.80); 
the second category of exports ( r a i s i n s , f i g s , hazelnut) 
r e c e i v e d TL 280 premium ( i n a d d i t i o n to TL 2.80). A l l 
other exports were given TL 6.20 premium. Thus, f o r 
exports, a m u l t i p l e exchange system was applied. However, 
on August 1960 the premium system was abolished, a l l 
exports were paid $ 1 = 9 TL. On the import side, a l l 
imports, except f o r a few government t r a n s a c t i o n s were 
a l s o placed i n the new r a t e . I t was declared that 
henceforth, a l l imports were to be made i n accordance with 
the Import Programme. 
The e f f e c t s of devaluation on the balance of pay-
ments can not be a s s e s s e d e a s i l y . Exports increased by 
49.2% i n l l 9 5 9 but however, f e l l s l i g h t l y i n 1960, by 2%. 
As f a r as the long term e f f e c t s of devaluation a r e con-
cerned, i n the 1961-65 period exports followed an unstable 
trend. Although they rose i n 1961 and 1962 by 9% and 22% 
r e s p e c t i v e l y , i n the two subsequent years they f e l l again. 
I n my view, the export problem of Turkey widely involves 
r e a l f a c t o r s r a t h e r than monetary ones. I t i s t r u e that 
export p r i c e s of Turkey rose i n the 1954-59 period. I n 
t h i s r e s p e c t a devaluation d e c i s i o n was necessary. However, 
devaluation i s not the only remedy f o r i n c r e a s i n g exports. 
Other measures, such as s t a n d a r d i z a t i o n , improvements i n 
entrepreneurship, should be taken, a t o p i c which i s 
o u t s i d e the scope of t h i s study. 
Regarding the e f f e c t s of devaluation on the balance 
of payments, i t may be suggested that changes i n r e l a t i v e 
p r i c e s were l e s s important than expenditure reducing 
p o l i c i e s were. However, the former may be given a 
complementary r o l e i n the adjustment process. 
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C H A P T E R 8 
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION 
I n t h i s study an attempt has been made to show some 
r e l a t i o n s h i p s between i n f l a t i o n and the balance of pay-
ments i n the 1950-65 period. I n t h i s context, i t can be 
suggested t h a t i n f l a t i o n aggravated balance of payments 
d i f f i c u l t i e s r a t h e r than caused them as balance of 
payments d i f f i c u l t i e s were f e l t before the emergence of 
i n f l a t i o n . 
The evidence suggests t h a t the e f f e c t s of i n f l a t i o n 
on exports through the "income" and the " p r i c e e f f e c t " 
were not important: domestic consumption of the major 
export goods was not observed i n the i n f l a t i o n a r y period. 
On the other hand, i t was a f a c t t h a t the export p r i c e s of 
the major export goods rose compared to the coun t r i e s 
competing w i t h Turkey. Yet, there was not any strong 
i n v e r s e r e l a t i o n s h i p between the high export p r i c e s and 
the volume export'ed. Thus i t seems that the " i n t e r n a t i o n a l 
competitiveness" of Turkey was widely determined by 
f a c t o r s other than p r i c e c o n s i d e r a t i o n s . I n the 1954-59 
i n f l a t i o n a r y process the share of b i l a t e r a l trade aggre-
ments - i n c r e a s e d , reducing the working of the p r i c e system 
i n t r a d e and from 1952 onwards the demand f o r exports 
decreased due t o r e a l f a c t o r s such as changes i n t a s t e s , 
as i n the c a s e of tobacco. 
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The e f f e c t s of i n f l a t i o n on imports may be more c l e a r 
than those on exports. The s t r u c t u r e of imports i n d i c a t e s 
t h a t investment expenditures were l a r g e l y financed through 
monetary expansion, a strong r e l a t i o n s h i p between i n f l a -
t i o n and the balance of payments can be e s t a b l i s h e d . 
As investment expenditures increased, the demand f o r 
imports rose, leading to f u r t h e r d e f i c i t s i n the balance 
of payments. I n f l a t i o n , through expenditures, impaired 
the import c a p a c i t y of the economy. I t should be pointed 
out t h a t Turkey to a l a r g e extent ran out of exchange 
r e s e r v e s i n the e a r l y 1950s, before i n f l a t i o n . I n t h i s 
case, i n f l a t i o n a f f e c t e d the borrowing c a p a c i t y of the 
economy, both p r i v a t e f o r e i g n and public foreign c r e d i t , 
decreased, as i n t e r n a l economic s t a b i l i t y was requested 
by donor c o u n t r i e s . On the other hand, a t the present 
exchange r a t e , imports became more.K p r o f i t a b l e . However, 
the " p r i c e e f f e c t " did not a f f e c t the balance of payments 
d i r e c t l y , but i n d i r e c t l y , as exchange earnings were l e f t 
o u t s i d e the economy w i t h the hope of b e n e f i t t i n g from a 
devaluation. Compared to exports, the p r i c e and the 
income (expenditure) e f f e c t of i n f l a t i o n on imports seemed 
more e f f e c t i v e . 
I n order to stop i n f l a t i o n and balance of payments 
d i f f i c u l t i e s , a s t a b i l i z a t i o n programme was declared i n 
1958. The main core of the programme was an expenditure 
reducing p o l i c y through c u t s i n monetary expansion. The 
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n a t i o n a l currency was devalued, namely, an expenditure 
switching p o l i c y was a p p l i e d . I t may be suggested that the 
a p p l i c a t i o n of expenditure switching and expenditure . 
reducing p o l i c i e s were c o n s i s t e n t w i t h each other. 
However, i t should be pointed out t h a t the expenditure 
reducing p o l i c y was the main p o l i c y v a r i a b l e . 
A f t e r the a p p l i c a t i o n of the 1958 S t a b i l i z a t i o n 
Programme, the economy underwent a stagnation. I n t h i s 
r e s p e c t i t can be suggested that both i n t e r n a l and 
e x t e r n a l s t a b i l i t y was achieved at the expense of economic 
development. 
I t seems c l e a r t h a t the easy c r e d i t p o l i c i e s pursued 
by the government a f t e r 1954 contributed s i g n i f i c a n t l y 
to the i n f l a t i o n a r y process. The rapid i n c r e a s e i n p u b l i c 
s e c t o r a c t i v i t y , leading to an i n c r e a s e i n the demand for 
imported machinery and raw m a t e r i a l s put considerable 
p r e s s u r e on the balance of payments. As the majority of 
T u r k i s h exports are a g r i c u l t u r a l i n o r i g i n , there 
was l i t t l e immediate response on the export s i d e to 
the r a p i d i n c r e a s e i n imports. Hence the balance of 
payments c o n s t r a i n t a p p l i e d very q u i c k l y . This c o n s t r a i n t 
worked back i n t o the domestic economy through the 1958 
S t a b i l i z a t i o n Programme, to b r i n g about p r i c e s t a b i l i t y ; 
but stagnation. 
Thus domestic i n f l a t i o n did a f f e c t the balance of 
payments s i t u a t i o n i n Turkey, l a r g e l y through imports and 
u l t i m a t e l y measures to a l l e v i a t e balance of payments 
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d i f f i c u l t i e s a l s o had the e f f e c t of reducing the r a t e of 
change of p r i c e s i n the e a r l y 1960s. 
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